DG COOPER ON DPRK: EU READY TO HELP WHEN TIME IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001119

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2014
TAGS: PREL KNNP KN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DG COOPER ON DPRK: EU READY TO HELP WHEN TIME IS
RIGHT

REF: BRUSSELS 1081

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Visiting EAP PDAS Donald Keyser met with Council DG
for External Relations Robert Cooper March 5 on the margins
of semestral troika consultations with the EU (reftel).
Cooper expressed satisfaction with the slow but steady
progress in the Six Party process and offered the EU's
assistance both in support of the process (i.e. to deliver
any messages) and afterward (i.e. when the time comes for
European aid and trade incentives). (COMMENT: We believe the
Department should bear Cooper's offer -- conveyed also by
regional directors at the troika -- in mind as the Six Party
process moves forward. Multiple avenues for EU support
exist, from political declarations to economic carrots when
the time is right -- all in consultation with the U.S. END
COMMENT.) Cooper drew a parallel between the North Korea and
Iran, saying that in both cases the trend lines looked
positive, if halting. And he suggested that the lessons of
the Iraq war were helping to curb the Libyan, Iranian and
Pakistani WMD programs, and hopefully also the DPRK program.
North Korea seems increasingly interested in aid and trade
issues, he said, and in dealings with the EU has been less
preoccupied by the old insistence on U.S. security
guarantees. The EU will convene an economic reform seminar
in Pyongyang in April. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Accompanying Cooper were Council Secretariat DPRK Desk
Director Antonio Tanca and China Desk Director Ana Ramirez.
USEU DCM Jim Foster and USEU poloff also attended.


3. (C) Cooper opened by assessing that efforts in North Korea
"do not seem to be going badly now." He said that in
retrospect, the war in Iraq might have been a good thing from
the nonproliferation perspective because it appeared to be
having a powerful and positive impact on Libyan, Iranian and
Pakistani WMD programs. Hopefully it was having a similar
impact on North Korea, he said. Keyser agreed that the
Coalition resolve in Iraq was having an effect on
proliferating states, and added that the Libyan and Khan
events were potentially instructive for and manifestly
troubling to the DPRK, despite its insistence otherwise.


4. (C) Cooper said the U.S. "strategy of calm patience" in
the face of North Korea's "panicky attempts to provoke a
crisis" seemed to have worked. The slow, deliberate pace of
the Six Party process was probably a good thing, he said,
because it had the effect of lowering temperatures and
dampening North Korea's heated rhetoric. "It can't be called
a success story," he continued, "but it could be a lot
worse." He also drew a parallel between the DPRK and Iran,
"where the process is not entirely successful but where slow
steady trend lines have emerged." (COMMENT: Cooper's
repeatedly expressed satisfaction with the Six Party Process
was probably intended as a subtle message that the patient
and unified-multilateral-front approach to North Korea might
usefully serve as a model for dealing with other
proliferating states, e.g. Iran. END COMMENT.)


5. (C) As evidence that tensions were waning, Tanca cited a
recent meeting in Brussels between EU WMD Rep Giannella and a
DPRK official, in which the official "barely mentioned" the
North Korean goal of obtaining security guarantees from the
U.S. This was a new dynamic, Cooper and Tanca said, which
was also reflected in the DPRK's growing interest in engaging
the EU on aid and trade issues. Keyser agreed that the Six
Party Talks have pushed the North Koreans to focus more on
their core interests -- i.e. economic and regime security --
and less on their earlier insistence on U.S. or multilateral
security guarantees. Tanca said the heads of EU member state
delegations in North Korea, in coordination with the
Commission, were organizing a seminar on economic reform in
Pyongyang, tentatively scheduled for April 27 - May 1.


6. (C) Cooper said the EU would continue delivering a strong
message of support for the Six Party Talks in all dealings
with North Korean officials. He added, "if at any time you
think there is some way we can deliver a message, or think of
some message we can send, let us know." Keyser responded
that the U.S. appreciated the EU's support for the process
and that we would consult more as/when the time drew near for
the EU to have a greater role. For now, the focus needed to
remain squarely on the goal of "complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement" (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, including its clandestine HEU program.
Cooper agreed, and said that the EU had no desire to see the
process rushed. Just "let us know when you think we should
get involved," he said, "we'll be ready once things are
resolved and you begin talking economics and assistance."


7. (C) Tanca said also that the EU would introduce a
resolution on North Korea at the UNCHR this year. Keyser
urged the EU to consult closely with South Korea on the draft
resolution. Cooper said they would (although it was clear in
the meeting that the EU had not previously thought about
consulting South Korea).

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Comment: Considering the EU Offer
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8. (C) Cooper's message that the EU would like to help when
the time came was reinforced by points made earlier in the
day by a regional directors-level troika during U.S.-EU
consultations on Asia. At that meeting, EU interlocutors
expressed gratitude at the U.S. effort to keep the EU in the
loop about progress in the Six Party Talks and reiterated the
EU desire to help when the time comes. This willingness to
help on our (or Six Party) terms -- conveyed at multiple
levels and with an unobtrusive openness -- contrasts sharply
with the EU's irritation last year at feeling left out of the
whole process, particularly with regard to KEDO. The EU's
standing offer should be kept in mind as the Six Party
process advances. While the time for European carrots may
not have yet arrived, perhaps there are other things the EU
could do to support the process in the near term. For
example, we could talk to the EU about drafting a high-level
declaration of support for the Six Party Talks, which could
include strong, even conditional language on the need for
CVID. We could maximize the impact of such a declaration by
suggesting and consulting on its language and timing. Other
options exist as well and should be carefully examined. END
COMMENT.


9. (U) PDAS Keyser has cleared this message.

Foster