INTERAGENCY DELEGATION DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001938

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, INL, AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2014
TAGS: SNAR PREL MOPS BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION DISCUSSES
INFORMATION-SHARING REGARDING BRAZIL'S SHOOTDOWN PROGRAM
(CORRECTED COPY)


Classified By: Pol Consul Dennis W. Hearne for Reasons 1.5a


1. (C) Summary and Introduction. On July 30, a
State/DoD delegation, led by WHA PDAS James Derham, met with
Brazilian Ministry of Defense interlocutors to discuss
mechanisms through which the GOB would provide information to
the USG about the status of Brazil,s shootdown program once
that program begins. The two sides generated a working text
that would provide the USG timely access to GOB data (i.e.,
reports and video/audio tape) in cases where Brazilian
interceptors employed lethal force. In addition, the GOB
committed to providing the USG with: a) notification of any
substantial changes to program procedures and training
requirements, and b) the opportunity for periodic
consultations that might address the number of events that
stop short of lethal force and the date and location of such
events.


2. (C) Both sides agreed to take the working text back to
their respective interagency processes for a more complete
review. The GOB will produce, in Portuguese, the official
version of the working text, by the middle of the week of
August 2. State will generate an English version of that
document shortly thereafter. The USG delegation proposed
that, when finalized, the document and two annexes that
detailed the GOB's procedures, would serve as attachments to
an exchange of diplomatic notes, that would be initiated by
the GOB. In its current form, the exchange would represent a
political commitment on the part of the GOB, as opposed to a
binding international agreement. End Summary and Introduction.


3. (C) Fernando Abreu, Chief of Staff of Defense Minister
Viegas, led the Brazilian delegation, which consisted of
Orlando Almeida (Special Advisor to Viegas),Air Force
Brigadier General Machado (Sub-Chief of Operations of the MOD
Joint Staff),and Air Force Colonel Servan (Vice-Chief of the
GOB Air Defense Command). After welcoming remarks, Abreu
noted that the GOB planned to initiate its shootdown program
on October 17, with great emphasis being placed on
transparency for both the Brazilian public and foreign
governments. He then turned the floor over to General
Machado, who launched into an extended description of
Brazil,s air defense infrastructure and the procedural
safeguards associated with the GOB,s implementation of
shootdown. In particular, Machado noted that:
-- Since 1979, the GOB had been safely conducting air
interceptions (i.e., approaches short of lethal force),and
was well aware of the need to scrupulously observe ICAO
requirements during the course of aerial interception. The
use of lethal force, he emphasized, was merely an extension
of the GOB,s current interception efforts.
-- Brazil,s operational norms for its airspace defense
system were contained in a large classified document known as
the NOSDA (the Portuguese acronym). Though the Air Force
was not able to provide the USG with a copy of the NOSDA, he
emphasized that the documents that were passed to the
delegation representatives during the course of the July 29
talks, in addition to the GOB's two sets of responses to the
USG's questions about GOB shootdown procedures, were accurate
summaries of the contents of the NOSDA. (In brief, these
summaries describe a process of detection, monitoring,
identification, interrogation, investigation, and warnings
prior to the use of lethal force, as well as the procedures
and circumstances under which the GOB would use lethal
force).
-- The use of both warning shots and lethal force would only
be authorized by the Commander of Brazil,s central air
defense center. Lethal force would only be employed in cases
where intel information indicated that the suspect air track
was tied to narco-trafficking.
-- The co-location of civil aviation facilities with
military controllers, along with reliance on a common Air
Force radar feed, facilitates the identification of routine
civil aviation traffic.
-- The GOB plans to conduct an extensive media campaign,
using television and radio spots, sporting events, and
notices to airmen (NOTAMs) to publicize the contemplated
October 17 initiation of its shootdown program. A parallel
effort would be aimed at the international public as well.
-- The training regime for program personnel includes
training for pilots, air controllers, and communications
personnel. In particular, he noted, those pilots who conduct
air interceptions receive more extensive and specialized
training than their non-interception counterparts.


4. (C) Subsequent discussion then refined the mechanism
through which the USG would receive information about program
events. Abreu noted that the GOB was open to passing
comprehensive information to the USG on an informal basis,
but that any arrangement that smacked of USG intrusion into
Brazilian sovereignty was a non-starter, given the
potentially negative reaction by the Brazil congress and
public. Still, Abreu pledged that the GOB would:
-- provide, on an urgent basis, the AmEmbassy Brasilia Air
Force Attache with information regarding any shootdown
incident. Such information would be provided to the general
public as well.
-- At the USG,s request, meet with USG representatives to
provide background information about the program,s progress
(i.e., the number of suspect tracks detected, interceptions,
and warning shots as well as other similar data),and
-- notify the USG of any changes in security procedures,
non-classified checklists, flight plan requirements, and
training regimen.


5. (C) Begin Comment. As a result of these discussions, it
is clear that -- other than for information on shootdown
events -- the USG will have to initiate contacts with the GOB
when securing information on the shootdown program. It may
be worthwhile for USG agencies to: a) establish a checklist
of information that they would like the AmEmbassy Brasilia
Air Force Attache to obtain, b) and provide guidance on the
frequency with which the Attache should seek consultations
with the GOB. End Comment.


6. (C) PDAS Derham proposed that the two sides ultimately
document the understanding reached regarding information
sharing through an exchange of diplomatic notes. The
diplomatic notes would expressly reference three attachments:
the GOP responses to the first and second set of questions
from the USG regarding GOB operational procedures and the
working text that was the subject of this round of
discussions. The diplomatic note would also reflect the
GOB's assurances that the shootdown program would only be
directed at aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The GOB clarified that
this meant that aircraft carrying drugs or aircraft carrying
money, weapons, or precursor chemicals to exchange for drugs
could be subject to lethal force. (The scope of the GOB's
program thus falls within the scope of the 22 U.S.C. 2291-4,
i.e., the immunity statute, as further articulated by DOJ in
the context of the Colombia ABD program.)


7. (C) Abreu was open to the idea of an exchange of
diplomatic notes, though he indicated that he would need to
check with others (in particular, Minister of Defense Viegas)
prior to providing us with the GOB,s formal answer. Both
sides then explored possible language for inclusion in the
exchange of diplomatic notes (which would be initiated by the
GOB). For Abreu, a red-line was any language which indicated
that the exchange of diplomatic notes would be a binding
international agreement, as that would mean that the text
would need to be approved by the Brazilian congress.

WHA PDAS Derham cleared message.

DANILOVICH