Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS1134
2004-03-17 17:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AFTER MADRID

Tags:  EFIN PGOV PINR PREL PTER EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 001134 

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: EFIN PGOV PINR PREL PTER EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AFTER MADRID

REF: USEU TODAY 02/06/04

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

------------------------
Summary: Europe Wakes Up
------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 001134

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: EFIN PGOV PINR PREL PTER EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AFTER MADRID

REF: USEU TODAY 02/06/04

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary: Europe Wakes Up
--------------


1. (SBU) The EU is re-examining its role in the war against
terrorism following the March 11 attack in Madrid. Many EU
efforts to improve its counter-terrorism (CT) effectiveness
-- for instance by revising the EU CT Action Plan and
creating and streamlining the Clearinghouse -- were in the
works before Madrid but are now being pushed along with
greater urgency. Others, such as establishing a CT
Coordinator, were not yet considered ripe for adoption just a
week ago. European Council President Bertie Ahern announced
on March 12 that he would seek a raft of agreements on
counter-terrorism at the March 25-26 European Council
(Summit).


2. (C) A Council press release later detailed Ahern's
proposals, saying he would seek agreement by EU Heads of
State and Government to: adopt an EU solidarity clause; adopt
a revised CT Action Plan; appoint an EU CT coordinator;
enhance security and intelligence cooperation among member
states; adopt a long-dormant "guidelines" document to provide
strategic guidance to EU CT activities; endorse the draft UN
Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism; enhance the
"efficiency and effectiveness" of EU efforts to combat
terrorist finance; reinforce cooperation with Europol,
Eurojust and the Police Chief's Task Force; speed up
implementation of existing agreements on border and document
security; and adopt a program for enhancing EU-third country
CT cooperation. EU staffers are working round the clock to
elaborate these proposals for policymakers, who will begin
debating them in marathon sessions between March 18 and March

26. While many of the proposals put forward by the Irish
Presidency are presentational, and intended to respond to
political demands in the wake of the Madrid bombings, the
shock of Madrid and a strong new mandate from heads of

government at the March 25-26 Council session may help the EU
move ahead where progress heretofore has been stymied. This
cable discusses the timeline and likely outcome of these
debates. End Summary.

--------------
Timeline: From Now to the Summit
--------------


3. (U) PM Ahern's proposals will be discussed first by the EU
PermReps (COREPER II) on March 18, then by Justice and
Interior Ministers at a special session of the Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) Council on March 19, then by FMs at the
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on
March 22, and finally by Presidents and PMs at the European
Council March 25-26. Not all of the proposals will make it
through the guantlet of EU preparatory bodies in time for the
European Council, but some will; those that don't will be
sent back to the preparatory bodies for further elaboration
and negotiation. The three high-profile measures -- the
creation of an EU CT Coordinator, the adoption of a revised
EU Action Plan, and the adoption of an EU Solidarity Clause
-- will almost certainly be adopted in some form.

--------------
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
--------------


4. (C) PM Ahern said that the EU "will consider the
appointment of a security coordinator to enhance cooperation
between EU bodies and third countries and streamline
activities in the fight against terrorism." Commission
security policy expert Patricia Holland told us the
Coordinator would work in the Council Secretariat under HiRep
Solana in an arrangement similar to that of WMD Rep Annalisa
Giannella. Unlike Giannella, however, the CT Coordinator
will, if mandated as expected by the European Council, be
vested with the explicit endorsement of EU leaders (Giannella
was appointed by Solana unilaterally, as a "Personal
Representative" for WMD). The move to create a Coordinator
has been pushing slowly forward since January (ref),but has
taken on new urgency in the wake of last week's Madrid
bombings.


5. (C) The Coordinator post is envisaged as tasking one
person with facilitating cooperation among EU institutions --
which jealously guard their stovepiped competencies, often
leading to inconsistent policy and ineffective activities --
and with interfacing with third countries on behalf of the
EU's CT machinery. To a limited degree, and when asked, the
Coordinator would assist EU Member States with their CT
obligations under the revised EU Action Plan. The
Coordinator would have no direct authority over member state
ministries, but would instead serve both as a clearinghouse
for member state CT activities and as a facilitator for those
seeking greater coordination and assistance. Many in
Brussels also hope that the Coordinator will acquire the
moral authority to "name and shame" when Member States fail
to live up to their Action Plan commitments.


6. (C) In a meeting with visiting EUR/DAS Bradtke on March
16, Council External Affairs DG Robert Cooper said he hoped
the Coordinator would not only coordinate ongoing efforts,
but help to drive them forward. To do that, the office would
need to have a certain amount of Member State acquiescence,
which will be difficult to obtain even after Madrid.
According to a British-national Commission contact who was
part of an EU delegation sent to London to pulse its views of
enhanced CT coordination, UK Home Secretary Blunkett has
staked out an over-my-dead-body position on the idea of a
Coordinator whose influence might extend beyond the halls of
Brussels. If that's the case, he asked, "How can we expect
smaller countries to cooperate if the British won't?"


7. (C) According to our interlocutors, the name most often
mentioned as the first EU CT Coordinator is retiring Council
Secretariat DG for Justice and Home Affairs Charles Elsen, a

SIPDIS
choice which would reflect the EU preference for a low-key
senior bureaucrat to fill the post rather that a political
figure. But it is unclear how Elsen's front-runner status
will be affected by the March 14 Socialist electoral victory
in Spain. After the Madrid bombings, Solana will not be able
to name a Coordinator who does not have the fullest support
of Spain.


8. (C) While the Coordinator will probably be tasked with
enhancing inter-institutional coordination, it is unlikely
that the Commission will be any more inclined to cooperate
than some of the Member States. This is because CT policy in
the Commission is divided among several (often competitive
and mutually jealous) Directorates-General. They have been
reluctant to coordinate more with each other let alone with
outsiders such as the envisaged EU Coordinator. Recognizing
this shortcoming, the Commission is separately debating how
to improve its own internal "cross-pillar" coordination, with
ideas ranging from the creation of a single executive-level
Commission Coordinator, perhaps as a junior counterpart to
the Council's Coordinator, to a coordination group that would
bring together experts from the relevant Directorates-General
on a standing or as-needed basis. We believe the latter
option is more likely, as that would allow each DG to have
its own seat at the collective coordinating "table."
Commission Chiefs of Cabinet discussed the issue March 15 and
the College of Commissioners discussed it March 16. We do
not yet have a readout of those discussions.

-------------- -
Adoption of a revised Action Plan on Terrorism
-------------- -


9. (C) The Irish Presidency was tasked with revising the 2001
CT Action Plan in time for the June European Council. PM
Ahern surprised everyone by announcing on March 12 that he
would seek its completion in time for adoption at the March
25-26 gathering. EU interlocutors involved in the revision
process tell us that the new Action Plan will still not
provide the kind of actionable detail that many would like.
Instead, in the words of one Commission contact, it will
mostly be "motherhood and apple pie." Among other things, it
will call on Member States to do more in regard to terrorism
finance, cooperation with third countries and organizations
(U.S., CTC, ASEAN, etc.),law enforcement and intelligence
cooperation, securing borders and international transport,
addressing root causes of terrorism, and targeting assistance
to countries in greatest need.


10. (SBU) As a follow-on initiative, PM Ahern will seek
support for the creation of a more detailed implementation
plan to guide EU and Member State implementation of the
Action Plan. The March 25-26 Council will be just the
beginning of that process. Weeks or months will likely be
required for the kind of detailed (yet consensual)
articulation of steps and benchmarks desired by the Irish
Presidency (and by the UK, the most notable and credible
supporter of a strong implementation plan).

--------------
Solidarity Clause
--------------


11. (C) The draft EU Solidarity Clause was agreed late last
year during the EU Constitution negotiations in the
Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). But failure to agree on
other constitutional items prevented the clause from being
adopted at that time. The clause (Article I-42 of the draft
Constitution) states that the EU shall act "in a spirit of
solidarity if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist
attack or natural or man-made disaster." The idea is for the
EU to be involved, as the EU, in terrorist and disaster
response efforts, whether these responses include public
health, law enforcement, or military resources.


12. (C) The clause does not describe the kinds of actions the
EU might take to "assist" Spain (assuming Spain asked for
assistance). Unlike many other aspects of the draft
Constitution, the Solidarity Clause would not require a new
treaty to adopt. Nothing in the existing EU treaties forbids
such steps, and a "legal basis" could be found under the
current CFSP and JHA provisions. Political agreement by EU
member states is all that is required to put the clause in
force. Council, Commission and Member State interlocutors
tell us that in the wake of Madrid, the clause should adopted
with little debate. While a few EU member states (most
notably Sweden) reportedly retabled some of their original
objections to the clause, we don't expect any -- after Madrid
-- to stand in the way of consensus. At the very least, says
Solana Senior Advisor Niall Burgess, Member States will step
over themselves to declare their full support for the spirit
of the clause, if not the text.

--------------
Enhanced Intelligence Cooperation
--------------


13. (U) PM Ahern said the EU "will strive to improve
mechanisms for cooperation between police and security
services and promote effective, systematic collaboration in
intelligence services between Member States." Two options
are on the table:

-- Creating a new "European Information Bureau to bring
together information analysis inside and outside the EU"
-- Strengthening Member State support for Europol.


14. (C) The first option was proposed by Austria at the last
JHA Council on February 19 but was not well received.
Belgian PM Verhofstadt renewed the proposal over the weekend
in light of Madrid. The second option would seem easiest --
to give Europol the means required to make it effective.
However, Member States have been reluctant to give Europol
information, despite the fact that the fight against
terrorism has been one of its central objectives since its
creation in July 1999. Our money is on Europol. If Madrid
doesn't empower this organization, nothing ever will.

--------------
The "Guidelines" for Fighting Terrorism
--------------


15. (C) PM Ahern is calling for "speedy and final agreement
on the draft Guidelines for a Common Approach to the Fight
against Terrorism." The Guidelines document -- intended as a
sort of strategic umbrella for EU CT policy -- has been
blocked in draft for the past six months. According to Ken
O'Flaherty of the UK Mission, the Guidelines have become
mired in theological debates over the definition and taxonomy
of terrorism. It is doubtful that these debates can become
unblocked in time for the document's adoption on March 26.
But it may not really matter. The declaratory statement
released my EU leaders at the European Council will likely be
of sufficient depth and breadth -- in the context of a large
consensual union -- that it could serve as the strategic
umbrella that the EU has thus far lacked. Solana Advisor
Burgess predicts exactly that, and suggests that without
agreement on the Guidelines, the EU could simply build upon
whatever declaration emerges on March 26 in order to
articulate strategic guidance for CT policy.

--------------
Increased EU-UN Coordination on Terrorism
--------------

16. (SBU) PM Ahern wants to refocus EU efforts to achieve
support for the draft comprehensive Convention on Terrorism
currently under discussion at the UN. This was originally
endorsed by the EU in September 2001, when leaders adopted
the CT Action Plan. Yet to date -- after almost three years
of declared EU support for a single comprehensive UN CT
Convention -- only six of the twelve existing international
CT conventions have been signed and ratified by all EU member
states. Therefore, any move to renew attention to this issue
has as much to do with pressuring the EU's own Member States
to speed up the process as it does with signaling support to
outsiders.


17. (C) Under the Italian Presidency, the EU began a
concerted effort to strengthen ties between the CTC and the
EU's third-pillar (i.e. external affairs) Counter-Terrorism
Working Group (COTER). Between October and December 2003,
COTER members met with the Chairmen of the CTC, UNODC,
Sanction's Committee, and other UN groups to discuss
enhancing EU-UN CT cooperation. The EU wants to strengthen
these new ties and push the relationships even closer. In
particular, the EU wants to support the "revitalization" of
the CTC in order to give it a more active role in global CT
efforts, according to Irish COTER Chair Patricia O'Grady. In
addition, the EU wants to coordinate more with the CTC, UNODC
and CTAG in designing and implementing EU assistance programs
to third countries. These two efforts represent what we
understand to be the focus of the "new initiatives" in EU-UN
coordination mentioned by PM Ahern.

--------------
Financing of Terrorism
--------------


18. (C) PM Ahern is calling on the EU "to enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of the EU,s mechanisms for the
freezing of terrorist assets and to identify the movement of
terrorist finances." He said also that the Irish will "give
priority to taking forward work on the expected Communication
on the prevention of terrorist financing..." According to
Irish RELEX Counselor Kyle O'Sullivan, the proposal for a
"Communication" will come out of the Commission's JHA
Directorate-General. It has been in the works for some time
and was expected to be issued later this spring. Its release
is being accelerated as a result of the Madrid bombings.
O'Sullivan has not seen a draft, but understands that it
focuses on the creation of a network for the exchange of
information among member states, while preserving the system
of contact points between Financial Intelligence Units and
Central Banks.


19. (C) Beyond that, the statement refers generally to
ongoing efforts, conducted under the leadership of the Irish
Presidency, to improve Clearinghouse working methods. The
proposal being prepared for COREPER March 18 is made up of a
"modest" list of areas where Clearinghouse practices could be
improved, including:

-- focusing on individuals associated with designated groups;
-- member states providing more substantial background
information when they present proposals for designations;
-- the Clearinghouse renewing its focus on long-standing but
essentially "dormant" proposals, with an eye toward resolving
them one way on another;-- setting agendas for Clearinghouse
meetings that would direct the focus toward specific groups
rather than invite comment on all outstanding proposals at
any given meeting;
-- participation (albeit non-voting) by other services such
as Europol in the meetings;
-- taking a more active approach to renewing the list, as
required every six months (e.g., taking a more rigorous look
at the designated individuals to ensure that they have not
died in the period since their designation).

--------------
Measures to Reinforce Practical Cooperation
--------------


20. (C) PM Ahern's reference to reinforcing "practical
cooperation with... the Police Chiefs Task Force, Europol and
Eurojust" is a recognition of the underutilized character of
these organizations. Of the three, Europol, which is still
trying to find its way and earn the respect of Member States,
is garnering the most attention and probably holds the
greatest promise. Although terrorism has been in its mandate
since it was created in 1999, its work in this area to date
has been limited to writing threat assessments. It has no
operational capacity. In December, France unveiled an
initiative designed to make Europol operationally capable of
carrying out investigations. The French proposal also calls
for it to have the technical information required to provide
more aid to Member States in specific investigations, and to
have greater powers. The French Interior minister claimed to
have the support of the Commission, Austria, Spain and
Germany. The Irish proposal is to reinforce this initiative
with a focus on counter-terrorism.


21. (C) The Police Chiefs Task Force is a police-to-police
network that bypasses central government ministries (in hopes
of making it faster and more efficient than other
coordinating bodies). It is unclear how the EU could
interface more effectively with this organization, or indeed
whether it should. Eurojust is a new organization still
finding its feet. The Irish Presidency wants to give it a
boost, and is perhaps using the raft of CT proposals for the
March 25-26 European Council as a way of doing so. Yet it is
hard for us to see how it could help in counter-terrorism.

--------------
Implementing Existing Measures
--------------


22. (C) The Irish proposal to "take forward work on the
Framework Decision on the Mutual recognition of Confiscation
Orders" refers to a draft decision that was alomost agreed at
the February 19 JHA Council. Under the proposal each Member
State will have to recognize and execute on its territory
confiscation orders issued by judicial authorities of another
Member State. The Framework Decision is based on the
principle of "mutual recognition of judgments" throughout the
EU and forms part of a series of such decisions: After the
Council Meeting Feb. 19th Irish Justice Minister Mc Dowell
said he was aiming for political agreement on the draft at
the next JHA Council on March 30th. He noted that this
Framework decision was closely linked to the already adopted
Framework Decision on the Mutual recognition of orders
freezing property or evidence. It was also linked to the
draft Framework Decision on confiscation of crime-related
proceeds, instrumentalities and property on which the JHA
Council adopted a general approach in December 2002. In
light of Madrid, the confiscations agreement will probably be
endorsed at the Special JHA Council on March 19.


23. (U) PM Ahern also called for "the development of the
second generation Schengen Information System and the new
Visa Information System and the proposed European Borders
Agency." The SIS is a lookout database that keeps on file
names of individuals who are barred from entering the
Schengen area, as well as well as other individuals and
stolen objects wanted by the authorities. The proposed
upgrades will include a biometric function to assist in the
identification of listed individuals and will also support
automatic transliteration capabilities for names from
non-Latin alphabets (such as Chinese, Russian, Arabic, etc.).
Other upgrades include more data displayed on user terminals
and the capability to query results and link searches between
people and objects. In this regard, the current SIS will
evolve from a hit/no-hit name-checking system to one that
could be of increased value to law enforcement entities. The
EC has also proposed that
EUROPOL and EUROJUST should also be connected to SIS-II.


24. (U) Similarly, the proposed Visa Information System (VIS)
will contain a biometric function and will tie all EU
consular posts abroad with ports of entry. Neither the
upgraded SIS nor VIS is expected to become operational before

2007. The Border Agency will help Member States coordinate
policy, training and equipment acquisitions and could be
established as early as 2005.

--------------
External aspects
--------------


25. (C) The EU wants to make CT a more central and actionable
item in its relations with third countries, according to
COTER Chair O'Grady. In terms of technical assistance, the
EU will seek to better coordinate Member State and Commission
programs to ensure maximum impact and to avoid duplication.
The COTER working group is creating a matrix of existing
programs in order to assist this effort (much as WMD Rep
Giannella has done in relation to Member State and Commission
nonproliferation assistance programs). Under COTER lead, the
EU is also looking for ways to design and implement these
programs by drawing on the expertise of international (e.g.
CTC, CTAG) and regional (e.g. ASEAN, GCC) organizations.


26. (C) The EU also says it wants to "operationalize" its
political- and expert-level dialogues with third countries on
CT issues. Taking a page from the revised work program of
the U.S.-EU COTER troika consultations agreed under the
Italian Presidency in 2003, the EU is likely to seek
specific, achievable objectives in its dialogues with
countries such as Russia, China, India and Canada. In a
confidential report on EU CT activities presented to FMs at

SIPDIS
the GAERC in December (please protect),the Presidency and
Council Secretariat recommended that the EU "focus COTER
Troika meetings with third countries, whenever possible, on a
more operational perspective... One objective of this
exercise should be to devise, where appropriate common lines
of action toward certain countries and/or regional
organizations. A specific priority should be given to the
implementation of the revised mechanism for dialogue with the
United States."

--------------
Comment
--------------


27. (C) Many of the proposals put forward by the Irish
Presidency are presentational, and intended to respond to
political demands in the wake of the Madrid bombings rather
than move the EU forward in significant ways in their
counter-terrorism activities. Still, the creation of a
"Counterterror Czar" and a new political impetus from the
Council session could help improve EU implementation of
decisions taken in the wake of the September 11 attacks in
the US. Since then, some of the initial EU elan became
bogged down in legal debates and differing legal practices in
member states. The shock of Madrid and a strong new mandate
from heads of government at the March 25-26 Council session
may help the EU move ahead where progress heretofore has been
stymied.

Foster