Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS3333
2004-08-05 14:01:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EU/CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: READOUT OF UK POLDIR SAWERS

Tags:  PREL MARR PARM PHUM CH TW JA UK EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003333 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM PHUM CH TW JA UK EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: READOUT OF UK POLDIR SAWERS
MEETING WITH JAPANESE DFM TANAKA

REF: A. USEU TODAY 08/05/04


B. LONDON 5381

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003333

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM PHUM CH TW JA UK EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: READOUT OF UK POLDIR SAWERS
MEETING WITH JAPANESE DFM TANAKA

REF: A. USEU TODAY 08/05/04


B. LONDON 5381

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Japanese Mission offered us a readout of
the July 29 meeting in Tokyo between DFM Tanaka and UK PolDir
Sawers to discuss the China arms embargo. Sawers told Tanaka
that the UK wanted to de-link any decision to lift the arms
embargo from the EU-China summit in December because of
concerns over the potential for a rise in cross-straits
tension during the run-up to Taiwan's parliamentary
elections. Asked whether that meant the decision would be
taken before or after the summit, Sawers responded that the
UK could go either way. Japanese said the EU Code of Conduct
on arms exports, even if strengthened, would be an
unacceptable substitute for the arms embargo. Sawers
described US concerns as "exaggerated," and suggested that
even the US would come around in the end. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) Poloff met August 5 with a counterpart from the
Japanese Mission to the EU to get a readout of the July 29
Tanaka-Sawers meeting in Tokyo. Reading from Tokyo's
reporting cable, the interlocutor explained that Sawers laid
out three UK concerns about lifting the embargo: First, that
lifting the embargo should not result in an increase in the
"value" of sales currently going to China; second, that
lifting the embargo should not damage human rights in China;
and third, that it should in no way threaten Taiwanese
security.

Sawers: Code of Conduct Would Be Effective Substitute
-------------- --------------


3. (S/NF) Sawers argued that a strengthened Code of Conduct
(CoC) on arms sales could be more effective than the current
embargo because it would be more transparent and, like the
current CoC, cover dual-use items. He acknowledged, however,

that the effort to strengthen the CoC is now stalled over
French objections. Other EU Member States generally agree
that strengthening the system of pre-notification (of export
license denials) would be the best way to increase the CoC's
transparency and thus its effectiveness. Tanaka responded
that for Japan, the effort to strengthen the CoC, while
positive in its own right, was immaterial to the debate over
lifting the arms embargo on China. A strengthened CoC would
still not be legally binding or grant veto authority to
individual Member States, and would thus be an unacceptable
sustitute for Japan.

De-Linking Decision from Summit: Good or Bad?
--------------


4. (S/NF) Sawers also noted UK concern that cross-straits
tension might rise during the run-up to Taiwan's
parliamentary elections in December. The Tokyo reporting
cable cites Sawers as saying that the UK was therefore
"anxious to de-link the EU-China summit (also scheduled for
December) from the arms embargo." Asked if that meant the EU
might lift the embargo well before the summit, Sawers said
that a decision to lift the embargo could come either before
or after the summit, depending on progress in the coming
weeks. The UK just hoped to avoid any potentially
inflammatory direct linkage between the embargo and the
summit. Sawers noted that the decision to lift the embargo
had already been postponed twice, so a third delay might be
possible. (NOTE: The Tokyo reporting cable commented that
Sawers seemed to prefer a post-summit date for lifting the
embargo. END NOTE.)


5. (S/NF) Tanaka asked Sawers whether the EU was really
interested in lifting the embargo as a symbolic gesture or as
a means to selling more arms to China. Sawers said the UK
had asked France and China the same questions, and both had
responded that the motive was symbolic. (NOTE: Human Rights
Watch received a different response from French PSC
Ambassador Silvie Agnes-Berhman, who told HRW's Brussels
Director in July that she could not discern whether Chirac's
motives were symbolic or commercial, despite her best efforts
to pulse Paris for information. END NOTE.) Tanaka responded
that even if the EU saw lifting the embargo as strictly
symbolic, it could still lead to increased arms and
military-related sales to China. He said Tokyo was
particularly concerned about European dual-use transfers and
the risk of onward proliferation if the embargo is lifted.
Sawers suggested Tokyo should also argue its case in Paris,
Berlin, The Hague and Rome. He reported that of those EU
Member States with outstanding human rights concerns, the UK,
Denmark and Sweden were the loudest.


6. (S/NF) On US opposition to lifting the ban, Sawers
reportedly told Tanaka that "US claims are exaggerated," and
"even the US understands it can't change things." He
suggested that in time, third parties opposed to lifting the
embargo would recognize that their fears are unwarranted and
would become more willing to engage in dialogue about
post-embargo controls.

Sammis