BRAZIL AND U.S. HOLD FRANK, CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000913

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SANTO DOMINGO FOR SECRETARY OF ENERGY ABRAHAM; RIO FOR
JSCNEC DELEGATION MEMBER BURKART

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2009
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PREL KSCA BR NPT
SUBJECT: BRAZIL AND U.S. HOLD FRANK, CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ON
NUCLEAR NON-NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES


Classified By: Sci/C Daniel Rubinstein; Reasons 1.5 (B),(D).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: U.S.-Brazil policy discussions in the
Joint Standing Committee for Nuclear Energy Cooperation were
positive, non-confrontational, and useful to both sides.
While Brazil did not express new policy positions on
high-profile issues such as the Additional Protocol (AP) or
the Resende enrichment facility safeguards in these talks,
the Brazilian interaction with the USDEL strongly suggests
that the GoB is feeling the need to respond to IAEA pressure
regarding the Resende enrichment facility, and that the GoB
is reviewing its position on the AP. A/S Wolf emphasized
that universal adherence to the AP is a keen interest of the
U.S., and that while the USG is not pressuring the GoB, it is
pressing the IAEA to strengthen the credibility of the
safeguard system across the board. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) The first U.S.-Brazil Joint Standing Committee on
Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNEC) opened April 14 in
Brasilia. The USDEL was led by A/S for Non-Proliferation
John Wolf, and included representatives from State, DOE, the
NRC, and three national laboratories. The Brazilian side was
led by the Foreign Ministry's Director for International
Organizations (A/S-equivalent) Antonio Guerreiro and included
Ambassador at Large for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Sergio Duarte, representatives from the Foreign and S&T
Ministries, and the National Nuclear Energy Commission
(CNEN). Technical-level discussions on safeguards, nuclear
security and safety, and technical cooperation will occur in
Rio de Janeiro April 15-16. Septel will cover A/S Wolf's
April 13-14 meetings with Guerreiro, Duarte, and Defense
Minister Viegas.


3. (C/NF) After a brief look back at U.S.-Brazilian nuclear
ties, A/S Wolf reviewed the key elements of the President's
February National Defense University address, as well as
global developments and abuse of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that led to this new policy
direction. Wolf urged that Brazil show leadership on
non-proliferation and that there be no distance between
Brazil and the U.S. on the non-proliferation front.
Emphasizing the centrality of the AP to U.S. efforts, Wolf
highlighted the recent advice and consent of the U.S. Senate
to the AP and encouraged Brazil to consider signing the AP as
well. Wolf noted that the Resende enrichment facility
safeguards issue is one to be settled by the GoB with the
IAEA, not with the U.S. The USG is, however, pressing the
IAEA to strengthen the NPT safeguards system across the
board. IAEA Director General El-Baradei has spoken of the
need to "close the loopholes," and the U.S. fully agrees.
The USG will continue to work hard to prevent the spread of
proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle technologies. The U.S. is
comfortable with the IAEA's commitment to preserve the
confidentiality of sensitive technologies, and Brazil needs

SIPDIS
to work with the IAEA to reach a similar comfort level. Wolf
urged the GoB to accelerate discussions with the IAEA
regarding the Resende facility.


4. (C/NF) In response, Brazilian Delegation Head Guerreiro
reiterated long-standing GoB points on the need for the
disarmament leg of the NPT to receive equal attention and for
universal adherence to the NPT to precede the
universalization of the AP. On Resende, Guerreiro said the
GoB has "complete confidence" that it will reach agreement
with the IAEA about a safeguards regime; since the facility
is not yet operational, it is not yet time for it to be
safeguarded. Guerreiro explicitly acknowledged that it is
the IAEA, not the USG, that is pressuring the GoB on the
Resende issue.


5. (SBU) After the USDEL presentation on the USG's own AP
implementation plans in the afternoon session, the Brazilians
queried the USDEL in detail on several fronts, including our
interpretation and use of the national security exclusion,
our understanding of the measures that can be used under the
"managed access" regime, and our preliminary estimates of the
costs associated with compliance with the AP. The exchanges
were substantive, candid, and constructive. USDEL suggested
that Brazil consider the creation of an Action Sheet activity
within the bilateral U.S.-Brazil safeguards sphere to expand
on these questions and themes, as well as the possible
provision of an intern to assist working through these
issues. The Brazilian delegation took the suggestions on
board.


6. (SBU) Beyond the AP and Resende issues, the delegations
made presentations and discussed respective views on the next
NPT Review Conference, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the Convention for the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. The delegations also briefed on each
country's respective nuclear programs and policies, as well
as issues regarding the transport of nuclear materials.
Brazil reviewed the triangular (IAEA, ABACC, and CNEN) system
of safeguards in place at Brazilian nuclear facilities, and
answered USDEL questions regarding the extent of IAEA-ABACC
cooperation. USDEL in turn described the safeguards system
in place at U.S nuclear facilities.


7. (C/NF) Given the extensive coverage of specific regional
non-proliferation concerns during A/S Wolf's 4/13 meetings
with GoB officials, the theme was lightly revisited during
the JSCNEC. The Brazilian delegation, however, sought U.S.
views regarding Iran, with particular emphasis on the degree
to which Iran's statement that it is implementing its AP
affects USG concerns. A/S Wolf reiterated that the U.S has
seen no Iranian statement or action that mitigates these
concerns, and that we are convinced of the Iranian strategic
decision to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. COMMENT: It
is clear the Brazilian and U.S perspectives on Iranian
nuclear intentions remain divergent. END COMMENT.


8. (C/NF) COMMENT (cont.): A/S Wolf's meetings with key GoB
non-proliferation figures (septel) before the JSCNEC provided
an opportunity to clear the air and remove any sting
emanating from the recent media controversy on Brazilian
nuclear intentions kicked off by an April 4 Washington Post
article about the Resende facility. While the Brazilians did
stick to long-standing policy positions on many issues, their
willingness to state categorically and on the record that
there will be an agreement between the GoB and the IAEA
regarding the Resende enrichment facility before it commences
operations shows that IAEA pressure on the GoB is working.
Similarly, the Brazilians' intense focus during the JSCNEC on
the USG's own implementation plans regarding the Additional
Protocol is likely an indication that the GoB is carefully
reviewing its own approach to the issue.

HRINAK