SUBJECT: MARCH 19 U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001607

SIPDIS

PASS TO IO/CD AND NP AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2014
TAGS: PREL KNNP EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: MARCH 19 U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON
NON-PROLIFERATION (CONOP)

REF: A. A. BRUSSELS 1119

B. B. BRUSSELS 1081

C. C. USEU TODAY 03/03/04 AND PREVIOUS

D. D. BRUSSELS 36

Classified By: USEU Poloff David Armitage for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 19, Special Representative of the
President for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Geneva
CD Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders and NP/PPC Director
Christopher Murray led discussions on arms control and
disarmament with the EU's Nonproliferation Troika (CONOP).
Issues discussed were:

-- Irish European Union (EU) Presidency priorities: The
Irish want to implement the EU's weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) nonproliferation strategy. This includes seeking to
universalize nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control
regimes. It also includes an EU peer review of national
export controls, with a general assessment planned for
completion by June.

-- Nuclear Issues: The EU is concerned about planning for the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Third Preparatory Committee
and reiterated its call for support for extending Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) membership to the EU accession states
that are not yet members of the NSG.

-- Missiles: The EU was raising pre-launch notifications at
every occasion and has discussed it so far with 113 countries.

-- G8 Global Partnership: EU member states seemed willing to
expand the Global Partnership's geographical scope, but
resources would be tight through 2006.

-- Regional Issues: Iran, Libya, and North Korea were
discussed, and everyone noted the need for continued US-EU
cooperation.

-- Australia Group: EU restated its hope for USG assistance
on extending AG membership to all EU accession states.

END SUMMARY.


EU Delegation
--------------

2. (U) The Irish EU Presidency was represented by Disarmament
and Nonproliferation Director Adrian McDaid and Deputy
Director Sarah McGrath. The upcoming Dutch Presidency was
represented by Nuclear Affairs and Nonproliferation Director
Paul Wilke and Policy Officer Elke Merks-Schaapveld.
Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative for WMD
Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation Desk Officer Didier
Cosse represented the Council Secretariat. Nonproliferation
specialist Marc Deffrennes and USA Desk Officer Andrew
Denison attended for the Commission.

Priorities of the Irish EU Presidency
--------------

3. (SBU) McDaid said that a priority for the Irish Presidency
would be to implement the EU's WMD nonproliferation strategy
(ref. D). A key tool in the EU strategy is to seek
universalization of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms
control regimes. This will be in the form of a series of
demarches to countries that have not yet acceded to the
regimes. The first round, currently underway, urges
universal membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). The results will be compiled in a matrix and
delivered to the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). The EU is working on the terms of reference
for a Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) demarche. The EU
also plans to hold a seminar on challenge inspections, as
part of its effort to strengthen multilateral
nonproliferation regimes. McDaid discussed plans to exchange
information among EU member states on bilateral assistance to
prevent overlap.


4. (C) Giannella described the EU nonproliferation strategy.
In early February, a team of EU member state experts began a
peer review of national export controls and hoped to have a
general assessment completed by June. The EU is also
implementing a Council Directive on controlling radioactive
sources that is stronger than a Code of Conduct, and recently
conducted a demarche campaign urging countries to enhance the
physical protection of fissile materials. Moreover, the
Political-Security Committee (PSC) plans to discuss
transshipment/transit and seizure issues, which Giannella
described as "conceptually linked" to the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI),but which she said "needs to
happen anyway." (ref. C)


5. (U) McDaid and Murray exchanged views on US and EU efforts
to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
activities. McDaid noted that the EU had just pledged 3.3
million euros through the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) budget to fund three new EU-selected, IAEA-implemented
programs in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus/Central Asia.
Murray responded that the US provides about USD 50 million
annually in voluntary contributions to the IAEA. Murray also
provided an update on the status of ratification of the IAEA
Additional Protocol in the Senate. McDaid emphasized that
the EU was looking to work with the US to strengthen the
IAEA. With reference to the President's February 11
nonproliferation speech, he asked rhetorically how we might
define "under suspicion" when deciding whether to bar a
country from the IAEA Board of Governors.

Nuclear Issues/NPT
--------------

6. (C) Ambassador Sanders stressed that the U.S. was
committed to a renewed emphasis on compliance with NPT
nonproliferation obligations. Recent disclosures in Libya
and elsewhere have made clear that the NPT needs
strengthening, a goal the US would pursue at the 2004 NPT
Prepcom and 2005 Review Conference (RevCon). McDaid
discussed issues related to the run-up to the Third PrepCom.
He noted that the PrepCom should provide two sets of
recommendations: one procedural and the other substantive.
McDaid agreed that it would be best if PrepCom III could
resolve the RevCon agenda issues, and cautioned that we
should avoid publicly discussing any possibility of a 4th
PrepCom to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy.


7. (C) On the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),Dutch Nuclear
Affairs and Nonproliferation division head Wilke described
work in several areas: a French paper on sensitive
technologies; a French/British/Swedish paper on information
exchange; a British/Austrian paper on the Additional Protocol
as a condition of supply; and a French outreach paper.
Sweden had raised the issue of NSG intelligence sharing, and
was hoping to get into greater depth at information sharing
meetings by limiting participation to a select group. The EU
reiterated its call for support on ensuring NSG membership
for all ten EU accession states. Murray later reported that
the U.S.supports NSG membership for Malta, Estonia, and
Latvia, the three accession states that are not already
members of the NSG. Finally, the EU expressed concern over
China's bid for NSG membership, particularly with regard to
1993 grandfathering and IAEA safeguards. Murray reviewed the
President,s speech of February 11 as it described proposals
for limiting the export of enrichment and reprocessing
equipment and technology. These proposals, he continued,
could be effected through strengthening NSG guidelines, which
would be discussed at the upcoming NSG working level meeting
in Vienna. Wilke replied that most EU member states would
support our amendments, but that one (note: one EU
participant confirmed on the margins that it was France. end
note) was likely to block full EU consensus.


8. (C) European Commission nonproliferation specialist
Defrennes raised a question about how to deal with spent
fuel. He said some were concerned about the possible impact
of the US NSG proposals on the EU's internal market and
Euratom. He added that the Commission legal services were
responding to a member state request for further analysis.

Missiles
--------------

9. (C) Wilke asked where the US stood with Russia on
finalizing the pre-launch notification system, and urged us
to move quickly to finish the process. He said that the EU
was raising pre-launch notifications at every occasion. The
EU has discussed it with 113 countries so far. On the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),Wilke noted that
Kazakhstan's and Croatia's MTCR membership credentials were
weak, but stressed the EU desire that no one break silence on
EU accession state applications. Murray agreed that Croatia
and Kazakhstan were not potential significant suppliers of
missile technology, and Kazakhstan was not part of the ICOC
or BWC. Wilke expressed interest in whether interception
would be on the agenda of the Re-enforced Point of Contact
meeting in Paris 13-14 April, and if so, whether it would be
related to PSI.

G-8 Global Partnership
--------------

10. (C) Deffrennes provided a readout of ongoing Commission
efforts in the G-8 Global Partnership (GP),and said the EU's
Joint Action to renew the program with Russia would be
finalized June 24. Deffrennes noted also that the EU was
unhappy with Russia's efforts to link GP assistance delays to
Russia's failure to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles in
accordance with its CWC commitments. He said there
appeared to be the will among EU member states to expand the
geographical scope of the GP and to devise a second Joint
Action program. He warned, however, that the EC would be
under budget constraints through 2006, so new money would not
be available until the 2007-2013 budget cycle. Murray
replied that the US is focusing on the threat, not just
geography, and is also considering countries such as Libya,
Iraq, etc.

Regional Issues
--------------

11. (C) On Iran, the EU was supportive of the efforts by the
EU-3 and recognizes the need to maintain pressure. McDaid
assessed Iranian cooperation so far as mixed -- should have
been better but could have been worse -- and said the EU was
pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors was able to agree on
a resolution by consensus. On Libya, McDaid said the EU was
pleased with the BOG resolution and with the US-UK
disarmament efforts.


12. (C) Wilke was interested in US views on the situation in
the DPRK, particularly as it impacts KEDO. Currently, there
is no EU position on the costs of suspending KEDO, but he
emphasized that there was a connection between KEDO
suspension and Six Party talks. Wilke reiterated what he
called the "standing offer" made by EU Asia Directors and DG
Cooper (refs. A and B) to assist in any way possible with the
Six Party process. Giannella said the EU did not want the
DPRK to have even a civilian nuclear facility, though it was
unclear how North Korea would meet its energy needs without
one.

Australia Group
--------------

13. (C) Wilke was open to US ideas on preparation for the AG
plenary June 7-10 in Paris. He reiterated the need to
discuss membership in the AG for the ten EU accession states.
Murray said the US was discussing the issue with EU
counterparts through AG channels, and would do so more once
the current MTCR silence process was finished. He said the
US would appreciate EU assistance in persuading Switzerland
and France to stop blocking the addition of new nerve gas
precursors to the control lists. The EU took note of the
request but did not respond.

Schnabel