Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS2389
2004-06-04 10:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

DEALING WITH EU IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:

Tags:  PREL UN EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002389 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA JOHN RODGERS, IO/UNP MARK WEINBERG, L/EUR
EVAN BLOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014
TAGS: PREL UN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH EU IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
USEU FIRST IMPRESSIONS

REF: A. A) STATE 10097


B. B) STATE 100881

C. C) UNVIE VIENNA 471

D. D) BRUSSELS 2292

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002389

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA JOHN RODGERS, IO/UNP MARK WEINBERG, L/EUR
EVAN BLOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014
TAGS: PREL UN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH EU IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
USEU FIRST IMPRESSIONS

REF: A. A) STATE 10097


B. B) STATE 100881

C. C) UNVIE VIENNA 471

D. D) BRUSSELS 2292

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: We reviewed ref A draft guidelines on
dealing with the EU in international organizations, and
believe the guidelines, with a few adjustments, will provide
what is needed: an equitable and fair framework which allows
flexibility within broad parameters and clearly spells out
U.S. redlines. Below are USEU's overall recommendations
(para 2),and specific comments on each of the draft
guidelines (para 3). END SUMMARY.


2. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

--The guidelines should provide flexibility within broad
parameters, but with U.S. redlines clearly explained.

--Flexibility within broad parameters should help USG
officials to apply the guidelines in a wide variety of
circumstances and venues.

--Clear red lines are needed to overcome the current lack of
clarity and the resulting tensions between the U.S. and the
EU.

--The guidelines should be conspicuously equitable. It
should be emphasized that their primary purpose is to promote
fairness for all interested parties; the guidelines should
ultimately be shared with the EU in order to promote
constructive U.S.-EU engagement in international
organizations.

--Department, together with Japan, Canada and Australia,
should consider approaching the EU once the guidelines are in
final version. The purpose of the approach should be to get
explicit EU agreement to the guidelines, even if that may
require a willingness to negotiate with the EU on some of the
fine points.

END RECOMMENDATIONS.


3. (C) SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT GUIDELINES:

--The first guideline as written -- that rules for EU
participation must be reviewed case-by-case and no particular
case creates a precedent for others -- could result in a
continuation of endless haggling with the EU in each
individual case. We suggest the following reformulation:
"Equitable general guidelines should be established with
which EU participation should comply in each particular case.
We do not view EU participation in any particular case as
creating a precedent for others unless the relevant
conditions of both cases are identically applicable."

--On the second guideline, we would appreciate a clearer
delineation of what type of speaking arrangements would
confer special advantages to the EU, and what those special
advantages would be.

--On the third guideline, is the USG justified in trying to
prevent EU member states alone from constituting a quorum at
any meeting? If the principle behind the guidelines is no
additionality -- not to allow the EU and its member states to
have an advantage over other countries simply because of the
existence of the EU, then presumably the EU and its member
states should suffer no disadvantage simply because of the
existence of the EU.

--On the fourth guideline, we agree that the onus should be
on the EU to disclose fully its competence over the subject
matter of meetings, and inform third parties who is
negotiating for the EU. If the EU claims mixed competency
(competency shared by the European Commission (EC) and EU
member states) but cannot explain how the mixed competency is
shared or what the implications of mixed competency are in a
particular case, the EC should not be granted any enhanced
status.

--On the fifth guideline, we propose that the sentence, "EU
rights at major conferences should be subject to case-by-case
review" be changed to "EU rights at major conferences and
agencies within international organizations should be subject
to case-by-case review within established and equitable broad
guidelines." This will allow for enough flexibility to
accommodate cases in which enhanced EU rights not only in
conferences, but also in agencies within IOs, may be
equitable and in the interest of the U.S.

--While we understand the need to maintain flexibility, the
sixth guideline, "The EU should not be allowed to dominate by
its numbers small negotiating groups," should be delineated
more clearly. What exactly is meant by "dominate by its
numbers?" What exactly are "small negotiating groups?" If
exact answers to these questions are not possible, perhaps
Department can illustrate the overall intent of this
guideline by including specific examples of cases in which
the EU has dominated small negotiating groups.
--USEU agrees with the final guideline, "We should consult on
any additionality questions that go beyond these basic
guidelines."

END COMMENTS ON DRAFT GUIDELINES.


3. (C) We will continue to work this issue, and consult our
counterparts in the Japanese, Australian and Canadian
Missions.

FOSTER