DECIPHERING THE SIZE OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003545

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PINR PINS PROP SNAR CO AUC ELN FARC
SUBJECT: DECIPHERING THE SIZE OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD),
at least 20,000 Colombian terrorists, both paramilitaries and
guerrillas, have deserted or been captured or killed in
combat with government forces since President Alvaro Uribe
took office in August 2002. Still, the estimated numerical
strengths of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC),the National Liberation Army (ELN),and paramilitary
groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC) have not seen corresponding declines. This apparent
contradiction can largely be explained by: (1) continued
terrorist recruiting, (2) truncated criminal cases against
terrorist suspects, (3) GOC actions that target urban
militias and civilian terrorist support networks not included
in MOD estimates of terrorist strength, and (4) estimates
influenced by the institutional responsibilities of
particular government entities. Although the exact size of
Colombian terrorist groups will never be known with
certainty, it is clear that the GOC is hitting terrorist
groups -- both paramilitaries and guerrillas -- and their
civilian supporters harder than ever before. End Summary.

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The Numbers in a Nutshell
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2. (SBU) The Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD) reports that
between January 2003 and March 2004, nearly 800
paramilitaries and 2,000 members of the National Liberation
Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
deserted. Since President Uribe's inauguration in August
2002, the MOD reports that nearly 500 paramilitaries and
2,800 members of the FARC and ELN were killed in combat and
over 4,200 paramilitaries and 9,350 members of the FARC and
ELN were captured by GOC security forces. In addition, over
1,000 paramilitaries voluntarily demobilized near the end of

2003. Thus, according to official figures, approximately
6,500 paramilitaries and 14,200 guerrillas have been taken
off the battlefield in the last 19 months. However,
estimates of the numerical strengths of the FARC, ELN, and
paramilitary groups have not fallen consistent with these
figures.


3. (C) According to the Department's 2002 and 2003 human
rights reports on Colombia, which used figures similar to
official GOC estimates, the FARC lost only 3,000 combatants
in 2003 and the ELN only 1,000, while paramilitary strength
remained unchanged (the 2003 report estimates there are
13,500 FARC members, 3,500 ELN, and 12,000 paramilitaries).
These relatively small declines in official estimates of
terrorist strength raise questions about the accuracy of GOC
figures on desertions and casualties suffered by terrorist
organizations. However, most of the apparent discrepancies
can be accounted for by continued terrorist recruitment,
truncated criminal cases against terrorist suspects, GOC
actions that target urban militias and civilian terrorist
support networks not included in MOD estimates of terrorist
strength, and estimates influenced by the institutional
responsibilities of particular government entities.

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Recruitment Continues
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4. (C) Aggressive recruiting efforts by illegal armed groups
compensate for many desertions and casualties. The GOC does
not keep statistics on terrorist recruiting, primarily
because most takes place in areas beyond GOC control.
However, it is clear that illegal armed groups continue to
add thousands of new members to their ranks, sometimes by
force. In some regions, new recruits fully offset losses
from desertions, detentions, and deaths. Recruiting occurs
primarily in poor rural areas where illegal armed groups
exercise de facto control. The FARC, for instance, obtains
most of its recruits from the eastern departments of Meta and
Caqueta. In many of these economically backward regions,
joining an illegal armed group is a seemingly attractive
option. For similar reasons, illegal armed groups have found
rich recruiting grounds in urban slums, especially on the
outskirts of Medellin and in southern Bogota.

5. (C) FARC deserters often report joining guerrilla ranks
because of FARC promises to care for their impoverished
families. A significant percentage of other FARC deserters
claim they were forcibly recruited, although the
self-selecting nature of this group makes it difficult to
extrapolate a reliable percentage of FARC recruiting that is
forcible. The ELN, weakened by conflict with paramilitaries
and increased GOC military pressure, has difficulty
recruiting new members outside of regions where it still
enjoys well-established grassroots support, such as the
departments of Arauca and Norte de Santander. Paramilitary
recruits most often join for the promise of a regular,
relatively generous salary.

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Many Detainees are Released without Trial
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6. (C) Another factor offsetting GOC military and law
enforcement actions against illegal armed groups is the fact
many detainees are released soon after they are captured.
The military often detains large groups of persons suspected
of affiliation with terrorist groups. Representatives of the
Prosecutor General's Office ("Fiscalia"),who generally
accompany military operations, take charge of these
individuals and check their identities against the names of
known fugitives. If there are no outstanding arrest warrants
against an individual and no additional incriminating
evidence is immediately available, the suspect must be
released. Because Colombian terrorist groups do not have
internationally recognized "belligerent" status, the GOC must
treat each individual case as a law enforcement matter,
significantly limiting its ability to incapacitate suspected
terrorists.



7. (C) Even when fresh evidence or outstanding arrest
warrants legally justify a more lengthy detention, Colombian
law generally requires that detainees be released if the
Government fails to file charges against them within 180 days
of their arrest. For example, in November 2002, 85 persons
were detained in Arauca department on suspicion of ties to
the ELN. However, only 43 were held beyond the initial
screening stage, and 37 were released months later because
the 180 day period -- legally extended in this case under a
terrorism exception -- expired before criminal charges were
filed. Hence, although MOD statistics reflect that 85
terrorist supporters were arrested, only six actually remain
in custody. The GOC does not keep records on how many
detainees are released. The National Penitentiary Institute
(INPEC) reports that approximately 19,000 persons were
imprisoned for all types of crimes in the past 19 months. If
over 13,500 members of illegal armed groups were captured
during this same time frame, it is probable that large
numbers of suspected terrorists were released without trial
or ruled "not guilty."

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Urban Militias and Support Networks Confuse the Numbers
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8. (C) Urban militias and civilian logistical and
intelligence support networks contribute significantly to the
operations of illegal armed groups. However, their numbers
are notoriously difficult to estimate, and are not included
in overall estimates of terrorist strength. Most law
enforcement operations against terrorist groups, especially
in urban areas, target support networks rather than
combatants. For example, on March 28, Colombian authorities
arrested 65 supporters of the FARC's Teofilo Forero Mobile
Column (TFMC); it is unlikely that more than a handful of
these individuals were included in official GOC estimates of
FARC numbers. However, these arrests -- and arrests and
deaths of other members of urban militias and terrorist
support networks -- are included in GOC statistics on actions
against illegal armed groups.

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Institutional Environments Influence Opinions
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9. (C) Particular institutional environments also affect how
organizations in Colombia, whether government or private,
formulate statistics on illegal armed groups. For example,
MOD estimates of the number of paramilitary fighters have
remained at or near 12,000 for several years. However, the
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, which is hoping to
receive international support for its efforts to negotiate
the demobilization of the AUC, has claimed that as many as
22,000 paramilitaries could demobilize as a result of its
efforts. We suspect that the responsibilities of the High
Commissioner's Office color its interpretation of available
data and its public estimates of paramilitary strength.
Undoubtedly, the opinions of other entities are also
affected, albeit perhaps subconsciously, by their own
institutional interests.

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Comment
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10. (C) Even within the MOD, there are discrepancies and
disagreements about terrorist strength. What is clear,
however, is that the GOC is hitting terrorist groups -- both
paramilitaries and guerrillas -- and their civilian support
networks harder than it ever has before.
WOOD