DARFUR: EU STRESSES STRONG GOS ACTION AGAINST JINGAWEIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003140

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR EAID SU ET EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DARFUR: EU STRESSES STRONG GOS ACTION AGAINST
JINGAWEIT

REF: A. A) STATE 159301


B. B) SMALL-SCOTT E-MAIL OF 7/23/04

C. C) ADDIS ABABA 2300 AND PREVIOUS

D. D) BRUSSELS 3116

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR KYLE SCOTT. REASON: 1.4(B)
(D)


1. (C) Summary and Action Request. Hirep Solana's point man
on Sudan, Christian Manahl, stressed the importance of
improving the security situation in Darfur to allow
humanitarian assistance. He ridiculed some of the GOS
actions to date, and urged the arrest of Jingaweit leaders
and suspension of GOS officials who have cooperated with
them. EU continues to believe AU has all the funds it needs
in short run until EU funds arrive, but said the AU staff
backstopping the effort was hopelessly understaffed and
creating a bottleneck for timely transfer of funds to the
region. EU not certain of need for air surveillance in the
region, and asks US views. End Summary and Action Request.

Need to Get Jingaweit Leaders "Out of Action"
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2. (C) Mission spoke July 23 with Christian Manahl, the
official in Hirep Solana's Policy Unit tasked with Sudan, to
relay ref A points and to compare notes on GOS compliance
with its commitments (ref B). Ref B points were also passed
directly to CFSP Director General Robert Cooper. Manahl told
us he is convinced the GOS can and should do more. The
critical issue, in his view, is disarming the Jingaweit
militia. So far, GOS steps have been insufficient. He said
the arrests made were actually a ruse: the GOS has taken
criminals already in GOS custody and declared them Jingaweit.
Similarly, Manahl said the GOS was taking equally
distasteful militia groups from Southern Sudan and placing
them in Darfur as "policemen" -- a dangerous step more likely
to exacerbate tensions than solve them.


3. (C) The real test of GOS sincerity, Manahl argued, is
whether they are prepared to arrest key Jingaweit leaders.
These people need to be taken out of circulation immediately.
He said the list of top leaders the US has provided is
basically right -- although the EU might consider one or two
names questionable, and also believes other names should be
added. Nonetheless, they should be arrested without delay.
A second key step should be the suspension of GOS officials
who have cooperated with the militia leaders. While
acknowledging that the evidence may not exist to allow these
officials to be tried for their activities at this time,
suspension pending further investigation is the least the GOS
could do. By getting militia leaders and their GOS
supporters out of action, it should help eliminate the
attacks, Manahl said.

The Situation on the Ground
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4. (C) The EU believes the problems of humanitarian access
have been eased, but Manahl argued that sustained pressure is
still required. Relaxed GOS regulations have made access
somewhat easier, but if the security situation does not
improve it will not matter what procedures are in place
regarding access.


5. (C) EU understanding is that six monitoring teams should
be fully deployed by Sunday (with the possible exception of
the team). Manahl supported the view we heard yesterday from
Commission officials (ref D): the EU does not believe that
cash-flow problems are a constraint on the AU in fielding
teams. They have been assured that there is enough cash in
the bank to keep the AU missions functioning for a few more
weeks, allowing the time needed before the EC monies arrive.
The real problem, according to Manahl, is in the AU
secretariat, where crucial administrative backstopping is

SIPDIS
slow, causing the AU to have difficulties getting resources
from Addis out to El Fasher. He cited in particular the
staffing gaps in Amb. Ki Doulaye's operation, and called Ki
Doulaye "a racist" for refusing to allow non-African
additions to his staff to help facilitate operations. In
this regard, he noted that the EU would soon be sending a
military operations liaison officer similar to the two US
officials being attached to the AU effort.
Air Surveillance: Is It Needed? - Action Request
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6. (C) Action Request: Manahl said missions in Khartoum were
sending conflicting reports on the utility of air
surveillance in Darfur. If air attacks had ceased, the need
for air surveillance would appear to have been overcome.
Manahl asked for US views in this regard.
SCOTT