US-EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LOOK AT UPCOMING ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 003059

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2009
TAGS: PREL EAID MOPS ETRD MASS EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: US-EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LOOK AT UPCOMING ISSUES
FOR DUTCH PRESIDENCY


Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. US-EU Political Director consultations in
Brussels on July 13 discussed a broad agenda including summit
follow-up, and compared notes on Russia, Ukraine, Moldova
and Central Asia. EUR A/S Jones told the EU now is not the
time to lift its arms embargo on China, and urged the EU, in
its July 16 meeting with Russia, to raise the need for Russia
and Georgia to "engage politically and disengage militarily."
The EU, led by Dutch MFA Political Director Hugo Siblesz,
briefed on Iraqi FM Zebari's very positive July 12 visit and
discussed the need
for the EU to raise its "visibility" in Iraq. The EU is
frustrated by Israel's refusal to work with the Quartet, and
looks to the US to reiterate with Israel the Quartet's
importance. The EU is reluctant to promote reform in the
Middle
East through joint action with the US. On security issues,
the EU wants a dialogue with NATO on more than just Berlin
Plus issues; Turkey objects. The EU also wants to clarify
control of strategic reserve for its upcoming Bosnia takeover
of SFOR. The EU may send a high level delegation to Sudan; it
also asked for US views on out of country voting by Afghans
in Iran and Pakistan. End Summary.


Next six months: Elections, EU constitution
--------------

2. (C) A/S Jones opened the meeting by noting that there was
much work for the US and EU to do following June's productive
US-EU summit. The next six months would also be a period of
change, with elections in Europe, the US, in many of Europe's
neighbors, and beyond. She congratulated the EU for the
"huge
accomplishment" in drafting a constitution, and asked the EU
to help the US understand the process as the constitution is
implemented. Dutch European Correspondent Joep Wijnands
noted the constitution will be signed October 29 in Rome;
entry into force is expected in 2006 or later. The EU wanted
to move
ahead with planning for an EU Foreign Minister and a
supporting diplomatic corps, but did not want to pre-judge
the ratification process. He also noted that a new
Commission at 25 would take over in November.

Russia: Difficult Issues Remain
--------------

3. (C) Dutch PolDir Hugo Siblesz noted that gaining Russian
acceptance of EU enlargement, and the extension of the
EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),had
been difficult. Siblesz expected all the issues raised by
Moscow -- e.g. Kaliningrad and the ethnic Russian minorities
in EU accession
countries -- to be dredged up again by the Russians. On July
16, the EU will hold it PolDirs meeting with Russia in
Moscow, and Siblesz will raise Chechnya, media freedom, and
Yukos, and the "near abroad." On Chechnya, the EU noted the
need to keep pressure on Moscow over human rights abuses and
the need for
access by humanitarian organizations. On the near abroad,
Siblesz said the EU sees a common obligation with Russia to
promote stability through democracy and free markets; Russia
does not share this view. Commission Deputy DG Valenzuela
said that although Russia considered the EU's European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to be beneath it, and therefore is
not interested in an ENP Action Plan, many of the ENP
elements are in fact applicable, and the EU will use
"roadmaps" for each of the four agreed "common spaces" to
force Russia to work on specific issues.

EU: Yukos Case is Troubling
--------------

4. (C) Valenzuela and Siblesz cited the Yukos case several
times as particularly damaging for potential investors. A/S
Jones shared U.S. concerns that while Putin wants strategic
engagement, all the "value issues" were going the wrong way
inside Russia. She cited FM Lavrov's recent false claims
that
Secretary Powell did not raise Yukos in their most recent

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meeting, at which point Council Foreign Policy Director
Robert Cooper quipped, "I guess we better make sure to raise
Yukos on Friday."

Ukraine and ENP
--------------

5. (C) Siblesz briefed on the July 8 EU-Ukraine summit,
which he noted the press had termed a "disaster" because of
the failure to agree on a joint "Action Plan" under ENP. In
fact, he said, the discussions were very frank, and Kuchma
engaged on EU concerns about democracy, media freedom and
rule of
law. Valenzuela said Ukraine was unwilling to negotiate an
Action Plan, hoping the summit might result in some
indication from the EU on eventual membership for Ukraine.
In the end, he said, the EU expects Ukraine to negotiate an
Action Plan --"it's not Russia, after all" -- although the
political reform elements of the plan won't be popular with
Kiev.

Georgia and Moldova/Transnistria
--------------

6. (C) A/S Jones noted concern about rising
Georgian-Russian tensions over South Ossetia, and proposed as
a practical step that both the EU and US push Georgia and
Russia to "calm down, engage politically and disengage
militarily." The US was sending it's Special Negotiator to
Tbilisi to press
Georgia and Russia to address contentious issues on South
Ossetia; the EU might want to consider doing the same. On
Transnistria, A/S Jones expressed US disappointment with
Moscow's complete failure on its Istanbul commitments to
withdraw arms. She said the US was thinking of adding names
to the list of Transnistrian officials banned from travel to
the US and EU countries, and would be providing the EU soon a
proposed list. Both sides expressed concern about the
possibility that Russia would spring a "Kozak II" unilateral
settlement proposal in the fall -- or even sooner.

OSCE: Moving East and CIS Ideas
--------------

7. (C) The EU asked about US views on the recent CIS summit
proposal to strengthen the OSCE secretariat. A/S Jones said
the concern was that Russia's goal was not a stronger OSCE,
but one that Russia could better control by seeking a key
role in an expanded secretariat. Cooper said the EU was
puzzled;
the OSCE's economic dimension was moving toward the EU (with
nearly half the members now in the EU too) while the security
component was moving closer to NATO. Both sides agreed that
moving some OSCE events further east made sense;
Valenzuela noted that Slovenia has proposed taking such a
decision in principle, but leaving implementation to the
future. A/S Jones said that might make sense; it was
unrealistic to think Georgia or Tajikistan could host a huge
OSCE event next year. Siblesz said it made sense for the
OSCE to look at new
threats such as trafficking in persons and narcotics, but it
is important the OSCE not move away from its core
achievements in human rights, political freedoms and election
monitoring. Cooper said the EU was working on a paper to
define what the OSCE could best do now to promote stability,
security and
reform.

Central Asia
--------------

8. (C) A/S Jones described US relations as being good
bilaterally. U.S. military use of bases in the region for
resupply of the Afghan effort is important, but the U.S.
keeps "all issues" on the table. She commended US-EU
cooperation, especially in the area of border security,
reviewed Tajikistan's
desire for Russian border guards to depart, and called on the
EU to help train Tajik border forces. She outlined US
training and election assistance in the region, noted Deputy
Secretary Armitage's trip to the region, and said the U.S.

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was facing a difficult decision on whether or not to continue
security
assistance to Uzbekistan, which had not come through on any
its promised political reforms. Siblesz briefed on EU
ministerial meetings earlier in the day with Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, where the sides had discussed elections, media
freedom, and rule of law. The EU saw progress in Kazakhstan
(A/S Jones agreed, but noted one outstanding issue -- the
imprisonment of former official Zhakianov for political
reasons) and Valenzuela said they planned to sign a
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Tajikistan
in the fall. At Kazakhstan's request, EU High Rep Solana mayattend the
September regional security CICA ministerial in
Almaty as an observer. EU assistance to the
region has increased to 120 million euros, but this probably
is a cap, Valenzuela said, indicating that additional funds
for border guards was problematical. A/S Jones offered to
provide US assistance figures, and noted the benefit of the
image of the US and EU pushing the same agenda in the region.

Sudan
--------------

9. (C) Siblesz said the EU saw eye to eye with the US on
Sudan and the EU's July 12 ministerial conclusions tracked
closely with the US position. The EU is not present in
Khartoum, but provides about half the aid. The EU agreed the
draft UNSCR was useful to keep pressure on Sudan, but noted
importance of
keeping policy consistent with North-South talks. Siblesz
said this was like "squeezing both an egg and a tennis ball
in the same hand." Cooper said the last sentence of the EU's
ministerial conclusions is key -- "if no progress is made,
the EU will consider other measures." A/S Jones said the US
is working closely with UNSYG Annan; security issues are key
and EU should also coordinate closely with UN. Siblesz said
visibility is key and the EU may send a high level envoy to
Darfur; German FM Fischer was just there but was told by the
Sudanese government there is no problem, which is nonsense.

Iraq: Good Zebari Visit
--------------

10. (C) Siblesz said Iraq FM Zebari's lunch the day before
with EU FM's went well; Zebari focused on what the EU could
do to help with the political process, reconstruction, with
the UN, and on training for police and judicial officials.
Cooper said Zebari was "extremely credible," and left a good
impression as willing to assert independence from the U.S.,
recognizing the
challenges ahead, and determined to meet them. He called for
a "visible" EU presence on the ground, and for direct EU aid,
not through the UN. Zebari also spoke cynically about
relations with neighboring countries, recalling that when he
was in the opposition, the only way to smuggle arms into Iraq
was with the
help of neighboring regimes, implying the same was true in
today's Iraq. Siblesz noted that Solana may attend a July
meeting in Cairo to talk with Iraq's neighbors. The EU side
had made a major issue about the death penalty; Zebari
explained it was needed as a deterrent, and may not need to
be applied.

Iraq Next Steps: EU "visibility"
--------------

11. (C) Siblesz said the EU agreed with Zebari to continue
the political dialogue, perhaps with a high level visit to
Baghdad. The Commission has opened an office in Amman and
will travel to Baghdad but there is no timeline for opening a
Baghdad office -- that depends on the security situation.
Cooper said the EU held an initial technical meeting July 12
to canvas member states
on their bilateral programs in Iraq; the EU is looking at
whether turning them into EU-wide programs would add value.
Once the EU has come to some conclusions, Brussels will
consult with the US. The key point, Cooper summarized, is
that the EU is "moving forward" on Iraq.

Middle East: Summit Followup
--------------

12. (C) A/S Jones proposed that Senior Level follow up to
the US-EU summit statement on the Broader Middle East and
Mediterranean (BMENA in the US-EU context) should be
discussed in the US-EU Task Force that would meet July 14.
She also suggested additional US-EU digital video conferences
on assistance, coordination on the ground between US and EC
missions in the region, and how to work with the G8's
Forum for the Future as topics for the Task Force to
consider. Siblesz said the EU was focusing on summit
followup; some steps would be procedural, some would be
substantive, but the EU and US were looking at the same
agenda and the same goal and was conducting a
country-by-country assessment of its programs in
the region. Valenzuela urged senior level follow-up to
coordinate US-EU assistance, but urged clarifying our goals
before "rushing to the region," noted that the US and EU
still disagree over WTO access, and added that the EU was
also looking at how to engage with the Gulf countries and at
the linkage to
its policies toward Iraq and Iran. Siblesz said the EU
wanted to compare notes on Saudi Arabia; A/S Jones said we
would welcome a dialogue. Cooper noted that this summit text
was the "most difficult text the EU has ever negotiated;" it
remains a "delicate" subject for the EU. Differences remain
between the US
and EU -- the EU, for example, does not view WTO access as a
reward; rather, it has a transforming effect that empowers
NGO's and civil society. Viewed this way, he said, "it cannot
be a bad thing to have all countries in the region in the
WTO, and this is an EU policy goal."

EU Still Smarting over Israeli Snub to Quartet; ICJ opinion
--------------

13. (C) Siblesz expressed frustration with Israel's
continued unwillingness to engage the Quartet, referring to
Israel's refusal last week to meet with Quartet envoys to
discuss their concerns about the Gaza withdrawal plan. The
EU would appreciate US support to underline to Israel the
importance of the Quartet as the main instrument for
international engagement in the peace process. Cooper said
the G8 reiterated support for the Quartet, but Israel just
refuses; should the EU just give up on the Quartet? A/S
Jones reiterated US support for the Quartet as the mechanism
to push the parties toward a negotiated solution. She noted
that, rather than leave the Quartet, the EU should offer its
own ideas for greater Quartet effectiveness. Cooper urged
close contact on this point between EU High Rep Solana and
Secretary Powell.

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14. (C) On the ICJ advisory opinion on Israel's security
fence, Siblesz said that while the EU was not persuaded a
ruling was appropriate, the substance of the decision handed
down was in line with the EU view -- that any departure from
the Green Line was contrary to international law. Now, he
said, we must
assess the implication of this isolated legal opinion for the
political process, which needs to be reinvigorated. The EU
expects the Palestinian Authority to propose a draft UN
resolution. A/S Jones urged the EU to consider voting
against, or, at a minimum, abstaining on a UN resolution; the
ICJ ruling does not help
move ahead with the roadmap. Siblesz replied that the EU
position will depend on what's in the resolution; the EU
cannot ignore the ICJ opinion.

ESDP: Turkey and EU-NATO dialogue
--------------

15. (C) Cooper commended EUR DAS Bradtke's efforts to work
with the EU and NATO on security issues, and pointed to the
recent EU approval of operation "Althea" in Bosnia as proof
of the results. Cooper noted there is an outstanding issue
related to Berlin Plus and Turkey. Because EU members Malta
and Cyprus do not have a security relationship with NATO, any
discussion with NATO of NATO classified information must be
done at 23, not 25. Turkey maintains that any EU-NATO
contact must therefore be done at 23. This, Cooper said, is
not possible for the EU. Malta and Cyprus, for example, are
engaged in EU defense capability projects, which the EU would
like to discuss with NATO. If Turkey insists on its
position, though, there can be no EU-NATO dialogue except on
Berlin Plus issues. This is an emerging problem, he
concluded, but he questioned whether this was in the interest
of the EU, NATO or even Turkey, and
asked if the U.S. could raise this with Turkey.

Bosnia Reserve and Berlin Plus
--------------

16. (C) Cooper also wondered whether Berlin Plus is really
working. There is still a problem with the common reserve
forces for the Bosnia mission. The reserve is a common
strategic reserve, and it is understandable that the NAC
would want to approve any decision to call it up. But the EU
cannot understand why the reserve, if called up to support
EUFOR, would not then be under EU control, since it is an EU
mission and the troops in questions would all be
European. This needs to be clarified in a logical manner.
Cooper said his goal is to have the EU look to SHAPE as its
military HQ, and have SHAPE do the planning for the EU, not
the EU doing it for SHAPE. A/S Jones noted that this issue
was still under review, but perhaps could be discussed in
more detail at the September 27 US-EU PSC Troika.

Cyprus
--------------

17. (C) Valenzuela said that recent EU Council decisions
would allow direct trade with Northern Cyprus, and are part
of an effort to end Turkish Cypriot isolation. A/S Jones
said the US welcomed these EU steps, wanted to work with the
EU for a Cyprus settlement, and hoped to work together for a
strong UN
resolution to support UNSYG Annan's Mission report. Cooper
reported that the Cypriot Ambassador to the EU was fired the
night before, reportedly for not blocking the EU decisions toopen up trade with
Northern Cyprus.

China Arms Embargo
--------------

18. (C) A/S Jones said now is not the time for the EU to
lift the embargo; the human rights situation is deteriorating
and listed numerous instances; this is important to the
Administration and to Congress. Siblesz said China put the
issue on the EU's agenda; no decision has been taken; there
are two angles to consider -- human
rights and regional stability. The EU judges the human
rights situation as better than in 1989; the Chinese argue
the embargo puts them in the same category as Zimbabwe or
Burma. The current arms embargo allows sales and does not
cover dual use technology transfer; the EU is looking at
enhancing its code
of conduct so that levels of sales do not increase. Can this
be done? The jury is still out. There is no deadline, but
the summit with China in December will increase pressure.
The EU wants to maintain a dialogue with the US on this, and
appreciates a frank exchange of views. A/S Jones noted this
was
important; she also noted that there are draft bills in
Congress that would sanction entities that sell arms to China.

Non-Proliferation
--------------

19. (C) Siblesz noted the US-EU summit produced good
results. The EU was looking at working with third countries:
agreements concluded with Tajikistan, and under negotiation
with Syria, Pakistan and MERCOSUR all have non-proliferation
clauses in them. The EU wants US support for including all
ten new EU members in existing non-proliferation regimes.
They will have
access to the technology as EU members; they should therefore
be in the regimes. A key EU goal shared with the US is
strengthening the IAEA. Iran and Syria are areas where the
US and EU may diverge. The US is sanctioning Syria;
EU policy is engagement. On Iran, not clear where things are
headed; will the US insist on taking it to the UNSC? A/S
Jones thanked the EU for close cooperation with us in June in
the IAEA on Iran. The US remains concerned by Iran's
response -- continuing enrichment and not ratifying the
Additional
Protocol. The international community needs to make clear
that this is unacceptable. If there is no Iranian
compliance, the UNSC is the next step. The US and EU need to
stay in touch.

Afghanistan Elections
--------------

20. (C) Siblesz raised the decision to split the
Presidential and Parliamentary elections, noting that this
includes accepting out-of-country voting. His understanding
is that this has been agreed with Iran, but only on the
condition that Pakistan also agrees, and asked for the US
view. A/S Jones promised to look into the issue and get the
information to the EU.


21. (U) A/S Jones has cleared this cable.

McKinley