Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS1274
2004-03-25 10:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA HIGHLIGHT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PREF EAID PHUM XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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251054Z Mar 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001274 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR
AFR, DCHA AND PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID PHUM XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA HIGHLIGHT
PEACEKEEPING AND POST-CONFLICT EFFORTS

REF: STATE 53747

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001274

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR
AFR, DCHA AND PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID PHUM XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA HIGHLIGHT
PEACEKEEPING AND POST-CONFLICT EFFORTS

REF: STATE 53747

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (U) Summary. Major topics of discussion at the
transatlantic consultations on Africa (COAFR),held March 10
in Brussels, included: support to peacekeeping and conflict
prevention activities, including the EU's proposed Africa
Peace Facility and U.S. support to ECOWAS through EUCOM;
political developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC),Uganda, Zimbabwe and Guinea; post-conflict needs in
Liberia; peace processes in Sudan and Burundi; the boundary
dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and humanitarian
concerns related to food insecurity and the bombing of
civilians in the Darfur region. The U.S. and EU agreed on
most issues. End Summary.

--------------
Participants
--------------


2. (U) EU participants included: Nicholas O'Brien, Director
General for African Affairs (MFA) and Pat Kelly, Deputy
Director General for African Affairs (MFA) for the Irish
Presidency; Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the
Great Lakes; Peter Clausen and Genoveva Hernandez, Africa
Desk Officers for the EU Council Secretariat; Anders
Henriksson, Director for the Horn, East and Southern Africa
(DG DEV),Peter Christiansen, Head of Unit for Central Africa
(DG DEV),and Andreas Fischer-Barnicol (DG RELEX) for the
European Commission (EC); and Norbert Braakhuis, Deputy
Director, Africa (MFA) for the incoming Dutch Presidency.
USDEL consisted of Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater (Deputy
Assistant Secretary, AF),William Schofield (Deputy Director,
AF/Regional Affairs),Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor,
USEU/USAID),and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM).

--------------
Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention: Shared Priorities
--------------


3. (C) The Irish Presidency reviewed the status of the Africa

Peace Facility (APF),which O'Brien characterized as an
"exciting new dimension of development and political policy,"
and said that he expected it to be operational before the end
of June. He noted that although "African ownership" of the
APF was important, the EU needed to maintain adequate
oversight of this 250 million euro funding mechanism.
Henriksson added that the EU was not seeking to take over the
African Union (AU) peacekeeping initiatives, but rather
sought to show solidarity with them by establishing the APF.
Presently, the EU is finalizing its internal discussion on
the nature and scope of the APF. According to Henriksson,
this includes determining: 1) how South Africa and north
African countries who are AU members, but not beneficiaries
of the European Development Fund (from which the EU is
drawing financial support for the APF),can be incorporated
into this initiative; 2) how the APF will relate to future
European security and defense operations in Africa (such as
the recent Operation Artemis in the DRC); and 3) how the APF
will relate to and support UN and regional peacekeeping
initiatives. Henriksson mentioned that other lingering EU
concerns about the APF relate to the AU's inability to
effectively manage funds, as well as the lack of military
expertise necessary to assess situations and decide on
logistical needs for each APF deployment.


4. (C) The U.S. welcomed the EU plan to support peacekeeping
in Africa and asked whether APF-supported deployments would
act as bridge operations until UN peacekeepers could arrive
or whether they would remain deployed until stabilization had
been achieved. Henriksson said that although both short-term
and long-term deployments were envisioned, at present only
bridging exercises could realistically be expected. Ajello
pointed out that 250 million euros was "peanuts" and said the
APF deployments should be limited to bridging gaps -- that
the AU should not try to duplicate UNPKOs. He also suggested
that the best APF forces deployed by the AU could be
integrated into follow-on UNPKO operations.


5. (C) When asked whether the APF would engage in any
capacity enhancement initiatives, Henriksson said that at
present this would be overly ambitious, but did not rule it
out. He spoke of triangular cooperation between the EU, AU
and UN in both capacity building and conflict prevention
activities. He noted there was a common EU position on
conflict prevention and said that the actual equipment,
training and logistical support had to come from the Member
States (not the EC). By mid-March, the EU should complete a
comprehensive work plan which will include coordination with
UNPKO. Henriksson requested a POC in Washington for
transatlantic coordination and Bridgewater suggested Mike
Bittrick of AF/RSA.

--------------
DRC: Kabila's Mistakes
--------------


6. (C) In his opening remarks, O'Brien stated that the dates
for the Great Lakes Conference had slipped and probably
could not take place before November 2005. He also
highlighted the need for the Kabila government to regularize
its diplomatic relations with both Uganda and Rwanda. Ajello
said that despite President Kabila's resistance to better
relations with his eastern neighbors, the EU should use its
clout with Kabila to impress on him the importance of
diplomatic ties. He also said the U.S. and EU should work
together to put pressure on Uganda, perhaps using aid to curb
involvement in the affairs of the DRC. Braakuis pointed out
that both Uganda and Rwanda's ambassadors are awaiting
accreditation even though, in Uganda's case, the appointment
was made over a year ago.


7. (C) Ajello described Kabila as better than his father, but
still error prone. He cited the letter Kabila wrote to
Parliament and made public (characterized by Ajello as
"insulting"),his decision to ask the Supreme Court about his
prerogative to appoint members to the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) and the Bokab crisis caused by his decision
to order an arrest outside the chain of command. Ajello also
expressed concern over the integration of the army (i.e., the
lack of a legal basis),problems with the police, and the
bureaucracy put in place by the government to implement DDR
(in order to tap into international funds for this activity).
Ajello also wondered whether MONUC could monitor control of
the main mines and said that this could be discussed in the
UN Security Council as this type of monitoring was not
currently in its mandate.


8. (C) Bridgewater said that the U.S. shared the EU's major
concerns and stated that financial management was key. She
supported SRSG Swing's recent suggestion that consideration
be given to having a "strategic budget review" to address
financial shortfalls. Christiansen noted that the DRC did
not have money to support the upcoming elections. He
recommended that the international community work together to
make sure a framework was in place for the elections, as well
as on financing for it. Lerner said that USAID is also
supporting the IEC with training and other technical support.

--------------
Burundi: Dutch Mediation Positive
--------------


9. (C) O'Brien noted the positive developments in Burundi,
lamenting that the death of the Irish-born papal nuncio had
been a catalyst in this regard. Ajello said that the GoB's
demobilization plans did not go far enough. He thought it
was ridiculous to integrate all ex-combatants into an army of
80,000 and then start to demobilize them. He also noted
that the 36 million dollar price tag for this phase of
demobilization (of the aged, children and disabled) was very
high and that most donors would refuse to pay army salaries.
Christiansen recommended that funds for training should be
restricted to civilians and said he hoped demobilization
would take place before the elections.


10. (C) Braakhuis gave a read-out on the Netherlands'
initiative to sponsor talks between the GoB and FNL. He said
that it was very difficult to work with the FNL because of
their ideological mindset, but within the CNLD there was
great respect for the FNL as the godfather of Hutu resistance
to Tutsi domination. Regarding violence, Braakhuis said that
he felt the FNL would respond to a ceasefire if there were
pressure put on both sides. He said that minimum security
guarantees needed to be in place before the FNL rebels would
agree to attend a conference; Braakhuis worried that the
President did not have a grip on the armed forces. According
to Braakhuis, the FNL wants attention, but establishing a
parallel process could kill the peace in Burundi.
Bridgewater commended the Netherlands for this initiative and
said the U.S. would press for FNL to participate in a
dialogue with the GoB.


11. (C) Regarding AMIB, Christiansen said EC funding should
enable the deployment to last until at least May or June. He
noted that if a UNPKO would take over earlier than that date
(perhaps by April),the EC would return the left over funding
to the Burundi development accounts which had been used to
support AMIB. The U.S. noted that estimates of over 6000 for
the PKO seemed too high. Ajello replied that he thought the
force could be the current AMIB force of about 2800 plus a
headquarters element. Both Christiansen and the Irish
Presidency noted the importance of upcoming elections.

--------------
East Africa: Concern Over Regional Problems
--------------


12. (C) The Irish Presidency underscored EU concern over the
border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea saying that it
had carried on longer than expected but that the EU had no
bright ideas. The EU planned to send a ministerial-level
Troika to the region in early April. The message to the two
parties would be that the decision of the boundary commission
was final and that both countries must cooperate with Lloyd
Axworthy, and that the EU does not view his appointment as an
alternative negotiating mechanism. The US thanked the EU for
this effort, noting that this was consistent with the
position of the U.S. Henriksson urged the U.S. to use its
clout to influence the government in Addis. Schofield said
the U.S. was in contact with the GoE, but cautioned that
since U.S. relations with Eritrea were "strained" we had to
be careful not to give the impression that the U.S. was
siding with Ethiopia in this dispute.


13. (C) Regarding food issues, Lerner said that the U.S. and
EU had developed good transatlantic cooperation in the area
of short term food aid and long term food security, but that
another food shortfall was expected this May in Ethiopia.
Bridgewater noted that to date only 20% of WFP's appeal has
been pledged and that the food pipeline had broken in
February. Henriksson replied that the EC was supporting the
agricultural sector, but that a feudal system which tied
people to the land was causing the vulnerability and that the
Ethiopian government was not relaxing these policies.


14. (C) Bridgewater briefed the EU on EACTI, stating East
Africa was the most important region on the continent for
counter terrorism activities. She explained that EACTI was a
15-month program which included training for law enforcement
and judicial authorities, the strengthening of financial
institutions, and support for border and coastal security.
She said a conference would be hosted in Kampala this April
to plan next steps, including possible expansion of the
program to Madagascar, the Comoros Islands and Yemen.
Christiansen noted that terrorist financing also comes from
the mining of tanzanlite and asked whether the recent closing
of Islamist organizations was connected to USG initiatives.
Schofield said that EACTI was designed to strengthen regional
capabilities and not conduct operational activities. Lerner
noted the option for donors to invest in secular educational
opportunities as an alternative to Islamist madrassas.

--------------
Sudan: Darfur and Navaisha both Precarious
--------------


15. (C) O'Brien expressed "grave concern" over the
deteriorating situation in Darfur, citing the 100,000
refugees in Chad and 800,000 IDPs. He informed the U.S. that
the Government of Sudan had just agreed to U.S.-EU monitoring
of mediation talks planned for next week and said the EU
intended to participate. Objectives of this mediation
include a ceasefire and increased humanitarian access.
(Background: UN Special Envoy Tom Vraalsen was in Brussels on
March 8 and informed the EU of his efforts to involve
President Deby of Chad to mediate between the GoS and rebels
active in Darfur. Besides the humanitarian toll in the
region, Vraalsen expressed concern for the environmental
degradation caused by over-grazing and digging wells to water
herds of cattle. He invited the EU to participate in this
mediation effort and said he also intended to invite the U.S.
End Note.) When asked about a possible joint statement on
Darfur, O'Brien said that he preferred to wait to see what
might happen with this new mediation effort. In any case, he
agreed that it was important for the U.S. and EU to "sing off
the same hymn sheet" and that we should stay in touch.


16. (C) Regarding a possible Human Rights Commission (UNCHR)
resolution about the bombing of civilian populations in
Darfur, O'Brien said he had learned that the GoS would not
cooperate with even an Item 19 resolution. He thought,
therefore, that the EU might pursue an Item 9 resolution,
falling back to an Item 19 if necessary. Both the Irish
Presidency and the incoming Dutch Presidency noted the Africa
voting block in the UNCHR would serve to keep the pressure
off Sudan. Schofield stated that the U.S. would like to
support a strong Item 9 resolution. Braakhuis noted that the
GoS has become accustomed to the pressure of the
international community and it has not always had a positive
impact. Henriksson also noted that the EC's engagement with
the GoS has resulted in "very unsatisfactory meetings,"
particularly with regard to the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur.


17. (C) Braakhuis said he was worried that the situation in
Darfur could complicate the Naivasha talks. He noted there
were a number of pending issues and wondered what the "end
game" was for Sudan. Bridgewater said the Acting Assistant
Secretary was in Naivasha for the talks and reported positive

SIPDIS
movement. She said the U.S. supported the inclusion of Abyei
in the south. Regarding a timeline, she said the U.S. had
hoped for an agreement by the end of last year, but that it
was up to the interested parties to finalize the negotiations
and reach a comprehensive settlement.

--------------
Uganda: LRA vs. Museveni
--------------


18. (C) Regarding the situation in northern Uganda, O'Brien
noted that the LRA had a base in Sudan. Schofield said that
the GoS had said it had stopped supporting the LRA, and he
noted the LRA was on the U.S. terrorism exclusion list.
Bridgewater said that although the U.S. supported the GoU's
struggle against the LRA, a political solution was required,
not a military one. Schofield also pointed out that the GoU
was buying weapons of no particular use, such as jets and
other high technology equipment. He called for more
transparency regarding Uganda's military budget. Braakhuis
commented on the GoU's call to have the International
Criminal Court investigate the LRA leadership and questioned
what impact this might have on a negotiated settlement. He
said there were indications the LRA was getting stronger and
mentioned a UK defense review undertaken by DFID which might
recommend that the strength of the Ugandan military be
increased by one third. Braakhuis said this would further
complicate the situation in Uganda. Both the U.S. and EU
supported the current presidential term limits and felt
President Museveni should step down at the end of his term.

--------------
West Africa: Next steps for Liberia, Guinea and ECOWAS
--------------


19. (C) Bridgewater reported that a DoS/DoD mission had been
undertaken to Liberia to assess military needs and
recommended a merit based military that could protect its
borders, including fishing resources along its coasts. She
said that support to the financial sector was crucial and
that the interim government lacked transparency. She called
for more "economic boots on the ground" and said that the
U.S. Treasury Department would be sending personnel to assist
Liberian authorities.


20. (SBU) Christiansen said that the 9 million euros (of the
total 160 million euros pledge for Liberia) would be
designated for technical support to and audits of key
financial institution, 16 million euros for DDR activities,
18 million euros for local community development (including
reintegration of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants); 8 million
euros to support ECOWAS, and 55 million euros probably for
health and education. He added that 50 million euros were
ready to spend and that a plan was being drafted for the
remainder. O'Brien noted that Ireland had also made 5
million euros available bilaterally for Liberia to support
good governance, health and education.


21. (C) Bridgewater said that the U.S., through EUCOM, would
build capacity of ECOWAS by conducting training and joint
exercises to support rapid deployments and would enhance
communications networks in the region. She also described
initiatives to support ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja,
including efforts to attract the best African military
personnel (through improved housing and other benefits).
Christiansen said that ECOWAS was clearly better now than ten
years ago, but agreed that it still needed strengthening.
Fischer-Barnicol added that good support at the head of state
level for ECOWAS did not translate to improvements in the
organization's bureaucracy. He said the ECOWAS' mission was
not always clear and that only 10% of the EC's pledge for
Liberia would be earmarked for peacekeeping. (Note. At a
separate meeting at DG DEV, the EC expressed dissatisfaction
with Francis Blaine for not being proactive and said that the
EC was considering cutting its financial support for the
ECOWAS office in Liberia. End Note.)


22. (C) Henriksson asked whether ECOWAS was becoming a victim
of its own success and cautioned against overextending the
organization. He noted that although the peace/security
sectors were dynamic, ECOWAS was structured to support
economic growth. Bridgewater shared this concern and agreed
that the organization should not be diverted from its
economic foundation by trying to be "all things to all
people."


23. (C) Bridgewater stated that expanding the scope of the
International Contact Group on Liberia to include Guinea had
merit. She said the U.S. was concerned about a deterioration
of the social and economic conditions in Guinea and opposed
the military stepping in when Presidente Conte left office.
She said the GoG needed to begin a dialogue with the
opposition and the country also needed an independent media.


24. (C) O'Brien stated that the EU was considering engaging
Guinea in an "article 96" dialogue (of the Cotonou agreement)
in which the GoG would come to Brussels and lay out their
reform agenda. The dialogue would continue for three months
and at the end, the EU would decide whether to expand it to a
regular, on-going "article 8" dialogue or end it for lack of
substantive progress in Guinea. Christiansen added that the
EU has asked for the following items to be on the article 96
agenda: 1) an independent body to supervise elections; 2)
liberalization of the airwaves; and 3) measures to reverse
the deterioration of the macro-economic climate.
Christiansen noted that the December 2003 election had added
to the further deterioration in Guinea and that the
president's illness had basically halted the decision making
process. The EC's development assistance is frozen. Lerner
noted that USAID still has a $21 million assistance budget
for Guinea, including programs to address AIDS,
democracy/governance, education and agriculture.

--------------
Zimbabwe: No Bright Solutions
--------------


25. (C) Bridgewater made many of the points contained in
reftel demarche about the continuing political impasse and
the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. She
welcomed the EU's renewal and expansion of targeted sanctions
and stressed the critical importance of urging the GoZ to
establish a meaningful dialogue with the opposition parties.
Responding to a question from the Irish Presidency about U.S.
sanctions, Bridgewater stated that they included some
businesses that were owned and/or operated by senior ZANU-PF
figures. O'Brien said that the EU had considered similar
provisions but had concluded that they were inoperable. He
also said the EU did not favor general economic sanctions
that would affect the population. Henriksson noted that
there was a lack of understanding among Zimbabwean citizens
about the EU's sanctions, with many believing them to be
comprehensive instead of targeted. Bridgewater responded
that public diplomacy was critical and that many people were
surprised that the U.S. still was giving $380 million for
humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe. Lerner reviewed the
various humanitarian needs, including the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
drought in the region, unemployment and a contracting
economy. O'Brien noted that the parallel dollar economy was
thriving. Henriksson said that the EC had allocated 20
million euros for food needs until May, but no further
funding was available. He also said that the GoZ had not
requested more food aid and that if they did there was a risk
of politicized distribution for electoral gains.


26. (C) Regarding a UNCHR resolution, O'Brien said that
Mugabe had been successful in convincing his counterparts in
Africa that he was engaging in an anti-colonial struggle and
that African governments were not responsive to critical
resolutions. Bridgewater encouraged the EU to consult with
South Africa, Nigeria and other African members of the
Commission before pursuing a resolution.

--------------
Comment
--------------


27. (SBU) The Irish Presidency's pledge to make Africa one
of its top priorities was evidenced at the COAFR discussions.
Irish engagement in reconstructing Liberia and in finalizing
decisions related to the APF peacekeeping facility are two
examples of the Presidency's leadership being instrumental in
achieving goals supported by the U.S. Dutch leadership in
Burundi and Sudan peace negotiations bode well for continued
transatlantic cooperation in the second semester of 2004.


(Ambassador Bridgewater has cleared this message.)

SCHNABEL