ILO STUDY: REMOVING POLITICS FROM LABOR RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 009311

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR - CLATANOFF
GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS AND CHAMBERLIN
LABOR FOR ILAB - JORGE PEREZ-LOPEZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014
TAGS: ELAB PHUM PGOV ETRD PTER CO ILO
SUBJECT: ILO STUDY: REMOVING POLITICS FROM LABOR RELATIONS
REDUCES VIOLENCE AND STRENGTHENS DIALOGUE

REF: A. BOGOTA 3866

B. BOGOTA 3913

C. BOGOTA 4950

D. BOGOTA 3736

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The relationship between labor violence and political
activity is widely accepted by labor leaders and academics in
Colombia. For many trade unionists, unions act as surrogate
political parties and avenues for political activity.
Because illegal armed groups perceive trade unionists,
particularly teachers, as political actors, some labor
leaders have actively discouraged trade union involvement in
political activity. Using actual case studies, a report
prepared by the DOL-funded ILO technical cooperation program
in Colombia concludes that removing politics from labor
relations can play an important role in improving tripartite
dialogue and reducing levels of violence against trade
unionists and management. In three of the report's seven
case studies, the exclusion of politics from labor relations
and the elimination of pressure from illegal armed groups
facilitated greater cooperation between unions and
identification of common ground between labor and management.
The report also presents potential strategies, which might
be employed to reduce violence against trade unionists. End
Summary.

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Linkage of Politics and Labor Relations Hurts Unions
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2. (C) The political orientation of some Colombian labor
unions has been the subject of several academic studies that
attribute the overt linkage of politics and labor relations
in Colombia to a historical absence of strong political
parties. According to Fabio Zapata (protect),Human Rights
Director for the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE),
Colombia's left-wing labor unions, particularly those
affiliated with the United Workers Central (CUT),do not make
a distinction between political activity and labor activism;
the former is part and parcel of the latter. Carlos
Rodriguez (strictly protect),President of the CUT, has
repeatedly told us that left-wing activists within the CUT
see Colombia's political parties as corrupt or, at best,
unrepresentative of Colombian workers. Rodriguez has worked
diligently throughout his tenure as CUT President -- largely
without success -- to press union members to make a
distinction between politics and labor activism (ref A). He
maintains that the linkage harms union leaders by increasing
the risk of violence against them, alienating potential union
members whose political views differ from union leadership,
and diverting attention from traditional labor priorities.


3. (C) According to Norberto Rios (protect),director of the
National Labor College ("Escuela Nacional Sindical," or ENS),
a well respected Colombian labor rights NGO, paramilitaries
target labor leaders for violence primarily because they
perceive them to be, at best, members of the radical
political opposition, or, at worst, covert guerrilla
collaborators. Moreover, ENS statistics show that
paramilitaries disproportionately target members of the CUT,
Colombia's most left-leaning and politically activist labor
federation (ref B). Carlos Jose Guarnizo (protect),a
project coordinator in the ILO's technical cooperation
program in Bogota, told the Embassy that the intrusion of
partisan politics into labor relations contributes to
violence against representatives of both labor and
management. Although not generally noted by Colombian human
rights activists, business leaders and managers are often the
victims of kidnappings, threats of violence, and extortion
attempts by paramilitary and guerrilla groups, for both
political and economic reasons.

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Politically Active Teachers Targeted
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4. (C) Forty-one of the 90 trade unionists murdered in 2003
were teachers. Many more teachers were threatened by illegal
armed groups or voluntarily displaced to other locations in
order to escape violence. Of the estimated 312,000 teachers
in Colombia, approximately 270,000 are members of FECODE, a
CUT affiliate. Most of the others belong to independent
teachers' unions not affiliated with FECODE. According to
FECODE's Zapata, illegal armed groups target teachers
primarily because they believe teachers disseminate
propaganda in the classroom. FECODE's 2003 human rights
report states that educators are targeted because of their
vocal opposition to forced recruitment of children by illegal
armed groups, their pedagogical, labor, and community
leadership, and paramilitary and guerrilla perceptions that
teachers are "enemy collaborators." In a recent meeting with
the Embassy, Zapata, who drafted the report, told us illegal
armed groups consider unionized teachers to be political,
rather than economic, actors, regardless of whether they
actually engage in political activities. Zapata attributes
this perception to the prevalence of left-wing political
activism within FECODE. The Presidential Program for Human
Rights is working with FECODE and local teachers unions to
design a nationwide program to assist and protect at-risk
teachers (septel).

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Absence of Politics Opens Space for Dialogue
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5. (U) A report recently published by the DOL-funded ILO
technical cooperation program in Colombia -- buttressed by
three of the report's seven case studies -- provides evidence
that the exclusion of political themes from union demands can
improve the quality of dialogue and reduce violence
perpetrated against trade unionists. In some cases, partisan
and non-partisan unions previously divided by political
differences were able to cooperate in negotiations with
employers after the politicized unions abandoned ideological
approaches. In other cases, the removal of vague political
ideals helped union leaders articulate concrete, tangible
demands they could explain to rank-and-file workers and
negotiate more effectively with management. Ultimately, the
abandonment of left-wing politics convinced both labor and
management that they were not negotiating with "the enemy,"
but with a common partner. This development helped both
sides identify common interests and understand the other's
position.

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Case Study #1: Banana Strike in Uraba
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6. (U) The Uraba region of northwestern Antioquia department
has long been characterized by a heavy presence of guerrilla
and paramilitary groups, many of which engage in narcotics
and weapons trafficking. For decades, the region's banana
growers -- plantation owners and laborers alike -- have been
caught in the crossfire. The Uraba banana industry employs
approximately 17,600 laborers working on 344 farms that range
from small producers to large-scale agribusiness.
Paramilitaries and guerrillas, including the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army
(ELN),traditionally exerted pressure on workers, managers,
owners, and the general population, often at the expense of
labor relations in the industry. According to the ILO
report, guerrilla infiltration of the region's unions in the
1980s and early 1990s resulted in the extortion of business
leaders, sabotage and theft of crops and plantation property,
and, ultimately, paramilitary attacks against banana workers.



7. (U) According to the ILO report, a stronger state presence
and a series of successful demobilization programs have
reduced the influence of illegal armed groups and contributed
to improved labor relations in the region, including a
reduction in violence. The report states that labor and
management, no longer separated by a political divide, have
realized that each is necessary to the other's survival and
that they must work together. The industry's eight labor
unions now negotiate jointly with the primary growers'
association. A sixteen-day strike in June was characterized
by record low levels of violence, despite high levels of
tension and significant crop loss. Over the course of the
strike, banana growers lost an estimated USD 25.5 million.
The 16,000 striking workers lost an estimated USD 5.4
million. When President Uribe and acting Vice-Minister for
Labor Affairs Mauricio Rubio traveled to Uraba to mediate
between labor and management, the issues on the table were
bread-and-butter labor concerns, permitting the Government to
successfully pressure both sides to meet halfway over the
course of a one-evening negotiating session.

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Case Study #2: Chevron Texaco
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8. (U) The ILO report describes the state of play in labor
relations within Chevron Texaco facilities in Colombia in

2000. Employees were represented by two labor unions,
SINTRACHEVRONTEX and the Syndicated Workers Union ("Union
Sindical Obrero," or USO). The former split away from the
latter in 1998 primarily because of disagreements over USO's
political orientation and aggressive tactics. The technical
cooperation program conducted workshops for leaders of both
unions in 2000 and 2001 and worked with labor and management
to set up a permanent conciliation commission in which
management explains the company's business plan and
priorities and organized labor presents concerns about
workplace issues. Discussion of national oil policy and
other political issues is off-limits. As a result of the
technical cooperation program's efforts, the two unions set
aside their political differences and now jointly present
labor concerns to management. Collective negotiations
conducted since 2002 have been resolved quickly with a focus
on traditional labor relations. The Chevron Texaco case
study contrasts sharply with the May "political strike"
declared by USO in protest of the GOC's restructuring of
Ecopetrol, Colombia's state-owned oil company (ref C).

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Case Study #3: Cementos Nare
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9. (U) According to the ILO report, conflict between Cementos
Nare, which operates in the municipalities of Nare and
Caracoli, Antioquia Department, and organized labor escalated
in the 1970s when the Colombian Confederation of Unions
(CSTC),a Communist labor union, convinced labor unions to
take a more radical stance, oriented in the idea of class
struggle, against management. (CSTC and the radical
Colombian Workers Union (UTC) merged to form the CUT in
1986.) Increased guerrilla activity in the region in the
1980s radicalized labor unions even further. Between the
1970s and 1990s, violence against organized labor and
management in the region escalated. In 1986, Cementos Nare's
Director of Industrial Relations and the union's president
were assassinated by illegal armed groups. In 1991, the firm
closed its plant for 25 days after several workers were
murdered. The firm reopened the plant with the proviso that
further violence would result in permanent closure. The ILO
report posits 1991 as a turning point in labor relations.
Levels of violence declined substantially throughout the
1990s as the firm increased social benefits for workers and
social investment in the community and rank-and-file union
members gradually voted the union's radical leadership out.
Once workers' interests began to take precedence over
political demands, levels of violence diminished quickly.

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Comment
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10. (C) The ILO study does more than support our conclusions
about the nature of labor violence in Colombia, for it
demonstrates that GOC strategies to strengthen state presence
and demobilize illegal armed actors have played a role in the
reduction of violence against trade unionists. The ENS
itself acknowledges that the paramilitary peace process has
played the most significant role in the striking decline of
violence against trade unionists (ref D) over the last 18
months. The ILO study provides models for future action
through which unions may be convinced to leave politics to
Colombia's political parties and focus instead on labor
relations and the promotion of traditional labor priorities.
Funding for the DOL-financed technical cooperation program
will run out in May 2005. We urge that serious consideration
be given to extending this program or funding other programs
-- perhaps under FTA-related capacity building assistance --
that will use the ILO's findings to develop sector-specific
plans of action to reduce labor violence and improve labor
relations.
DRUCKER