BRAZIL-UNSC: HAITI PKO UPDATE 26 APRIL 2004

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000991

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS BR UNSC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL-UNSC: HAITI PKO UPDATE 26 APRIL 2004

REF: A. STATE 88207

B. BRASILIA 685

C. BRASILIA 819

D. BRASILIA 864

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4
(B)(D)


1. (C) Summary. With introduction of the Friends of Haiti
draft resolution to the UNSC for discussion and a probable
vote this week, Brazil is at an important stage in its
planning to deploy a PKO mission. Major issues on the scope
now are internal political dynamics, congress' role and
operational planning. Once the UN resolution passes, the
executive plan for the deployment should move quickly to
congress, where the GOB's solid majority and historic
precedent suggest relatively quick approval, despite the
possibility of some debate. Budget issues are looming large
as a prime area of concern. The GOB also needs to speed up
its sluggish military operational planning, including
committing to send representatives to UN military
coordination meetings and offering greater clarity on what
equipment and support their forces may need from us. End
summary.

MRE AND UN STATUS


2. (C) PolCouns discussed ref a demarche points and Haiti
developments with Foreign Ministry UN Division Chief Carlos
Duarte on 20 and again on 23 April. Duarte said that
Brazil's delegation in New York has been working with the
U.S. and other Friends (Canada, France, Chile) to craft a
resolution text that will help facilitate Brazil's
deployment, even if the resolution's mandate is under Chapter
VII. Duarte also said that, following release of the UN
assessment team's report on 20 April, Brazil's New York
delegation had been approached "on an urgent basis" by the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO),requesting
details asap on Brazil's contribution and urging closer
liaison with the UNDPKO.

PRESIDENCY


3. (C) Marcel Biato (protect),President Lula da Silva's
deputy foreign affairs advisor, confirmed to PolCouns on 26
April that the joint MRE-MOD message detailing Brazil's
deployment plan is on Lula's desk. Biato opined that Lula
would sign off on the deployment plan and move it quickly to
congress when the resolution passes. That said, Biato
indicated that budget questions are looming large in
Planalto's consideration of the deployment and likely would
be a focal point of any debates within the executive branch,
congress or the press. Biato said that the GOB is estimating
a cost of about USD 50 million for the deployment. He
pointed out that is roughly the amount of funding Lula may
release on an emergency basis to Brazilian states for
spending on public security -- a hot issue in the wake of a
recent explosion of organized criminal violence in Rio de
Janeiro. (Note: Although the UN reimburses on most costs of
the PKO, the lag between disbursal of funds by the GOB and
reimbursement affects budget decisions in the near term. End
note.)


4. (C) PolCouns noted to Biato a recent speech by Lula in
which the president insisted that Brazil's PKO contribution
be viewed as part of a broad international commitment to
social and economic development in Haiti. Biato replied that
Lula's support for the deployment remains robust. However,
along with concerns noted above about costs and priorities,
the GOB may have to deal with other domestic criticisms of
the deployment, including questions about Aristide's
departure and leftist charges (including from within Lula's
PT party) that the deployment will bolster American
"hegemony." Biato said Lula needs to show the PKO fits in
with the GOB's vision of global social development, and Biato
said that language in the current Friends of Haiti resolution
draft should help with that concern.

CONGRESS' ROLE


5. (C) Under widely-accepted interpretations of Brazil's 1988
Constitution, the congress must approve the overseas
deployment of Brazilian military forces. The MRE-MOD joint
message, once signed off by Lula, will be sent to the
Congress in the form of an "explanation of motives"
("explicacao dos motivos"). A budget request for the plan is
included. The executive branch measure goes first to the
lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, where the Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee will assign a sponsor
("relator") who redrafts the executive document into a bill
("projeto do lei"). The Foreign Affairs Committee considers
and votes the bill out to the plenary for approval, and that
secured, the bill moves to the Senate. Following examination
by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, there is a Senate
plenary vote. In this case, the bill will almost certainly
be placed on the congress' "urgent" track, where it can
by-pass other legislation, and the entire congressional
process can be completed in a matter of several days, if
debate does not stall progress.


6. (C) Senator Eduardo Suplicy, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee, told poloff last week that
Brazil's congress had never rejected an executive branch
proposal for overseas deployment of Brazilian forces.
Indeed, while the budget questions and some of the domestic
criticisms noted above may well surface in Brazil's congress,
the government's solid majority in both houses and historic
precedent strongly suggest the measure will pass, and
relatively quickly.

MOD - SLUGGISH OPERATIONAL PLANNING

7. (C) The factors above point to a window of one to two
weeks from the time the UN resolution passes until the GOB
gives the final go-ahead for a deployment. However, it is
not clear that Brazilian military planning is moving ahead in
a manner that would will facilitate rapid deployment once the
political order is given. Repeated Mission MLO Chief queries
in the past several days to Brazilian military planners
suggest the military establishment is moving at a sluggish
pace. Brazilian military sources told MLO chief that only
after a resolution is passed and Brazil's congress approves a
deployment will the military commit to sending
representatives to UNDPKO operational planning meetings (such
as the one scheduled for Haiti on 2-7 May.) In addition,
despite Defense Minister Viegas' request for support and
transfer of U.S. equipment to Brazilian forces that deploy to
Haiti (ref B),Brazilian liaison officers have yet to
indicate when or if the GOB will sign an ACSA agreement to
facilitate U.S. logistical support to Brazilian forces, and
the MOD has not yet provided a list of specific requirements
for equipment.


8. (C) In one effort to accelerate progress, SOUTHCOM J-4 and
Brazilian liaison have compiled (on 26 April) a working list
of equipment that Brazilian forces may require in Haiti, for
DOD to determine whether the items can be made available for
purchase to Brazil. (Note: Brazil army contacts indicate to
MLO chief that Brazil has USD 400 thousand available in an
FMS account. End note.) DOD and SOUTHCOM are also pursuing
information on availability of equipment from the UN.
Mission DAO is also providing situation reports to the MOD,
and has offered secure communication equipment for
intelligence sharing.


9. (C) Comment. Possible debate about the budget issue and an
evident lack of speed in military planning appear to be the
main challenges in the weeks ahead to deployment of Brazilian
forces to Haiti. While these are obstacles, the continued
commitment of the GOB to the operation, the political force
the Lula government enjoys in congress and a certain native
Brazilian talent for pulling complex projects together in
competent fashion at the last minute suggest DefMin Viegas'
timeline of a late June deployment for the bulk of forces
(ref C) is possible and likely. Nonetheless, we should
continue to encourage the GOB to participate in crucial
military planning now, to sign an ACSA agreement to
facilitate operational support, and we should be proactive in
identifying equipment that could be transferred to Brazilian
units in Haiti.

HRINAK