Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRASILIA795
2004-04-02 11:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

AFRICAN DIPLOMATS DESCRIBE BRAZIL'S AFRICA FOCUS

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON AF BR UNSC 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000795 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT. FOR WHA/BSC, AF/S, AF/W AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AF BR UNSC
SUBJECT: AFRICAN DIPLOMATS DESCRIBE BRAZIL'S AFRICA FOCUS
AS MUCH RHETORIC, LITTLE SUBSTANCE

REF: 03 BRASILIA 2156

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000795

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT. FOR WHA/BSC, AF/S, AF/W AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AF BR UNSC
SUBJECT: AFRICAN DIPLOMATS DESCRIBE BRAZIL'S AFRICA FOCUS
AS MUCH RHETORIC, LITTLE SUBSTANCE

REF: 03 BRASILIA 2156


1. (SBU) Summary: In 2003 the incoming Lula administration
asserted it would refocus its foreign policy to place greater
emphasis on Africa. Some African diplomats here, however,
believe that Brazilian interest in their countries has
remained unchanged, despite the rhetoric. While they admit
they may be out of the loop on issues dealt with in New York
or Geneva, the diplomats could identify no specific
initiatives or activities reflecting increased GOB attention,
except for South Africa and the lusophone countries --
countries already marked for closer ties. They were also
apprehensive that Haiti could distract Brazil from future
African peacekeeping efforts. The griping may be premature,
but given recent GOB behavior, other areas of the globe may
be capturing Brazil's interest, at least for now. End
Summary


2. (U) Since taking office in January 2003, the Lula
Administration has emphasized its intention to rethink
Brazil's foreign policy and, in particular, place increased
focus on Africa. In various fora during the first six months
of his administration, President Lula specifically targeted
Africa, emphasizing Brazil's deep historical and cultural
ties to the continent and the commonality of interests. As
noted reftel, this policy stems from President Lula's desire
to demonstrate Brazil's leadership as an advocate for Third
World issues and in global trade interests, which in turn
will bolster Brazil's bid for a permanent UN Security Council
seat.


3. (SBU) From one perspective, however, the reality of
Brazil's new African focus has not, so far, met expectations.
In an informal luncheon with poloffs, senior diplomats from
Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Angola described the Lula
Administration's Africa-oriented foreign policy as more
rhetoric than fact. True, they conceded, both President Lula
and Foreign Minister Amorin visited Africa in 2003. But the
countries visited, the diplomats said, reflected existing GOB
priorities to strengthen Brazil's leadership role among
lusophone countries (Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe,

Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau) and ties with South Africa. The
diplomats, a few of whom have served in Brazil for many
years, could point to no obvious change in GOB policy or
attention towards their nations.


4. (SBU) The diplomats admitted that many issues of concern
between their governments and Brazil -- particularly those
involving the World Trade Organization -- are conducted in
New York or Geneva, leaving their embassies out of the loop.
Yet, it still appeared that the GOB was more concerned with
counting heads for UNSC reform -- and support for Brazil's
bid for permanent UNSC seat -- than in being a champion of
Africa's interests, supporting African peacekeeping, or
augmenting trade. The diplomats could not identify any
examples of expanded commercial opportunities for African
products nor any common trade negotiation strategies that
would benefit Africa. Several noted that Brazil and many
African countries produce similar agricultural products and
therefore Brazil is a competitor rather than a benefactor.


5. (SBU) As one constraint to closer Brazil-Africa ties,
all cited the dearth, difficulty, and expense of flights
between Brazil and Africa. Except for flights to
Johannesburg and Luanda (not noted as a aviation hub),the
diplomats could identify no direct service between Brazil and
Africa. Instead, travelers had to transit Europe at great
cost and significant delay. To remedy this, a few urged that
the Brazilian Government press airlines to open up routes
across the Atlantic.


6. (SBU) Brazil's recent commitment of over one thousand
peacekeepers to Haiti, as opposed to the GOB's paucity of
commitment to African peacekeeping, was perceived as evidence
of Brazil's true lack of interest in Africa's problems. A
few added that even if Brazil had been thinking of Africa
before, Haiti would be a significant distraction and
impediment to any future African peacekeeping mission.
Diplomats from the DRC and Cote d'Ivoire, countries often
mentioned by the GOB as possible peacekeeping focal points,
stated there had been no effort by the Foreign Ministry to
engage with them. (Note: In a recent meeting senior Foreign
Ministry officials confirmed to poloffs that GOB interest in
participating in a Cote d'Ivoire PKO had been eclipsed by
Haiti. End Note)


7. (SBU) Comment: It may still be relatively early in the
Lula administration to point to Brazil-Africa success
stories, and we note the GOB's interest in HIV/AIDs relief
efforts in Africa seems unabated. Some of the complaints
leveled against the GOB may be premature but the diplomats
make a legitimate point. The Africa-focus rhetoric aside,
Brazil's current foreign policy emphasis on South
American/Caribbean and major, like-minded developing nations
(ex. South Africa, India, China) may leave little room for
paying closer attention to Africa.
HRINAK