Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BOGOTA4951
2004-05-17 12:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

NEXT STEPS IN PARAMILITARY PEACE PROCESS

Tags:  PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS SNAR KJUS CO OAS ELN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004951 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2014
TAGS: PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS SNAR KJUS CO OAS ELN
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN PARAMILITARY PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004951

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2014
TAGS: PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS SNAR KJUS CO OAS ELN
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN PARAMILITARY PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On May 14, Ambassador and Peace Commissioner
Restrepo discussed the paramilitary peace agreement. The
paramilitary leaders have a month to concentrate. Restrepo
speculated they agreed after almost destroying the talks
because: (1) the government had followed a consistent line
and put forward a written, almost take-it-or-leave-it
proposal, (2) they had been "startled" by recent tough public
comments by the ambassador, (3) the elimination of Castano
had increased their confidence they could hold together, and
(4) they may be feeling the effects of government military
and police efforts. Restrepo is pleased that paramilitary
silence after the signing has allowed the government to spin
the agreement, but worried that the signers may be having
second thoughts. Paramilitary leaders remain resistant to
concentrating their troops without a guarantee against jail
time and extradition. Restrepo does not expect the draft
"Law for Justice and Reparation," which provides for
mandatory jail time, to be softened when it is considered
during the congressional session that begins on July 20.
Restrepo reiterated that extradition was not on the table and
that the April 27 presidential declaration embodies GOC
policy. End Summary.

--------------
Paramilitary Change of Heart?
--------------


2. (C) Carlos Castano's ouster from the peace process
reflected a hardening of the paramilitary position and a
strengthening of the narcotics trafficking influence. Why
then did the ten commanders of the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB)
and United Self Defense Forces (AUC) agree on May 12 and 13
to concentrate in a 400 square km zone in Cordoba (map
emailed to WHA/AND)? Restrepo speculated that several
factors caused the change:

-- Castano was not only a source of tension among leaders;

they also didn't trust him. With his elimination, they
became more confident of their ability to stick together.
From that stronger position, they could agree to Restrepo's
concentration proposal.

-- The Ambassador's public comments in Semana magazine that
(that the ouster of Castano revealed the paras to be nothing
more than narco-terrorists, thieves and murderers with no
claim to being treated as political actors) startled them.

-- The GOC has followed a tough, consistent line, solicited
the May 12 meeting with the AUC/BCB and presented the written
the concentration proposal on an almost take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Restrepo commented that, although they have positions
on issues, the para leaders had no coherent negotiating game
plan.

-- Almost in passing, Restrepo also speculated that the paras
might be feeling the effects of government military and
police pressure. (Interestingly, during the conversation,
Restrepo received a call from the Minister of Defense who
wanted to make sure that a planned operation against an
upper-mid level para/drug dealer would not overthrow the
peace deal at this sensitive stage; Restrepo told him to
launch the operation.)


3. (C) Restrepo said that Don Berna had eliminated four
persons of importance to Castano that that Castano had, in
return, killed someone close to Don Berna (presumably
"Danilo"). This had precipitated the attack on Castano.
Restrepo expressed the belief, but said he didn't have
conclusive proof, that Castano was dead. He noted that
Castano's disappearance relieved the BCB, which had feared
Castano would give information to authorities about their
drug trafficking activities.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------


4. (C) Concentration of leaders: The first step is
concentration of leaders and bodyguards (estimated to be
about 25 leaders and 400 persons in all). Restrepo said that
there had been informal agreement that the commanders would
concentrate within one month. In the meantime, Restrepo will
work with the security forces and the OAS to prepare the
area. The GOC must demonstrate within the first few days of
concentration that the paramilitaries will be completely
prohibited from any illicit activities and held accountable
for cease-fire violations. If not, the concentration zone
risks becoming another FARC-like farce. He stressed that OAS
verification will be crucial.


5. (C) Concentration/demobilization of cadre: Restrepo would
like to concentrate/demobilize around 5,000 paramilitaries
before the end of the year. Restrepo said that the
paramilitary leaders continue to resist concentration of
cadre until they receive written guarantees against jail time
and extradition. Restrepo said that he would continue to
refuse to negotiate, in spite of repeated efforts by the
paramilitary leaders, the draft "Law for Justice and
Reparation," which calls for mandatory jail time for anyone
guilty of a serious, violent crime. Congress will review the
bill during the session that begins on July 20. Although
paramilitary supporters (lawyers, lobbyists, etc.) are
seeking to soften the bill, Restrepo does not expect them to
be successful. Castano stressed that concentrated leaders
would still be fully under the legal jurisdiction of Colombia
and, if the law were passed while they were concentrated,
they would become immediately subject to it.



6. (C) Restrepo said that the para leaders continued to claim
that the FARC will re-enter the areas they currently control
if they demobilize and that they must have the freedom to
defend those areas. In response to the ambassador's
rejection of the idea that the paras play any positive role
and assertion that that the danger of vacuums was
overestimated, Restrepo agreed that "the paras are not
necessary." Restrepo has asked the para leaders for a map of
areas they think the FARC might try to move into, both as a
negotiating tactic and to provide information to the ministry
of defense. In any event, Restrepo agreed with the
ambassador that concentration zones for cadre must be small
enough to remove any practical operational capability from
the paras, whether against the FARC or anyone else.

--------------
No Change on Extradition
--------------


7. (C) In response to the ambassador's question, Restrepo
reaffirmed the April 27 presidential declaration that
extradition is not on the table and assured that no
concessions of any kind had been made in this regard.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Restrepo clearly is unable to completely explain the
sudden change in direction of the para leaders; up to very
recently he had thought that the talks were on the rocks. If
we had to add an element to what he told us, it would be the
presidential declaration of April 27, which amounted to an
ultimatum to the paras and clearly ruled our extradition and
jail time as subjects for negotiation. In our view, that may
have been the key variable.


9. (C) But it is also clear that the para leaders are still
in full negotiation mode. Getting them to actually
concentrate will be a challenge, and getting their cadre to
concentrate will be a bigger one. Then getting
demobilization will be still harder.


10. (C) Embassy recommends that the Department, in its public
statements and third-country diplomacy, emphasize the need
for the paras to completely fulfill their promises:
cessation of violence, concentration of leaders within a
month, and concentration of cadre sometime after that.


11. (C) Embassy also notes Restrepo's emphasis on the OAS
role. We agree. Embassy recommends that Department work to
ensure adequate funding and staffing for the Caramagna effort
here. Embassy is prepared to work closely with Washington
agencies on the issue.
WOOD