Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BOGOTA4506
2004-05-03 22:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

U/S GROSSMAN MEETS WITH VICE-PRESIDENT SANTOS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR CO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004506 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR CO GOV
SUBJECT: U/S GROSSMAN MEETS WITH VICE-PRESIDENT SANTOS

REF: A. BOGOTA 04176


B. BOGOTA 04278

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004506

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SNAR CO GOV
SUBJECT: U/S GROSSMAN MEETS WITH VICE-PRESIDENT SANTOS

REF: A. BOGOTA 04176


B. BOGOTA 04278

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) On April 29, U/S Grossman met Vice-President Santos.
Grossman said that the USG supports Plan Patriota, and
praised the GOC's accomplishments in combating narcotics and
terrorism. The U/S stressed that the USG will insist on
maintaining extradition as an effective law enforcement tool,
and cautioned that much still needs to be done to improve the
human rights situation. End Summary.

--------------
Pressing Forward with Security Strategy
--------------


2. (C) U/S Grossman lauded GOC success combating
narcoterrorism, and expressed USG support for Plan Patriota
and the consolidation of Plan Colombia. The U/S thanked the
GOC for assistance in the search for the American hostages,
and said Plan Patriota could bring us even closer to locating
them. GOC public security forces must focus on: (1)
improving cooperation between the military and the police;
and (2) severing forever ties between the public security
forces and the paramilitaries by imposing strict discipline.
The Ambassador highlighted Vice Admiral Soto's response to
the "Gloria" narcotics incident as an example of quick,
forceful action.


3. (C) Santos said the GOC agreed with both recommendations.
Although military-police cooperation in the field has been
good, cooperation at the national level needs improvement.
Santos added that the paramilitaries pose a particular
challenge, given their strong support in certain communities.
However, he is seeing a decline in support by sectors that
have traditionally supported paramilitary groups; more
importantly, military and police leaders have also noted this.


4. (C) Grossman asked about the impact of increased public
security presence, and noted the high level of desertions by
illegal armed groups. Santos agreed the desertion results
were impressive. He does not expect the same results this
year, however, since those remaining in the terrorist

organizations are more likely to be hardcore members. Santos
expressed surprise that the FARC had not put up more of a
fight defending territory. Perhaps the GOC had overestimated
the FARC's strength. Alternatively, perhaps the FARC
mistakenly expect the GOC to withdraw from FARC areas and,
more fundamentally, are waiting out Uribe's term. Santos
said the FARC must be concerned about Uribe's possible
re-election, since they lack the resources to last eight
years of Uribe. Capture of another key FARC leader could
start splintering the group.


5. (C) Santos asked for an update on FARC leader "Sonia's"
extradition. He also requested additional U.S. support for
the Colombian Navy (COLNAV),as river operations will be
crucial in Plan Patriota. The Ambassador said "Sonia's"
extradition is proceeding. He also noted that her capture
would not have been possible when he arrived last August; the
improvements in the military's ability to conduct small,
specialized operations has improved dramatically. The
Ambassador added that U.S. assistance to COLNAV increased
this year, and the Embassy has asked for additional funds for
it the next two fiscal years.


6. (C) Grossman asked about the possibility of peace
negotiations with the ELN. Santos responded that there has
been no progress either in the GOC or the Catholic Church
tracks. The ELN is weak and lacks leadership. Moreover, its
cumbersome decision-making process inhibits consensus. The
Ambassador added that some believe the ELN's window of
opportunity ) when they were weak enough to want peace, but
strong enough to be able to negotiate ) has closed.


7. (C) Santos was puzzled why the price of cocaine has not
increased, despite the record-levels of aerial and manual
eradication. Grossman observed that overall coca production
went down in the Andean region by 15 percent. The Ambassador
added that eradication is working: during 2002-3, 270 tons of
cocaine was destroyed; however, we lack the knowledge of
inventory and markets that would allow us to accurately gauge
the impact.

--------------
The Future of the Paramilitary Peace Process
--------------


8. (C) Grossman expressed his appreciation for President
Uribe's April 27 statement on the paramilitary peace process
(ref B). He stressed that extradition cannot be a bargaining
chip in negotiations and asked whether the paramilitaries
would now be confronted on the battlefield.


9. (C) In response, Santos said:

-- As Uribe has said, this is the paramilitaries' last chance
to escape military confrontation. AUC leader Carlos Castano
had a moderating influence, and his removal means hardliners
are solely in control of the negotiating process (ref A). If
the paramilitaries do not want to negotiate, the military
will need to challenge them on the battlefield. The GOC is
concerned that its public security forces are not capable of
combating the guerrillas and the paramilitaries
simultaneously. Santos added that the paramilitaries are
more politically savvy than the FARC and enjoy greater
popular support than the guerrillas.

-- Although extradition is off the negotiating table, there
might be a need in the future for the GOC to offer a way out
to those who have demonstrated their commitment to peace and
renunciation of crime. Grossman said that there should not
be any hint that this might be a bargaining chip; Santos
agreed.


10. (C) The Ambassador asked about paramilitary threats
against the President. Santos said there have been instances
of joint FARC-paramilitary terrorism, and this could grow
over the next year. Santos thanked the USG for assistance
with Uribe's protective security.

--------------
Increase Focus on Human Rights
--------------


11. (C) Grossman said that the State Department's human
rights certification process was much more controversial this
year. Critics question accountability in the Prosecutor
General's Office ("Fiscalia"),ties between paramilitaries
and public security forces, and large-scale detentions. The
Ambassador noted the General Del Rio case. The GOC must deal
with these issues. Grossman said that the MOD's recent
statement about registering NGOs in Choco (septel) had raised
concerns among human rights groups. Santos assured Grossman
that the GOC will continue working hard to improve Colombia's
human rights situation.


12. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern with the level of
corruption and paramilitary collusion within the Prosecutor
General's Office, and called for the establishment of an
effective anti-corruption unit. Santos responded that he
supports Prosecutor General ("Fiscal") Osorio's recent
dismissals of corrupt officials. He expressed confidence
that Osorio will continue cleaning up the Prosecutor
General's Office, especially with the support of his
exceptional deputy. He also lauded the Prosecutor General
Office's Human Rights Unit, and noted concern for the safety
of the unit's prosecutors due to their aggressive
investigations.
WOOD