EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY IN CONTEXT: ANALYSIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000014

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/P - DR. REISS
STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, S/CT, NP, IO/UNP
NSC FOR KURT VOLKER AND TRACY MCKIBBEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM KNNP MARR MCAP EAID SOCI NATO OSCE UNSC EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY IN CONTEXT: ANALYSIS
AND COMMENT

REF: A. USEU TODAY 12/11/03


B. USEU TODAY 12/05/03

C. USEU TODAY 10/30/03

D. USEU TODAY 10/24/03

E. USEU TODAY 10/09/03

F. 03 BRUSSELS 5594

G. 03 BRUSSELS 5520

H. 03 BRUSSELS 4424

I. 03 BRUSSELS 4143 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

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Summary and Comment
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1. (C) SUMMARY: The final draft of EU HiRep Javier Solana's
European Security Strategy (ESS) -- adopted by EU heads of
state at their December 12-13 Brussels Summit -- envisages a
world of dangerous but preventable threats, multilateral
solutions, and stabilizing partnerships. The ESS identifies
five (up from the earlier draft's three) primary threats:
terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state
failure, and organized crime. The strategy highlights
"effective multilateralism" as the key to dealing with these
challenges, and recommends that the EU become more active,
more capable and more coherent in its approach to new
security challenges, and that it work more with key partners,
especially the U.S. The revised ESS -- formally titled "A
Secure Europe in a Better World" -- also recognizes the
central role of NATO in European security, and highlights
Berlin Plus as a valuable framework for NATO-EU strategic
relations. As Secretary Powell said at the December 4
NATO-EU Ministerial, the ESS is a good basis for future
cooperation.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The revised ESS leaves unanswered
the tough question of what to do when international rules are
broken and multilateral efforts fail. It avoids, as did the
earlier text, any discussion of when and under what
conditions the EU would resort to the use of force (ref. I).
Rather than address the issue head on, the EU hopes to avoid
it altogether through "preventive engagement" and by
strengthening the international system so that rules either
will not or cannot be broken. But the EU still recognizes
that this is only a partial, stopgap response. The ESS hints
at what will surely be a contentious future debate by saying
that Europe "must be ready to act" when the rules are broken.
END SUMMARY.


3. (C) COMMENT: This is the first time the EU has tried to
develop an over-arching security concept, and reflects the
sense after the Iraq crisis that the EU needed a better
strategic framework for developing common positions to
emerging crises. But the Iraq crisis only accelerated a
process that was probably inevitable. The EU, while far from
supranational, is considerably more than an international
organization or a customs union. It is a union of states
which, having already pooled sovereignty on a wide range of
vital economic and commercial interests, now wants to speak
with unity and credibility on security affairs. EU
interlocutors, including Political and Security Committee
Ambassadors and Council DG Robert Cooper, have told us time
and again that among its other hats, the EU is fast becoming
a security organization.


4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The ESS represents the current, if
not ultimate, limit of European consensus on security.
Wiggle room remains in the details, but for now, the EU has
found its strategic voice: The EU is not yet ready to commit
to pre-emptive use of force; the EU will renew its commitment
to multilateral solutions, while recognizing the need to make
them more effective; the EU will continue in partnership with
the U.S., and honor its arrangement with NATO. We expect the
EU to be increasingly assertive with its newfound strategic
vision, and less nervous about its disagreements with the
U.S.


5. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: If a crisis like Iraq were to
erupt again now, Europe would be no less divided than it was
last year. But in five, ten or twenty years' time, the ESS
and the common ground it represents can provide a foundation
for a more united Europe -- even in a crisis like Iraq.
Whether a united EU would agree with our position or not is
unclear. We have an opportunity, however, to influence the
outcome. A strategic security dialogue with EU policy
planners, as offered by Secretary Powell at the November 18
U.S.-EU Ministerial, represents a valuable opportunity to
influence the development of an increasingly assertive EU
role in the world. While forcefully arguing our own
positions -- on NATO, on responses to terrorism,
proliferation, and regional crises -- we should also accept
that the EU now has the elements of a distinctly European
strategic worldview -- one that will usually if not always
agree with our own, and one that will only strengthen over
time. END COMMENT.

Note: The revised ESS is now available at
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/en/reports/78367.p df

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Threats: Remembering the Old with the New
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6. (C) The revised ESS retains the original text's
description of terrorism and WMD proliferation as
unprecedented and qualitatively different sorts of threats
than the world has henceforth known. But it departs from the
original by discussing in more depth the continuing danger
posed by three conventional threats: state failure, organized
crime, and regional conflict. The revised ESS underscores
the role of the conventional threats in facilitating the new
ones (terrorism and proliferation thrive on organized crime
and failed states; regional conflict breeds extremism; and so
forth). Senior Solana Advisor Niall Burgess tells us that
the coming year will see further work to break down the
concept of state failure into a taxonomy of failure -- i.e.
weak, failing, failed -- that the EU can use to create
targeted approaches for each stage (ref. E).

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Confronting the Threats and the Use of Force
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7. (C) The international press has made much in recent days
of the ESS' substitute of the term "pre-emptive engagement,"
used in the first draft, for "preventive engagement," favored
in the final (ref. B). Pundits lined up to claim the EU has
watered down its security strategy by backing away from the
more forceful word. Not wanting to sound too soft, the EU
maintains that this semantic variation means nothing (an EU
Troika told EUR/DAS Bradtke December 10 that it helps with
translation into some EU languages). This is a debate over
the lightest shades of gray. The widely variant defense
doctrines and strategic traditions of EU member states
ensured that both drafts of the ESS would be "soft."
Possibly not until Europe faces an existential peril -- such
as a devastating terrorist attack, or a WMD-armed rogue state
in its neighborhood -- will the EU be able to join consensus
on the tough questions surrounding justified use of military
force.


8. (C) But having for the time being ruled out serious
consideration of conditions for the use of force, what then
is left for a security doctrine to discuss? What does the
ESS mean when it says that the EU "needs to develop a
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when
necessary, robust intervention?" How can the EU convince
rule-breaking states that their actions will have serious
consequences? How can Europe deter would-be proliferators
and combat terrorism so that the devastating attack never
happens?


9. (C) For the Europeans, the answer lies in "effective
multilateralism" and assertive, full-spectrum engagement --
an approach for which the ESS says "the EU is particularly
well equipped." To combat terrorism, the ESS calls for a
"mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and
other means" (the earlier draft said "intelligence,
political, military and other means"). To counter
proliferation, the EU should focus on export controls and
political and economic pressures, while also tackling "the
underlying political causes" of proliferation. (Note: The
insistence on export controls and external pressures
generally tracks with our own views, but the latter element
problematically implies that proliferation is a justifiable
response to regional insecurity.) Reflecting recent EU
developments in nonproliferation policy, the revised ESS also
says the EU is committed to universalizing and strengthening
multilateral nonproliferation regimes.


10. (U) The ESS calls for political solutions to regional
conflicts, but recognizes that military and police assets, as
well as economic instruments and civilian reconstruction
expertise, may be needed in the post-conflict stage. Failed
states require a similar mix of instruments. On organized
crime, the revised strategy picks up where the earlier draft
left off by acknowledging the special problem of criminal
networks originating in the Balkans. The solution, it says,
is democracy, good governance, and cooperation with local
authorities.

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More Multilateralism, Please
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11. (C) The strategy makes a bold pitch for the EU to take a
larger role in world affairs (commensurate with its role in
economic and trade matters),and lays claim to the EU's
self-ascribed comparative advantage in combined
civil-military and post-conflict operations. Most
importantly, it calls for threats to European security, new
and old alike, to be addressed through "effective
multilateralism" whenever possible.


12. (C) For the EU, the United Nations is the embodiment of
legitimate multilateralism, so it comes as no surprise that
the ESS calls the UN Charter "the fundamental framework for
international relations." At the December 12-13 EU Summit,
which adopted the ESS, European leaders went further by
reaffirming "the deeply rooted commitment of the EU to make
effective multilateralism a central element of its external
actions, with at its heart a strong UN." The EU can be
expected to enhance its collective position in the UN by
leveraging the combined influence, and votes, of EU member
states. Much of this effort is likely to arise from
recommendations put forth in a European Commission paper
released in September (and welcomed by heads of state at the
December 12-13 EU Summit). That paper, titled "The European
Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism,"
calls on the EU to work for a more effective and efficient
UN, to deepen the EU-UN relationship, including on peace and
security issues, and to promote the EU's values and interests
in UN debates (ref. H). The September EU-UN Joint
Declaration on cooperation in crisis management provides
early evidence of this rapidly deepening partnership.


13. (C) Unfortunately, the ESS fails to address adequately
the question of what the EU should do if multilateral efforts
fail. The Europeans still find it difficult to answer the
question of how to deal with states or non-state actors that
defy the international community, or seek to circumvent
accepted rules of behavior. As we saw in their approach in
Iraq, and are seeing again in Iran, the Europeans advocate
carrot-and-stick diplomacy that is heavy on the carrot but
extremely reluctant to use the stick.


14. (C) Nevertheless, the ESS stands firm where it can by
declaring that the EU "must be ready to act when the rules
are broken... Those who are unwilling (to play by the rules)
should understand that there is a price to be paid, including
in their relationship with the European Union." This is a
small step, but one in the right direction. And for a union
ruled by consensus, which has sometimes seemed to view
multilateralism as both a means and an end, the assertion, no
matter how mild, that forceful measures may sometimes be
needed represents an evolving worldview that would have been
all but unthinkable just a year or two ago.

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What About the Neighbors?
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15. (U) As with the earlier draft, the revised ESS devotes
considerable attention to the problems of Europe's neighbors.
Along with countering the new threats through effective
multilateralism and preventive engagement, building a ring of
security around the enlarged EU stands as a key European
strategic objective. This is not new. For some years the EU
has recognized that its expansion would bring it closer to
the troubled areas of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the
Mediterranean rim. In response, the EU created mechanisms to
promote stabilization, reform and development in these
regions (the Wider Europe Initiative for Eastern and
Southeastern Europe, the Stability and Association Process
for the Balkans, and the Barcelona Process for the
Mediterranean).


16. (C) The ESS broadens Europe's definition of neighborhood
to include the Southern Caucasus and possibly even the
Greater Middle East. New language in the revised ESS calls
on the EU to "take a stronger and more active interest in the
problems of the Southern Caucasus." Interlocutors in
Solana's Policy Planning Unit and on the Council
Secretariat's Southern Caucasus desk speak of a new EU

SIPDIS
willingness to consider near-term inclusion of the Southern
Caucasus in the EU's Wider Europe Initiative (long a U.S.
objective for EU action) (ref. A).


17. (C) On the Middle East, the EU's first priority is to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then to wrestle
with other regional problems. Reflecting growing European
frustrations over the stalled Roadmap, the revised ESS adds
new language committing the EU to "remain engaged and ready
to commit resources to the problem until it is solved." At
the same time, the EU is developing a regional strategy for
the Middle East that recognizes, much like our own, the need
to promote reform throughout the Greater Middle East (ref.
F). EU leaders welcomed this effort at the December 12-13
Summit, and asked HiRep Solana, along with the Council and
Commission, to present a "joint report, within the
implementation of the European Security Strategy," by March

2004. We expect this to be a high priority for the EU in the
coming months.

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More Active, Capable, Coherent?
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18. (C) The ESS section on policy implications for Europe
represents a call to action for European governments. The
ESS argues that to address the threats the EU must become
"more active, more coherent and more capable." EU
governments need to act before situations deteriorate, and
develop the will to increase defense spending and procurement
coordination to ensure interoperability and avoid
duplication. The ESS highlights planning for the EU
armaments agency -- slated to begin work in 2004 -- as a good
first step. This will have a positive impact as long as it
is coordinated well with NATO and doesn't lead to a "Fortress
Europe" procurement approach. The ESS also calls for greater
civilian capacity to address the needs of crisis and
post-crisis situations, and to increase intelligence sharing
and diplomatic coordination among member states.


19. (C) There is also positive potential in the strategy's
call for greater coherence. The EU's CFSP (foreign) and ESDP
(defense) policies have thus far grown in awkward, disjointed
ways. "The challenge now," the ESS argues, "is to bring
together the different instruments and capabilities:
European assistance programs, military and civilian
capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as
the European Development Fund." To the extent that this
represents a willingness to link political, aid and trade
relations to security concerns, it is positive. This is
already underway with regard to nonproliferation: on November
17, the Council adopted a position requiring that all EU
relations with third countries be linked to progress on
upholding international nonproliferation norms (septel).
Commission officials tell us that Syria, with which the
Commission initialed an Association Agreement in December,
will be the first country to sign the EU's new
"nonproliferation clause" (ref. G).
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Transatlantic Relations, NATO, and Russia
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20. (C) The ESS acknowledges that the U.S. remains Europe's
greatest ally and most valuable partner. The revised text
calls the transatlantic relationship "irreplaceable," and
says that "(the EU's) aim should be an effective and balanced
partnership with the U.S.A." The call for an effective and
balanced partnership, new to the revised ESS, reflects the
European desire to enhance credibility by boosting (mostly
military) capabilities; in so doing, the Europeans hope to
earn a stronger voice in Washington.


21. (C) The revised ESS also adds positive new language on
NATO: "The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular
Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and
provide the framework for the strategic partnership between
the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects
our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new
century." The positive decision to clarify NATO's role in
European security, and to highlight Berlin Plus in
particular, reflects what Solana Advisor Burgess described as
a "widespread view that we got it wrong" in the first draft
(ref. D). In that text, NATO was characterized as a
reflection of the transatlantic relationship. In the final
version, the Alliance is afforded an independent identity,
reflected in the language above.


22. (C) The ESS paints a three-tier picture of the EU's
strategic partnerships -- with the U.S. on top; Russia,
China, India, Japan and Canada in the middle; and everybody
else on the bottom. The revised ESS differs from the draft
by separating the EU's relations with Russia from the rest of
the middle tier. According to Burgess, member states agreed
that the first draft failed to recognize the qualitative
differences between the EU's relations with Russia and its
relations with the other four (ref. C). Thus the revised ESS
says of Russia: "We should continue to work for closer
relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and
prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce
progress towards a strategic partnership."

Foster