Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS2262
2004-05-27 10:28:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

USEU SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY VISIT JUNE

Tags:  PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002262 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE, EUR A/S JONES, EUR PDAS
RIES AND EUR/ERA ALLEGRONE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: USEU SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY VISIT JUNE
1-2: EU ASPECTS


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002262

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE, EUR A/S JONES, EUR PDAS
RIES AND EUR/ERA ALLEGRONE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: USEU SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY VISIT JUNE
1-2: EU ASPECTS



1. Sensitive but unclassified -- entire text.


2. Summary: You are coming to Brussels during a time of
transition in the EU as it absorbs its new members and moves
towards a new Parliament, new Commissioners and a new
Constitutional Treaty. At the same time, the EU under the
Irish Presidency is in the home stretch towards the
forthcoming US/EU Summit next month. In addition to
co-chairing the Sri Lanka's Donor Co-Chair meeting, you will
be meeting with EU foreign policy czar Javier Solana. You
will also informally meet with Commission Foreign Relations
Head and fellow Sri Lanka meeting co-chair Chris Patten. Both
Solana and Patten are under consideration for future
leadership positions in the "next" European Union. Solana
and his office are heavily involved in US/EU Summit
preparations and Solana will be very interested in engaging
with you on Iraq, the Mid-East Peace Process and Bosnia. End
Summary

Co-Chair Chris Patten: Lame Duck, Or Future Commission
President?
--------------


3. There is real drama, from a Brussels perspective, about
the future of your fellow European Commission Co-chair, Chris
Patten, who is winding down his activities in Brussels as
Commissioner for External Relations, and has already begun
his next (unpaid) position at Oxford. Patten has been a
strong RELEX Commissioner, and very helpful in swaying his
Commission colleagues to move on key US concerns in the
Balkans and the fight against terrorism. He played a crucial
role in brokering a substantial EU commitment for Iraq
reconstruction at the Madrid Conference, and also maintained
Commission support for development needs in Afghanistan.
Recently, Patten,s name has been frequently mentioned as a
possible compromise candidate to replace Romano Prodi as the
next President of the European Commission, but weak French
language skills may hurt his chances of gaining French
support ) despite the open backing of Valery Giscard
d'Estaing.


4. On the margins of the conference, you may wish to raise
other issues with Patten. He will be keenly interested in

our views on developments in the Middle East, and should be
pressed to preview for you the Commission's Medium-term
strategy for assistance to reconstruction in Iraq. You
should also sound him out on the availability of funds to
assist the Palestinian Authrity should Sharon follow through
on his promises to withdraw from Gaza. Patten can be a
useful channel to his Commission colleagues on other issues
of immediate concern to the US, including Romanian adoptions
(where Enlargement Commissioner Gunther Verheugen has the
lead),although this issue does not fall directly in Patten's
purview.

EU's Transition Overload
--------------


5. Patten,s own transition mirrors a general sense of flux
and change that permeates the EU at this moment. At the
beginning of May, the EU finalized its largest and most
challenging enlargement, welcoming ten new members to the
Union. These ten countries, all significantly poorer and for
the most part ardently transatlantic in their outlook, are
likely to change the dynamic of the Union precisely at a time
when many other changes are in the offing. We should not
expect that the entry of these new members will somehow tilt
the EU to automatically become more pro-US. The Commission,
the EU,s executive body, has already become a lame duck. In
the middle of June, the Irish Presidency will announce the
agreed replacement for Prodi. Whoever that is ) and the
field still appears wide open ) will be charged with naming
a new Commission. Several of the most influential
Commissioners (including Patten and Trade mandarin Pascal
Lamy) have already announced they will not return to
ministerial posts.


6. In June, voters across Europe will go the polls to elect
a new European Parliament. In every country, national
issues dominate, while EU matters get second billing. It is
commonly assumed that these elections provide an ideal
opportunity for a protest vote against sitting governments.
Especially in countries where the ruling party joined the
coalition in Iraq, their opponents are attempting to
capitalize on widespread European disapproval of the US-led
war to score points ) as we have seen so dramatically from
Prodi,s campaign against Berlusconi in Italy.


7. In addition, the Irish Presidency is in the home stretch
of efforts to finalize negotiations on a complicated
Constitution that aims at streamlining the decision-making
apparatus of a Union of 25 Member States. The Irish hope to
wrap up before their mandate ends in the last days of June,
but the continent,s leaders remain mired in difficult
questions of decision-making (what sort of qualified
majorities will be applied, and what other issues will still
require consensus decision-making). Consumed in this effort,
it is not surprising that Irish attention to the US-EU summit
at the end of month has been spotty, despite a strong desire
to make transatlantic relations a key focus of their
Presidency.


8. If this weren't enough on their plates, the EU must still
come to grips by the end of the year with one of its most
difficult issues: whether to invite Turkey to begin accession
negotiations. There is little support for this move among
the European electorate, despite the strategic importance of
Turkey as a bridge to the neighboring Muslim world -- or the
committed progress of the Erdogan government in meeting the
Copenhagen political criteria or supporting a settlement in
Cyprus. Chris Patten will play a major role in a Commission
recommendation due this fall; he is one of Turkey's strongest
advocates.

Solana: Secondary on Iraq, Key on ME Peace
--------------


9. A source of stability in this period of change is Javier
Solana, the EU,s "High Representative for a Common Foreign
and Security Policy," who functions as the de facto EU
foreign minister. As a synthesizer of the European
cacophony, and a voice of the European mainstream, he has no
equal on the EU scene. If the constitution talks succeed,
they will create a new position that combines Solana's
current functions with those of Patten on the Commission, and
Solana is likely to be asked to remain on in that role.


10. On Iraq, however, Solana,s role is tangential. After
their failure to craft a united position prior to the
invasion, the EU wants desperately to speak with one voice in
the decisions that will be made on the future. But the EU,s
"Big Three" on the Security Council are jealously guarding
their own prerogatives. That leaves Solana little room to
maneuver. He does not play a decisive role on talks in New
York, but he can still make important contributions behind
the scenes in his interaction with European leaders. Your
approach will be most effective if it blends advocacy with a
willingness to listen and take European views into account.
In this regard, you can expect Solana to marshall arguments
about sovereignty and a lead role for the UN that enjoys
broad support in European capitals, but you should also
expect him also to test you for areas of flexibility in the
US position. He would most certainly welcome your thoughts


11. Solana plays a more pivotal role in Europe,s policies
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict than he does on Iraq.
The Contact Group meeting in London helped to paper over
continued unease with the U.S. approach announced at the
President,s meeting with PM Sharon. The subsequent
uncertainty caused by Sharon's failure to gain Likud
endorsement for his disengagement plan, as well as the
military actions in Rafah, have only reinforced Europe,s
concerns that our approach is failing to deliver the
hoped-for results. Solana will be anxious to hear where we
think the process is leading. He will try to steer the EU to
support any steps they believe will get the Road Map back on
track.

The Balkans, China Arms, and Iran's Nuclear Program
--------------

12. In your talks with Solana, you should also highlight
three other areas where he has a keen interest and can play a
decisive role: the Balkans, China arms embargo, and Iran.
You should acknowledge his pragmatic role in ensuring that
the transition from SFOR to an EU-led mission in Bosnia using
NATO assets under the Berlin Plus arrangements is proceeding
well. He is also likely to express his concerns that the
current stalemate in Kosovo is unsustainable.


13. Solana is on record supporting an end to the EU's arms
embargo on China. Our lobbying in European capitals has
managed to deflect the momentum in favor of this French-led
proposal, but it is unclear how much longer some of the
countries will hold out. You should make it clear to Solana
that our concerns about the impact of such a decision remain,
and that our study of other EU arms export controls indicate
they are not a substitute for the current policy.


14. Finally, we will be facing another decision-point in the
IAEA on Iran's nuclear program in the near future. Solana
was initially ignored by the British-French-German initiative
on Iran, but has now adopted it as the EU's and his own. He
was grateful for a special intelligence briefing we offered
him prior to his visit earlier this year, and accepts that
Iranian compliance is far from complete and verifiable. He
will waffle on next steps as the EU awaits El-Baradei's next
report, but you should press him on next steps should -- as
we both expect -- the IAEA be unable to certify a complete
and verifiable end to the Iranian enrichment program.

Schnabel