EUR/DAS BRADTKE'S SECURITY CONSULTATIONS WITH EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002381

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS BK EUN NATO USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR/DAS BRADTKE'S SECURITY CONSULTATIONS WITH EU


Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) EUR/DAS Bradtke met May 26 in Brussels with EU
leaders in the PSC Troika Format including representatives of
the EU presidency, Council, and Commission. Bradtke and his
EU interlocutors reviewed ESDP/NATO developments, including
the BiH SFOR transition, the EU's planning for a civ-mil
cell, EU African peacekeeping ambitions, the development of
NRF and the EU's rapid response capabilities, including
battlegroups, and finally, ways of moving forward with
NATO-EU strategic cooperation after enlargement in both
organizations. The EU believes that preparations for a
post-SFOR EU presence in Bosnia are proceeding well. The EU
also reviewed its non-pro efforts and views on Afghanistan;
Bradtke briefed on Kosovo and heard a read-out of the last
EUROMED meeting. Finally, Bradtke reviewed with EU
interlocutors the state of play in Moldova. In a separate
meeting, Bradtke met with HiRep Solana at Solana's request to
hear a strong pitch for a more creative approach by NATO to
Partnership for peace for Bosnia. Solana also stressed his
desire for the EU to be more active in Kosovo. End summary.

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Solana/Cooper Meetings
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2. (C) At the Hirep's request, Bradtke met privately with
Solana for half an hour prior to the larger consultative
meeting with the EU Presidency, Council, and Commission. DG
Robert Cooper told Bradtke Solana was "keen" on Peter Feith
to succeed Holkeri in Kosovo. Solana wanted the EU to get
"their man" in UNMIK because they believe the EU will
eventually take a lead role in Kosovo. Solana, who joined
the meeting later, did not make a pitch directly for Feith,
but urged a quick decision on a replacement for Holkeri in
Kosovo. Cautioning that he did not want to give the
impression the EU seeks to push the US out, Solana also
argued for the long-term "Europeanization" of the
international effort in Kosovo. He suggested the appointment
of an EU insider to replace Holkeri as the first step toward
creating a dual-hatted figure similar to the role played by
Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia.


3. (C) Bradtke told Cooper that the US was well aware of
Feith's strong qualifications. While this was a European
decision, there was concern about Feith,s key role in
managing the Berlin Plus transition in Bosnia. Cooper
recognized this as a problem, and suggested that if Holkeri
stayed on through his tenure to August, much of the heavy
lifting on Bosnia should be completed. Solana said the
international community should stick with its focus on
standards through mid-2005, but that Kosovo was facing a
difficult period with elections on the way. He was pleased
with the new US-EU-NATO formula, but noted that Kostunica
preferred the Contact Group because he could use Russia's
presence to gain leverage. That said, Solana said in his
recent discussions with the Russians (including Putin),he
found Moscow open to new ideas, and prepared to be
constructive. After the meeting, Cooper approached Bradtke
and suggested that one option was that Declan Kelleher, the
Irish PSC ambassador, would replace Feith on Solana,s staff.
The other option was that he (Cooper) would try to take on
more responsibility for the day-to-day management of the
Bosnia transition.

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Bosnia and PfP
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4. (C) Solana noted that the Bosnian PM had spoken to the
NAC/PSC at the beginning of the week, and had made a strong
case for his country's commitment to reform. Solana
suggested that, while mindful that it was not for him to give
advice to NATO,it might be time for NATO to rethink the
linkage between PfP and PIFWCs, noting that PfP is a powerful
tool to provide "oxygen" to militaries that enable them to
act more responsibly, which in turn is more likely to have a
positive impact on efforts to apprehend PIFWCs than the
current approach. The linkage is leading to frustration, and
it might be time to be more creative, rather than remain
"trapped" in the current policy. Bradtke responded that the
US had reviewed this issue at senior levels, and was not not
prepared to change the current policy before the Istanbul
Summit.

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BiH SFOR Transition
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5. (C) Following his meetings with Solana and Cooper,
Bradtke met with the PSC Troika formation of Presidency state
Ireland, incoming presidency state the Netherlands, EU
Council Secretariat and Commission staff. The Presidency
chaired, with Irish PSC Ambassador Declan Kelleher opening by
noting that NATO-EU cooperation on Bosnia was moving ahead
smartly. The EUMS is staffing its liaison positions at
SHAPE, and will soon send a liaison to Naples. PSC
ambassadors will visit Naples in early June to educate
themselves about the role of CINCSOUTH. The EU informal
force generation conference will take place June 8th;
modalities for third country participation remain under
discussion. The EU remains concerned about the need for
clear delineation of tasks, a clear Dayton mandate for the
EU, and ensuring "access to reserves at all levels." Bradtke
responded that the US was generally satisfied with the EU's
general concept for Bosnia, and pleased with Pieter Feith's
good cooperation with the NATO IS. Nonetheless, the US was
committed to the need for both NATO and the EU to have full
access to all Dayton authorities, with Bradtke saying:
"Dayton gave NATO very broad authority in Bosnia; we don't
want an effort to pick apart Annex 1A."


6. (C) Dutch PSC Ambassador Hamer told Bradtke "what you
have described is in line with our thoughts." Council ESDP
Deputy Director General Feith noted that the debate on
delineation and mandate is on-going at NATO; the key is to
"avoid the possibility of Bosnians using NATO as an appeals
court if EU assesses non-compliance on an issue." Feith
added that the delineation remains a political point that
can't be left to authorities on the ground; the EU "needs to
be fully comfortable with delineation." This delineation
need not be formally endorsed by the NAC-PSC, Bradtke agreed
with Feith. Finally, Bradtke underscored that a NAC decision
would be required to endorse EU access to strategic reserves.


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EU Civ-Mil Cell
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7. (C) Kelleher noted that the EU cell "is not a standing
HQ"; it is part of a package with the EU cell at SHAPE, and
should be seen as such. It will have three main functions,
developing strategic options, assisting NHQs, and working EU
autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets. The
cell will have approximately 25 personnel, and will keep
DSACEUR informed through consultations. HRSG Solana's goal
is to have a political way forward agreed by June; it will be
up to the Dutch presidency (second half of 2004) to move the
concept "from words to work" e.g. implementation and staffing
of the cell. Feith added that he believed the cell would be
up and running by "late 2005 or the beginning of 2006."
Bradtke noted that Washington continues to follow the
development of the cell with close interest and appreciates
the assurances the U.S. has received regarding its
consistency with Berlin-plus and non-duplication of NATO
capabilities.

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EU Ambition
for Africa?
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8. (C) Although the EU is currently not actively involved in
peacekeeping in Africa, it anticipates a surge in demand for
African peacekeeping, according to Kelleher. The EU's
approach will be multilateral, focusing on close cooperation
with the African Union and other regional actors. It will
also be, in keeping with EU doctrine: "integrated" -- meaning
that it will involve all EU actors, civilian & military, for
a coordinated approach to security restoration. For now, the
EU's ambitions are greater than its actions: one EU military
staff liaison officer is in Addis Ababa to liaise with the
African Union. He is there now. The EU also has on line its
250 million euro African peacekeeping facility, which it has
yet to use.

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EU battlegroups
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9. (C) Following Bradtke's review of developments with the
NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF),the EU briefed on its
battlegroups (BG) concept, based upon the UK-FR-GE proposal
for national and multinational units of 1500 troops
deployable within fifteen days. The concept has been
endorsed by EU foreign ministers, and is now being fleshed
out. The key point for the EU was the promotion of "mutually
reinforcing" capabilities; Kelleher also warned of EU
concerns that capabilities not be "frozen" by commitments to
specific duties. The EU would seek -- and offer --
transparency with NATO as it developed its approach to BGs.
Bradtke probed for specifics on how the BG concept would
work. It was clear that EU interlocutors had few. The
Council military planner speculated that "sub-Saharan Africa
would probably be about the limit" of potential
deployability.

10. (C) Bradtke underscored the need to keep NATO and EU
standards aligned. In response to Bradtke's question about
whether the EU would conduct field exercises for its BGs,
Ambassador Kelleher underscored that the EU would not conduct
field exercises, below the force headquarters level.
Training remains a national responsibility. Keller also
assured Bradtke that participation in battlegroups would be
open to all EU members, rather than only to members meeting
certain criteria.

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Post Enlargement
NATO-EU relations
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11. (C) Bradtke observed that it was important to ensure
that enlargement not hinder NATO - EU cooperation, despite
the challenges posed on participation by the accession of
Cyprus and Malta, both non-PfP members. Ambassador Kelleher
replied that the EU's position on participation was that the
use of NATO classified information -- or information derived
from NATO classified information -- was the dividing line for
the EU in terms of whether Cyprus and Malta would participate
in EU consultations with NATO. While the classification
exclusion was certain, it also could reduce their rights as
full EU member states. Kelleher probed Bradtke about the
prospect of a NATO - EU summit, or ministerial, on the
margins of the NATO Istanbul Summit. Bradtke said that from
his perspective, the issue of Malta and Cyprus did not
preclude holding NATO-EU Summits or Ministerials with the
participation of all twenty-five EU members. However, at
Istanbul, the US opposed a summit and probably would not be
enthusiastic about a ministerial, because of the time
constraints. Changing the subject, Bradtke praised the
Netherlands/UK/LUX non-paper on prospective enhanced NATO-EU
cooperation; "let's operationalize it," he said.

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Kosovo
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12. (C) Bradtke agreed with the EU on the need to redouble
efforts to address Kosovo; the US and the EU agreed that
there could be no reward for the recent violence. Instead,
the work of the contact group and US-NATO-EU efforts on an
intensive dialogue, including Belgrade Serbs needed to be
advanced more rapidly. Standards before status remained the
operative vision of both the EU and the US; there was a need
for a good replacement for UNMIK chief Holkeri, and there
were a number of excellent European candidates under
consideration.

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Other Issues: Non-Pro,
EuroMed, Afghanistan &
and Moldova
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13. (C) Kelleher briefly reviewed recent EU actions aimed at
strengthening non-proliferation cooperation; Bradtke
responded that the US was pleased with EU efforts, and looked
forward to further cooperation. In this regard, the US was
looking forward to seeing the EU draft for the US-EU Summit
Declaration. On other issues, Kelleher, Council, and
Commission officials made the following points:

-- On Afghanistan, the Commission has set a demobilization
goal of 40,000. The Commission is in the midst of an
internal debate about how to manage observing the elections;
clearly "a normal observation mission is impossible." The EU
will most likely seek a solution dependent upon heavy use of
NGOs and human rights advocacy groups. Bradtke briefed on
the status of PRTs, and the critical need for countries to
fulfill their assistance and security pledges with actual
disbursements. The EU asked for an assessment of the impact
of the withdrawal of Russian border grounds from Tadjikistan;
Bradtke replied that there was a need to address border
security, but that the Russian record there had not been a
good one.

-- On the EUROMED dialogue, Kelleher noted that the most
recent EUROMED meeting had been an informal one; the next
formal meeting of the partners would be held during the
Luxembourg presidency in the first half of 2005. This
informal was the first EUROMED meeting at 25 (the new
accession states) plus the ten EUROMED partners; Libya
attended as a guest. There were two significant results.
The first was the decision to make Alexandria the seat of the
EUROMED foundation; this would enhance Israeli-Arab as well
as European-Arab dialogue and intercourse. The second
outcome was a general agreement that at 35, a new working
method needed to be conceived for EUROMED; this was being
explored, but would result in a more efficient mechanism. In
an "unplanned" Troika with the Libyan FM, the EU expressed
its strong dissatisfaction with the death sentences for the
Bulgarian medics. Bradtke thanked the EU for the update, and
noted that US GME efforts were not intended to supplant EU
efforts in the region, but rather to further dialogue among
the parties.

-- Finally, Bradtke and the EU briefly exchanged views on
Moldova, with both sides agreeing that progress is stalled,
and that the Russians must be held to their commitments.

FOSTER