Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRUSSELS1074
2004-03-12 15:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

SOLANA ON BOSNIA: PARTNERSHIP REQUIRES TRUST, TOO

Tags:  BK MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001074 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014
TAGS: BK MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SOLANA ON BOSNIA: PARTNERSHIP REQUIRES TRUST, TOO

REF: STATE 51534

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott. Reason: 1.5 (B
)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001074

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014
TAGS: BK MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SOLANA ON BOSNIA: PARTNERSHIP REQUIRES TRUST, TOO

REF: STATE 51534

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott. Reason: 1.5 (B
)(D).


1. (C) This is a joint USEU/USNATO message. Policy
recommendation in para 12.


2. (C) Summary: In an animated discussion with Ambassadors
Schnabel and Burns March 9 on planning for a post-SFOR EU
mission in Bosnia, EU HiRep Javier Solana said, "If you want
the EU to be your partner in Europe, the US must learn to
trust us." Solana argued that U.S. proposals (reftel) for a
NATO HQ in Sarajevo led by a two-star officer, as well as
views on Dayton authorities and continuing NATO
responsibility for PIFWCs, "will not fly." He stressed that
clarity of command required that the EUFOR commander must be
the final authority, legally and practically. Ambassador
Burns told Solana that the US wants the EU mission to
succeed, and that we would continue to work practically with
the EU to resolve misunderstandings and outstanding problems.
However, he reaffirmed that we continue to support an
important role for a NATO HQ in defense reform,
counter-terrorism, and PIFWCs. Burns urged that we work
pragmatically to iron out differences before the transition.


3. (C) Solana's reaction to the US position reflects the EU
concern that an EU-led mission in Bosnia be clearly perceived
in Bosnia as the supreme authority, which we heard again from
the EU at the March 10 NAC-PSC (see USNATO 242). Ambassador
Burns used the NAC-PSC to assuage these concerns, restating
that the US wants the EU to succeed and fully accepts that
the EU will have the lead role in post-SFOR Bosnia. He said
the US would work to make sure that the Bosnians understand
this fact. USEU and USNATO recommend that the USG take a
second look at the question of the hierarchy of ranks in
Bosnia between the EU and NATO military leaders. In order to
avoid a senseless &bidding war8 over ranks between NATO and
the EU, one solution would be for the NATO commander in
Sarajevo to be a one-star officer, as opposed to a two-star.
Not only would this be seen as a positive gesture by the EU,
but it would remove the incentive for the EU to put a

three-star officer in command of its operation, thereby
ensuring that the AFSOUTH Deputy Commander in Naples would
remain the higher ranking officer ) a key point in our favor
as we seek to maintain a strict adherence to Berlin Plus
principles. End Summary.


4. (C) Ambassadors Burns and Schnabel met March 9 with EU
High Representative Javier Solana to review planning for a
possible transition from SFOR to a EU-led mission in Bosnia.
Ambassador Burns noted that a positive response to Solana's
proposals on exchange of liaison offices at SHAPE and EU
Military Staff would be forthcoming soon from NATO. He
stressed that the US wants an EU mission in Bosnia to
succeed, and agrees that the EU must be seen to be in charge
in Bosnia after SFOR shuts down. We want to avoid the
perception of competition between the EU and NATO, Ambassador
Burns stressed. He outlined reftel views on NATO's post-SFOR
role in Bosnia, including continuing responsibilities for
defense reform, counter-terrorism, and apprehension of PIFWCs.

EU Accepts Any NATO Nominee in an "International Capacity"
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Solana said he was surprised that a NATO response to
his proposals on liaison offices had been so long in coming,
and confirmed that the EU would respect DSACEUR's decision to
nominate any officer to fill the NATO liaison billets at EU
Military Staff, regardless of nationality (a key point for
non-EU allies Turkey, Norway and Canada). Solana had
delivered this message personally to the Turkish CHOD at the
beginning of the week, emphasizing that the Turks were "more
than welcome, they are super-welcome." Ambassador Burns
welcomed this statement, and encouraged Solana to repeat it
at the March 10 NAC/PSC.

BOSNIA: DO U.S. POSITIONS REFLECT LACK OF TRUST IN EU?
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Turning to Bosnia, Solana became highly animated. He
said the U.S. position on continuing roles for a NATO HQ
seemed to contradict the basic message of "mission
accomplished." Instead, it appeared the US seeks a joint
NATO/EU operation, rather than an EU-led mission using Berlin
Plus. The end result turned Berlin Plus on its head: instead
of the EU having guaranteed access to NATO assets, it
appeared the US wished to maintain NATO authority in Bosnia
while using only EU assets on the ground.

7. (C) He pointed to the US proposal for a NATO HQ led by a
two-star general of equal rank to the EUFOR commander as one
example. This would blur lines of authority to the local
population. It must be clear that the EUFOR commander is the
final authority. NATO will have a small HQ of a couple
hundred people, many not in uniform. The EU will command
several thousand troops. Clarity of command requires that
final authority in Bosnia be vested in the EUFOR commander.
If the EU and NATO are to be partners, then NATO must be
prepared to trust the EU, Solana stressed.


8. (C) U.S. insistence on NATO HQ responsibility for
apprehension of PIFWCs was another sign of "lack of trust."
The NATO HQ in Sarajevo would be too small to have any
operational capability. Any operations against a PIFWC would
require local forces to provide area support for a Special
Forces operation mounted from outside Bosnia. That is how it
has been up until now under SFOR command, and that is how it
should continue once EUFOR takes over. But since EUFOR will
provide the area support, the EUFOR commander must have the
same authorities now vested in the SFOR commander. Solana
briefly reviewed the U.S. points in reftel and said flatly
"these will not fly." Instead, he suggested that NATO allies
could continue to mount operations against PIFWCs, but that
they must be under the ultimate direction of the EUFOR
commander on the ground.


9. (C) Ambassador Burns stressed that the U.S. proposes
vesting Dayton authorities in DSACEUR or an appropriate
official in AFSOUTH, to be delegated to NATO or the EU as
needed to complete their missions. Solana was not swayed,
saying the US needs to be ready to trust an EU general. He
pointed out that the circumstances for EUFOR could not be
better for the US: our most trusted European ally, the UK,
will occupy every key position all the way up the command
ladder. Lord Ashdown is still in place, a UK commander will
lead EUFOR, report to a British officer as DCINC at AFSOUTH,
who in turn will report to a Brit as DSACEUR.


10. (C) Solana concluded that the impression left by US
positions was that Washington is still not ready to trust the
EU to take on this mission. The EU is ready to do the
policing mission, provide the resources to assist the
Bosnians and try to eventually bring them into Europe. To be
successful, it needs the visibility and authority to carry
out those tasks. If the U.S. has a political problem with
this, it should say so outright. Ambassador Burns assured
Solana that the U.S. supports an EU-led mission, and want to
help it be a success. He promised to convey Solana's views
to Washington. In addition, he argued that the U.S.
proposals for a residual NATO headquarters were limited,
practical, and common-sensical. There was full support for
them in Washington.


11. (C) Post-Script: At the NAC-PSC the next day, Ambassador
Burns used his intervention to reiterate our basic message
while allaying EU fears about US intentions vis--vis the
SFOR transition. Noting that Bosnia will become the template
for Berlin Plus, Burns said that the US wants the EU to
succeed. He said that the US agrees that the EU will be in
the lead in Bosnia, as it will have the preponderance of
forces on the ground, and that we will do everything to make
it abundantly clear to the Bosnians that the EU, not NATO,
had the leading role. The Ambassador assured the EU that
NATO would work with the EU on PIFWCs and that CT operations
are aimed at preventing foreign terrorists from gaining a
foothold in Bosnia. He said that Dayton was a complex issue
that would have to be resolved, but that clearly the EU would
need to be vested with its powers, as would NATO. Burns
suggested a possible model would be to vest the authorities
in DSACEUR, as he would be in both NATO and EU chains of
command. After the meeting, Solana thanked Ambassador Burns
for his remarks, which he said clearly articulated US
positions in a way that had given the process positive
momentum by showing the US commitment.

COMMENT AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION:
--------------


12. (C) The intensity of Solana's reaction reflects the need
to continue to work with the EU on the details of a hand-off.
To help keep the process on track, one area where compromise
is possible without crossing our redlines is the rank of the
U.S. general in charge of NATO HQ Sarajevo. We understand
that the EU has sent mixed signals in the past on whether
their EUFOR commander would be a three-star general and leave
it to the US military to assess whether the EU has a valid
point about clarity of command. We believe that the EU has a
valid point about the need for political clarity in Bosnia.
In particular, the Europeans have been adamant with us that
their own history in Bosnia peacekeeping requires that the EU
be seen as a credible guarantor of security. We believe
making the Senior Military Representative in Bosnia a
one-star general makes sense as an area to show flexibility
with the EU. It would give nothing away on the continuing
operational role for the U.S. and NATO and is consistent with
current NATO practice in its headquarters in Tirana and
Skopje (which was recently downgraded to a one star billet).
Finally, by removing the incentive for the EU to send a
three-star to lead its Bosnia force, we would ensure the
seniority of the AFSOUTH Deputy Commander, thereby
reinforcing the position of this NATO command in the EU,s
chain of command.

SCHNABEL