ENCOURAGING SIGNALS FROM COMMISSION AND DUTCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003226

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014
TAGS: PREL TU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING SIGNALS FROM COMMISSION AND DUTCH
PRESIDENCY ON TURKEY

REF: A. NICOSIA 1288


B. PARIS 5495

C. USEU BRUSSELS 3225

D. ANKARA 4133

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reason 1.4 (B/D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In meetings on July 26-27 in Brussels with Dutch
Presidency, Commission and Council officials, EUR DAS Laura
Kennedy heard guardedly optimistic assessments from all that
the EU, at its summit this December, would reach a positive
decision on opening EU accession negotiations with Turkey
next year. All officials, including acting Director General
for Enlargement Barbaso, excluded the possibility that the
Commission's October report to the EU leaders would recommend
against opening negotiations with Turkey. But they also
indicated that an unequivocal "Yes" was also unlikely. Much
discussion from now to October between Commission staff,
Commissioners, and the Dutch Presidency will be on how much
contextual language the Commission should include about areas
where Turkey should continue to progress. All interlocutors
added that while Turkey should be encouraged about a likely
good result, Ankara must not be complacent or presumptuous
about its status. Nonetheless, the Dutch Presidency said its
preference for the December decision would be a clear
decision that sets a date, with no need for any further
decisions by the EU prior to the commencement of
negotiations. If they are able to secure this outcome, any
language on "conditionality" would be unimportant, and should
not spark a negative reaction from the Turks. Every EU
official cited the recent visit of PM Erdogan to Paris, and
French President Chirac's positive comments about Turkey's
candidacy, as making a "yes" in December much more likely.
At the same time, they were generally dismissive of the
chance that the government of Cyprus would veto the decision;
"they wouldn't dare," said one official. (COMMENT: Given
Nicosia's recent behavior in the Council - see REF C - we
fear the EU may be underestimating this risk.) END SUMMARY.


2. (U) This is a joint USEU/Embassy The Hague report. DAS
Kennedy's discussions on Cyprus are covered Ref C.


3. (U) On July 26 and 27, DAS Kennedy met with a team of
Dutch Presidency officials (Pieter de Gooijer, MFA Director
for European Integration; Hannie Pollmann-Zaal, Director for
Western and Central Europe; and Jurriaan Kraak, Enlargement
Counselor of the Dutch PermRep in Brussels) as well as, in
separate sessions, with Fabrizio Barbaso, the Commission's
acting Director General for Enlargement; Matthias Ruete, DG
Enlargement's Director for Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria; and
Christoph Heusgen, Director of the Council's Policy Planning
Unit. She also met with Turkish Ambassador to the EU Mustafa
Oguz Demiralp.

COMMISSION REPORT DUE ON OCTOBER 6
--------------


4. (C) Barbaso and Ruete said that the European Commission
(EC) report on Turkey, scheduled for approval by the college
of all 30 Commissioners on October 6, would have three parts.
The first part, which Barbaso said the EC had already begun
drafting, would be an assessment of Turkey's progress in
meeting the EU's Copenhagen Criteria (political, economic and
administrative) for EU membership. Most important will be on
the political criteria, including democratic practice, rule
of law and human rights, which must be adequately fulfilled
before accession negotiations could begin. The focus will be
on Turkish progress since the EU Summit of December 2002,
when the EU set this December as a deadline for a decision on
Turkey's candidacy.


5. (C) Barbaso said that in regulatory and legislative terms
Turkey has achieved an enormous amount in the last two years.
A couple of necessary pieces of legislation are outstanding
such as the revised penal code and the foundations law, but
the EC was confident that Ankara would deliver on its
promises to get these passed. More difficult for the EC to
assess is the implementation of these reforms. Barbaso
observed that the Member States in the EU Council clearly
knew in December 2002 that two years was not enough time to
allow for absolute implementation everywhere on everything.
But Ruete commented that implementation was the "real worry."
The key issue will be if progress appears "sustained enough"
to be confident that full implementation will eventually be
achieved.

WHAT TURKEY NEEDS TO DO
--------------


6. (C) Ruete listed several key areas being watched and where
Turkey should continue progress. First was the continued
harassment "by the deep state" of defenders of human rights,
including prosecutors bringing cases against activists.
Another was the delay in returning internally displaced
persons and refugees to their homes, especially in the
southeast. On this, he said, Turkey could improve
cooperation with the UN. Ruete also highlighted the issue of
religious freedom and the foundations law, where the
Christian groups had been particularly vocal. He described
this as an "exaggerated" issue that was being treated
disproportionately, noting that the draft report has more
pages on this issue effecting some 60,000 people than it does
on the Kurdish issue. But nevertheless, religious freedom
was a politically powerful issue for EU politicians and
publics. Minority rights, especially Kurdish language and
education rights, were another big issue for implementation.
The changes to date are "great successes", but progress is
still "in its infancy", he said. Ruete added we should not
forget steps such as revision of the Penal Code, appointment
of a civilian as head of the national security council, and
resolution of the Leyla Zana case -- even if, for now, this
appear well in hand.


7. (C) Ruete and Barbaso noted that the EC was collecting
information on these issues constantly, drawing on reports
from Commission and Member State officials on the ground,
reports and meetings with NGOs, and other sources. Ruete
said it was ironic that one of the most critical and negative
assessments of Turkey in the last 12 months was the State
Department's annual human rights report, which he said read
as a simple litany of anecdotes, without any real analysis.
He understood DAS Kennedy's point that certain rigidities in
the required reporting format could make the report appear
more critical than it was, but said it was an "unhelpful
distraction." He was relieved to hear that the next report
was not due until well after the EU's December decision.


8. (C) Both Barbaso and Ruete commented on the issue of
Turkey's relations with Cyprus. Overall, the lack of a
settlement on the island should have no connection to the
assessment of Turkey's readiness for accession negotiations,
and in any case, no one in the EU was blaming the Turks for
the collapse of the process. One potential problem, however,
is Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and
particularly the complications that has created in expanding
Turkey's customs union (the Ankara Agreement) to cover the
enlarged EU (REF A). Ruete said Ankara just needs to accept
it has to be willing to negotiate "with all 25." DAS Kennedy
said her impression after meetings in Ankara was that the GoT
understood the issue and was committed to reaching some
accommodation on the issue (see Ref D for GOT comments on
this and ohter aspects of Turkey's EU bid). All EU officials
(Commission, Council and Dutch) also commented that a
unilateral and symbolic gesture by Turkey on troop
withdrawals from the island would also be very well-received.
But they all nodded their heads vigorously in response to
DAS Kennedy's observation that Turkey would find this nearly
impossible to do as long as the EU's own measures to end the
isolation of the north of the island are stalled (Ref C).

ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE EU
--------------


9. (C) The second part of the EC's October report will be an
Impact Assessment of Turkish accession on the EU. Ruete said
that a similar report had been done by the EC in 1997 on the
accession of the central and east European members. So there
is nothing new in this process, he said, and the Commission
needed to describe to Member States what the sectoral impacts
of adding the Turkish state and economy to the EU could be in
areas such as labor markets, justice and home affairs,
agriculture, as well as on the EU budget.

WHAT WILL THE COMMISSION RECOMMEND?
--------------


10. (C) The most important, and most closely negotiated, part
of the October report will be the Commission's recommendation
on whether the Council should decide to open negotiations
with Turkey. Ruete said he had not even begun to try
drafting this (likely brief) section, until he had a chance
to discuss with his "political masters," especially
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen. Ruete anticipated these
discussions would only begin at the end of August. As he is
certain these discussions would leak, he did not want them to
begin any earlier than necessary.


11. (C) None of our interlocutors, including Barbaso and
Ruete, expect the Commission's recommendation would be a flat
"No" or "we'll look again next year." Either, the Council's
Heusgen said, would be a "disaster." At the same time, none
thought it very likely that the recommendation could be a
simple "Yes." Ruete and Barbaso stressed that the key would
be what language came with the "yes." Would it be "Yes, but
only after Turkey has done X, Y and Z;" or would it be "Yes,
assuming Turkey continues to make progress on issues
including X, Y, and Z." Ruete observed that there were an
infinite variety of formulas that could be devised. (NOTE:
In a separate meeting, Turkish Amb. Demiralp argued that the
"yes, assuming..." version would be most consistent with the
Commission's most recent precedent on Croatia, where the
Commission listed six areas within the political criteria
requiring "additional efforts", but still recommended that
negotiations "should be opened." END NOTE.)

12. (C) Ruete flagged that devising language that would be
approved by the full Commission was no simple task, and all
30 Commissioners will have a vote at the October meeting. He
noted that on previous occasions some Commissioners have
tried to influence the wording of the Commission's
recommendations for other candidates, and this would likely
be true again. Ruete said Verheugen would begin the process
by testing his preferred version with key Commissioners,
including President Prodi and President-designate Barroso.
To avoid a potentially long and ugly debate, Ruete said the
final draft of the report and recommendation would only be
presented to the full Commission a couple of days before the
October 6 vote. (NOTE: De Gooijer said the Dutch Presidency
was already in close contact with the Commission, to try and
make sure there were "no vetoes, no surprises." END NOTE.)


13. (C) Both de Gooijer and Heusgen believed, and Ruete
implied, that Verheugen leans strongly in favor of "Yes,
assuming...". But Ruete was concerned that a clear positive
recommendation could be torpedoed in the full Commission,
especially if some negative external event such as a terror
attack or heavy-handed police action soured the mood -- and
he warned that some anti-EU forces in Turkey might try to
stage such an event.

MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOW WILL THE COUNCIL RESPOND?
-------------- --


14. (C) Heusgen said he thought Turkey "is a done deal" with
the only question being what date would be set for opening
negotiations, since the Council might decide to follow the
Croatia example and build in a several month period for
"screening legislation." De Gooijer, by contrast, opened his
discussion by saying "it is not as if it is a done deal." He
said the Presidency would give no indications of how the
Council will handle the issue until after the October report
is out, other than to say that no additional criteria could
be added to the basic Copenhagen criteria. De Gooijer felt
all Member States expected the Commission to be positive, but
not definitive, with language referring to the need for
further implementation. De Gooijer speculated this could
allow for a Council decision at the EU Summit on December 17
that would set out a time frame during which these additional
efforts could continue in preparation for beginning
negotiations. But de Gooijer was quite clear that the Dutch
did not want to establish a process that would require any
further action by the Council before negotiations began, but
rather a decision that the negotiations should start after an
appropriate time. De Gooijer added that he was sure there
would "be lots of words around this simple conclusion" but
that the Dutch Presidency "firmly intended" to get a real
decision on Turkey. (NOTE: Amb. Demiralp, for his part,
argued negotiations should open by March 2005 if they were to
be "without delay" as promised in Copenhagen. END NOTE.)


15. (C) This approach would be controversial with some Member
States, de Gooijer predicted. But it was the Presidency's
responsibility to devise a formula that could bridge the
gaps. He said a key element of this would be for the
December summit decision to also include some language to
"set the context for the negotiations." "Turkey is not
Latvia," he said, and Turkey's eventual membership would
compel revision of many core EU policies and programs, such
as agricultural supports. This will be clearer after the
Commission's impact assessment, but de Gooijer said it could
be important for the Dutch to lay out some ideas on these
issues in order to get all Member States on board with a
decision to open negotiations. What it could not involve,
however, was some sort of special or unique status for Turkey
within the EU. The final outcome would have to be Turkey as
a "Member State like all the others."


16. (C) Asked about which Member States might balk on a
positive decision on Turkey, all of the EU officials noted
that President Chirac's positive comment (REF B) after PM
Erdogan's recent visit to Paris was a very positive and
important development. Ruete said Austria was still very
skeptical and faced domestic problems on the issue, and added
that Denmark still appeared "uncertain." He also worried
about the possibility of "sleeper" opposition among some of
the new Member States such as Hungary.


17. (C) And then there is Cyprus. Barbaso and Ruete could
not predict how Papadopoulos might behave. Heusgen argued
Nicosia "wouldn't dare" block consensus on such an important
issue, and would buckle under pressure from Blair, Chirac and
Schroeder. Similarly, de Gooijer said that, while the GoC
has vital interests with Turkey, so does the EU. Nicosia
could not be allowed to dictate EU policy toward Turkey on
its own. Hannie Pollmann noted that GoC officials have told
her they would see more opportunities for leverage during
negotiations than by blocking the opening of negotiations.
De Gooijer also underlined the role of Greece, who the Dutch
believe will continue to strongly favor opening negotiations
as a way of improving vital bilateral relations with Turkey.
He said the Dutch were very sensitive that they needed to
"make it possible for Athens to play a constructive role in
December," implying this could lead to a softer approach in
the ongoing debates (REF C) about taking measures to help the
Turkish Cypriots.

HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
--------------


18. (C) All of the EU officials stressed that U.S. advocacy
should be behind the scenes and not in public, to avoid any
risk of backlash. De Gooijer, Barbaso and Ruete all
commented that the U.S. could help reinforce the message to
Ankara not to be complacent, and to continue with the reform
process. They all specifically mentioned encouraging Turkey
to help find a solution to the Customs Union issue over
Cyprus. Ruete added that it could also be helpful for the
U.S. to bolster some of the Member States, particularly the
new Members from central and eastern Europe, on the value of
a positive decision on Turkey, a view UK officials also
expressed to Kennedy in London (septel).

SAMMIS