Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BRASILIA2863
2004-11-22 13:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL-HAITI: READOUT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY'S

Tags:  PREL BR MARR MOPS UNSC POL MIL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002863 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014
TAGS: PREL BR MARR MOPS UNSC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL-HAITI: READOUT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY'S
ASSESSMENTS, 22 NOVEMBER 2004

REF: A. BRASILIA 2799 AND 2764


B. PORT AU PRINCE 2325

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS W. HEARNE. REASONS:
1.4 (B)(D
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002863

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014
TAGS: PREL BR MARR MOPS UNSC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL-HAITI: READOUT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY'S
ASSESSMENTS, 22 NOVEMBER 2004

REF: A. BRASILIA 2799 AND 2764


B. PORT AU PRINCE 2325

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS W. HEARNE. REASONS:
1.4 (B)(D
)


1. (C) Summary. Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marcos
Aurelio Garcia and his deputy, Marcel Biato, returned from a
mid-November fact-finding mission to Haiti with the strong
view that Aristide must not be allowed back into Haitian
politics under any circumstances, Biato told PolCouns in a 19
November meeting at the presidency. The dominant impression
gathered over several days meeting with multiple sources is
that Aristide is a criminal who should be prosecuted, but
still a powerful "shadow" over Haiti that inspires both
terror and ill-founded hopes among many. Hence Garcia and
Biato brought back to the GOB the key assessment that the
"grand strategic question" now is how to quickly create hope
for the future among Haitians that is decoupled from
Aristide, and specific GOB views outlined below on
requirements for stability, assistance programs and political
dialogue flow from that question, according to Biato. The
highly negative assessment of Aristide by this influential
advisor to President Lula da Silva will likely inform GOB
policies and actions henceforth. End summary.

Aristide:
--------------


2. (C) Garcia and Biato returned from their mid-November
fact-finding mission to Haiti with a strong view that
Aristide must not be allowed back into Haitian politics under
any circumstances, that he is "a shadow over the country" and
should be "exorcised," if possible by some form of trial in
Haiti, Biatio told PolCoun. Biato allowed that Garcia had
traveled to Haiti believing that Aristide was a political
reality that might have to be considered as a factor in
political dialogues. However, after 27 meetings with
government officials, diplomats, UN officials, church
leaders, military sources, and moderate Lavalas figures (who
would only meet with Garcia after he publicly denounced
Aristide in Port au Prince),Garcia came away from Haiti
viewing Aristide as a completely unacceptable actor, "a

mobster" involved in a range of illegal activity who "orders
assassinations by cell phone," Biato said.


3. (C) Biato (strictly protect on this) said Garcia's highly
negative assessment of Aristide is being heard by Lula and
the senior GOB leadership, and will be factored into any
consideration of sending an unofficial Brazilian emissary to
meet with Aristide (a possibility reported previously in ref
a). Instead, Biato opined that the GOB may communicate to
South African President Mbeki its concerns about the apparent
freedom Aristide enjoys in inciting violence and provocations
from his South African enclave.


4. (C) The "exorcism" of Aristide is essential because he
inspires both terror and "what passes for hope" among so many
in Haiti's masses, Biato said. The "grand strategic question
is how to create hope for the future among Haitians that is
not linked to Aristide." Biato said. From that question flow
several of the specific policy and practical assessments that
Garcia brought back from his trip, which also tend to
reinforce the GOB view that progress must move simultaneously
in establishing stability and order, starting real political
engagement, amd most importantly, bringing to bear assistance
projects that have an immediate and positive effect on the
population. Progress on all fronts needs to move ahead
quickly, "because time is on Aristide's side," Biato said.

Stability and Public Order:
--------------


5. (C) The GOB assessed that the threat to general stability
appears to have diminished after "Operation Baghdad"
dissipated, although crime and disturbances continue.
MINUSTAH's commander indicated to Garcia that force levels
expected on the ground by the end of the year should be
sufficient for maintaining general control, Biato said.
Biato noted that Brazil deployed a plus-up of 250 marines and
support personnel, 44 vehicles (including armored personnel
carriers) and provisions on 18 November from Rio. He said the
GOB is also planning to send an army engineering battalion
for civil works projects as part of its scheduled December
rotation. However, he stressed that the GOB does not plan a
substantial increase in its MINUSTAH contingent, in part
owing to domestic political sensitivities about the mission
in Haiti.


6. (C) Garcia returned concerned about the overall law
enforcement situation and the dysfunctionality of the
national police, Biato said, and the GOB will be trying to
work with others on police training and related initiatives.

Assistance:
--------------


7. (C) Of the more than one billion dollars in assistance
potentially available for Haiti, little has started to flow,
and at the current rate, the GOB fears there will not be
appreciable progress visible to the public before the
elections, Biato said. A main challenge continues to be a
lack of reliable interlocutors and institutions for turning
assistance funds into viable projects, so donors are standing
off, Biato said. Specific steps the GOB will pursue include:

--The GOB will pressure the EU, U.S. and others to accelerate
release of funds (e.g., the GOB met with other donors on the
margins of the Ibero-American summit, FM Amorim spoke to the
visiting German foreign minister, Garcia spoke recently to
French officials and Lula will soon call EU Commission
President Durao Baroso, Biato said).

--Coupled with this, the GOB will urge the UN to place
competent aid technicians on the ground asap, headed by a
senior UN official experienced both in large-scale program
management and dealing with the New York bureaucracy, Biato
said.

--Biato said the GOB is also planning to approach the World
Bank regarding a USD 70 million dollar loan that is available
for Haiti, but not released yet owing to Haiti's 50 million
debt to the Bank. The GOB, in coordination with Canada,
plans to loan the IGOH the required 50 million to pay the
debt off and trigger release of the World Bank loan. Once
the GOB is repaid and other adjustments are made, the GOB
estimates 25 to 30 million would be immediately deployable
for assistance efforts.

--The GOB is working with Canada and hopes to approach others
about quickly designing and implementing joint projects in
health, sanitation and utilization of such resources as Haiti
has, Biato said. Biato indicated he will approach the
Mission about possible U.S.- Brazil joint projects when the
GOB has developed more specific plans, but opined that the
single most dramatic U.S. contribution would be an immediate
adjustment of textile quotas to benefit Haitian producers.

--The GOB alone plans to send Brazilian technicians to assist
Haitians in enhancing their production of manioc and cashews
(the island's main export). Brazil will also build a garbage
recycling facility and plans to invite other donors to
support it in exporting to Haiti a successful Brazilian
program for building affordable housing (approximately USD
1,000 per house).

Political Engagement:
--------------


8. (C) Following Garcia's visit the GOB has the view that
elements of the sprawling Lavalas are willing to be part of a
national dialogue, if Aristide's intimidation efforts can be
diminished and if what many Lavalas members view as IGOH
repression is curtailed, Biato said. Opponents of Lavalas
also indicated to Garcia that there are "moderate" and
"intellectual" elements in Lavalas with whom they would be
willing to engage. The UN should expand on this baseline for
dialogue with a series of conferences on political, economic,
social and reconciliation topics, Biato said.


9. (C) Biato indicated that the GOB also plans to invite a
number of political figures from Haiti to a December OAS
conference in Brasilia on political party development, to
provide exposure of isolated Haitian political leaders to
international concepts of democracy and party politics.


10. (C) Garcia left Haiti convinced of the importance of
concentrating now on election mechanics, Biato said. The GOB
will work with others on efforts to make Haiti's election
commission functional and will send to Haiti over 10,000 of
Brazil's highly reliable computer voting machines. Political
efforts of all kinds will "fall into a vacuum," however, if
there is not apparent progress on aid projects, Biato opined.


11. (C) Comment: Garcia is an influential advisor to the
president and Garcia's fact-finding mission to Haiti produced
a realistic and negative assessment of Aristide that, we
believe, will inform Lula's approach to this issue and GOB
actions henceforth. We will be attentive to the possibility
that the GOB may reach out to Mbeki to underscore their
concerns about Aristide, and we will also be ready to discuss
with the GOB any specific assistance proposals they present
to us for possible bilateral collaboration.

Chicola