THE AUC PEACE PROCESS: AVOIDING ANOTHER CAGUAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005276

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2014
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER SNAR KJUS PINS CO OAS AUC
SUBJECT: THE AUC PEACE PROCESS: AVOIDING ANOTHER CAGUAN

REF: BOGOTA 4951

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In its negotiations with the paramilitaries the Uribe
administration has avoided several mistakes the Pastrana
administration committed during its fruitless peace process
with the FARC. In contrast to talks with the FARC, the Uribe
government has used public commentary sparingly and
effectively, will maintain state control over concentration
zones and limit their size, and will set concentration and
demobilization deadlines. As paramilitary commanders and
their bodyguards concentrate, the Peace Commissioner's
Office, OAS Verification Commission, and security forces say
they will focus on holding paramilitaries to the terms of
their agreements, ensuring permanent state control over
concentration zones, and moving forward with demobilization.
Focusing on these priorities should prevent the paramilitary
peace process from degenerating into a fiasco reminiscent of
the Pastrana administration's "Caguan" process with the FARC.
End Summary.

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Discretional Public Statements
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2. (C) The GOC prohibits public comments about internal
negotiations. The May 13 agreement specifically states that
neither the paramilitaries, GOC, or OAS verification mission
will publicly disclose anything discussed during
negotiations. This policy of confidentiality has prevented
the paramilitary peace process from degenerating into the
media circus that characterized the Pastrana administration's
"Caguan" talks with the FARC.

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State Control and Security
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3. (C) According to the May 13 agreement, the zone in Cordoba
Department where the ten key paramilitary commanders and
their bodyguards will concentrate is less than 150 square
miles. It will have a permanent presence of representatives
from the OAS and Peace Commissioner's Office and should be
small enough to permit effective state control. Restrepo has
recently floated the idea of a slight reduction in the zone's
size. It will be surrounded by a cordon of security forces
who will control access to the area. Paramilitary commanders
concentrated there will be held accountable for their troops'
actions outside the zone. Restrepo has told the Ambassador
that any future concentration/demobilization zones for
paramilitary troops must be small enough to ensure full state
control. According to OAS representative Sergio Caramagna,
the GOC hopes to create five to seven concentration zones
totaling no more than 460 square miles. In contrast, the
FARC's safehaven ("despeje") in Caqueta and Meta departments
was 16,200 square miles (roughly the size of Switzerland) and
had no state presence.

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An Agenda
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4. (C) The GOC is pushing paramilitary commanders to
concentrate in one month, and expects the concentration
period to last six months. These deadlines, although
flexible, should help to prevent talks from continuing
indefinitely without concrete progress. The GOC will need to
work quickly to define and agree on a demobilization
schedule, which the paramilitaries have been avoiding.

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Expected Next Steps and Clarifications
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5. (C) In the next month:
-- Logistics: The Peace Commissioner's Office will prepare
the zone for a permanent GOC presence. Paramilitary leaders
will be responsible for their own food and shelter.

-- Verification: The OAS is developing a detailed budget
plan. Caramagna tentatively expects to spend approximately
USD 500,000 for offices in Bogota, Medellin, and Monteria,
capital of Cordoba. He hopes to expand his two-person team
to seven international employees and several local hires (see
septel for the possibility of U.S. support for the OAS
mission).

-- Security: The Peace Commissioner's Office will coordinate
with the Colombian Armed Forces to create a security cordon
around the zone.

During the six month concentration period:

-- Regulation: Delegates from the Peace Commissioner's
Office, paramilitaries, and OAS will form a Security and
Co-existence Committee, which will regulate the zone and
manage communications and visits. Local government officials
and Catholic Church representatives will have an open
invitation to serve as guest members of the Committee. The
Peace Commissioner's Office must authorize any paramilitary
leader's departure from the zone. The agreement has left
ambiguous how often and for how long commanders will be
permitted to leave the zone to "conduct activities related to
the peace process" and how many commanders may be outside the
zone at any given time. This needs to be clarified.

-- Verification: Assuming funding is available, the OAS
mission will verify that all parties are fulfilling the
agreement and maintain an inventory of all weapons possessed
by the concentrated paramilitaries. Paramilitary leaders and
their security details will be allowed to carry arms but
cannot transport any weapons in or out of the zone.
Delegates from the Peace Commissioner's Office,
paramilitaries, and OAS will form a Verification Committee
that will receive complaints about violations of the
cease-fire nationwide and help the OAS verify the agreement.
Restrepo has repeatedly asserted that individuals who violate
the agreement and/or the cease-fire must be punished.

-- Security: The concentration zone is in
paramilitary-dominated territory. The security forces will
be responsible for preventing any other illegal armed group
from making incursions into the area. More importantly, the
security forces will seal off unauthorized access routes to
the zone and conduct robust intelligence operations to record
violations.

Post Concentration:

-- Demobilization: Restrepo hopes to concentrate/demobilize
5,000 paramilitaries this year. So far, paramilitary
commanders have refused to do so until they receive
guarantees against prison and extradition. Restrepo intends
to press the paramilitaries to commit to and follow a
detailed demobilization schedule.

-- Verification: As more concentration/demobilization zones
are created, the OAS will have to rapidly expand its
operation in order to monitor these areas.

-- Security: The paramilitaries have warned that the FARC
will move into areas where paramilitaries currently have a
presence if the paramilitaries demobilize. Restrepo states,
however, that the paramilitaries are not necessary or wanted
by the local population (reftel).

-- Legal processes: The "Law of Justice and Reparation" will
not be considered until the next session of Congress, which
begins on July 20. The GOC has repeatedly assured us that
the peace process will not raise legal impediments to
extradition.
WOOD