This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
1. (C) Summary and Introduction: As a result of Article 98
sanctions, Brazil's MOD is shifting to other countries for
training and exchanges previously done with the U.S. -- a
drop-off clearly evident to this Mission. Many in the
Brazilian military -- including Defense Minister Viegas
himself -- consider this development unfortunate and want to
reinvigorate bilateral mil-mil ties, particularly leading up
to Brazil's upcoming peacekeeping effort in Haiti. Indeed,
Defense Minister Viegas recently told the Ambassador that he
views Brazil's participation in Haiti as an opportunity to
try to bolster the Brazil-U.S. military relationship (Ref A).
But the transfer of funds to pay course/exchange costs and
particularly full FMS pricing is unacceptable for Brazil.
Unfortunately, a reversal of the decline in training and
exchanges with the U.S. is unlikely; Brazil remains opposed
to signing an Article 98 accord. End Summary
2. (C) Prior to the imposition of Article 98 sanctions on
July 1, 2003, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MOD)
leadership warned that it would seek military training and
exchange opportunities elsewhere if this were done and Brazil
was subject to paying full FMS course costs for military
training. Almost nine months later, the MOD has indeed
shifted most of its training away from U.S. military
institutions. Brazilian military leaders assert that MOD has
done so without reducing the overall level of overseas
training opportunities available to its officers.
3. (C) As expected, other countries have offered MOD
training programs to replace those previously conducted at
U.S. institutions. While France and the United Kingdom have
picked up much of the slack, Brazilian officers, according to
military sources, are now being sent also to training
programs in China, India, and South Africa.
4. (C) A brief survey reveals that a severe drop off in U.S.
training and exchanges has already occurred. The Navy plans
to send only three officers to the U.S. in 2005, including
two pilots for two-year flight training that MOD "would have
paid for anyway" according to Navy sources. When a decision
on purchase of Brazil's next generation fighter jet, the F-X,
is finally taken, training for pilots will likely be in the
country of origin of the new aircraft; this further
prejudices the already limited prospects for the U.S. F-X
competitor, Lockheed Martin's F-16. The Army has also sliced
the number of officers being sent to U.S. schools for
training and exchanges. The Army command's 2004 list of
visits and other activities in the U.S. shows only one
program as long as one month -- a program carried on the Army
list as "no cost."
5. (C) Brazilian Army staff officers are emphatic that they
continue to want strong ties with the U.S., and senior
officers appear ready to switch back to the U.S. if full IMET
funding were restored in the future. Some senior Brazilian
military officers go further and believe Brazil should bear
the full costs for friendly nation military exchanges in
Brazil. Thus, they argue, reciprocal treatment should be
granted Brazilian officers attending such exchange courses
elsewhere. Some of Brazil's new mil-mil exchanges are based
on this formula.
6. (C) Comment: Given the military's wounded pride and the
now high costs of training in the United States, it is
doubtful the sharp decline in training and exchanges with the
U.S. will be reversed anytime soon. Despite the loss of
valued U.S. training and exchanges, neither the MOD nor the
GOB shows any sign of softening its opposition in principle
to signing an Article 98 Agreement with us. As U.S.-Brazil
training links weaken, so too, inevitably, will the
traditionally close ties between our two armed forces.