PARAMILITARY PEACE DIFFICULTIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 002561

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KJUS PGOV PTER CO AUC
SUBJECT: PARAMILITARY PEACE DIFFICULTIES

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (S) At the instruction of President Uribe, Peace
Negotiator Restrepo met with the Ambassador to discuss
difficulties in the GOC's negotiations with the AUC
paramilitaries. Restrepo said the AUC had called for written
guarantees from the GOC that, during the concentration phase,
AUC members facing arrest warrants would neither be jailed
nor extradited to the United States. The AUC also wanted a
two-step system that gave demobilizing forces several months
within concentration areas before judicial reviews began on
individual criminal behavior. The Ambassador opposed lifting
arrest warrants on paramilitaries during the initial
demobilization phase as this would reduce compliance
incentives. He also cautioned against delaying the judicial
screening of concentrated paramilitary personnel. He
observed that the lack of transparency in the Medellin
demobilization undermined support for the larger paramilitary
peace process, and recommended that the GOC publicly
highlight what had been achieved. Restrepo noted that, as a
result of GOC military pressure, the Central Bolivar Bloc had
taken the potentially significant decision to pull out of key
areas, including Barrancabermeja. Carlos Castano still
flirted with the idea of turning himself in to the United
States. The Ambassador urged Restrepo to develop a more
integrated interagency approach to support the AUC process.
End Summary.

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Ambassador Meets with High Commissioner for Peace
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2. (C) High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo
called upon the Ambassador March 9 at President Uribe's
instruction to provide an update on the paramilitary peace
process. Restrepo was concerned that discussions with
paramilitaries were at a critical juncture.

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Concentration Areas and Arrest Warrants
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3. (S) Restrepo said his main objective during his March 5
negotiations with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC) was to secure their commitment to concentrate their
forces in specific geographic zones. Concentrations were
indispensable for the GOC to verify the paramilitaries'
compliance with the cease-fire.


4. (S) Restrepo said AUC leaders vehemently opposed
concentrating their combatants without a GOC written
commitment that paramilitary members would neither be
arrested nor extradited to the U.S. while involved in the
troop concentration phase. The AUC wanted U.S. endorsement
of this agreement. This stance appeared to be the result of
mid-level paramilitary leaders seeking complete protection
from jail or extradition. AUC leaders also argued that the
"security" they provided was necessary and would not be
available if they concentrated in zones.

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Overcoming the Impasse
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5. (S) Restrepo noted that the March 5 discussions would
have broken off had it not been for an emotional plea by AUC
leader Carlos Castano to agree in principle to geographic
concentration, pending further consideration of shielding
paramilitary members from jail during the concentration
phase. Restrepo had considered two solutions to the issue.
One, lifting individual arrest orders for a limited time, had
already been discarded. Another approach was lifting arrest
orders for individuals in specific geographic areas. He also
mused whether the GOC could broach the issue of extradition
with the paramilitaries.


6. (S) Restrepo observed that it was difficult to see how
paramilitary leaders could carry out their demobilization
tasks if they could not be temporarily shielded from arrest.
Nevertheless, President Uribe was concerned that the time was
not yet ripe for the GOC to lift arrest orders on
paramilitaries and had consistently opposed negotiating the
extradition issue with the paramilitaries. The USG also had
been clear that it opposed lifting the arrest orders for
specific individuals involved in peace talks and
concentration/demobilization. Restrepo requested USG views.

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Ambassador's Response
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7. (S) The Ambassador observed that the paramilitary
ceasefire, although imperfectly observed, already had saved
many lives. He endorsed the GOC's insistence that the
paramilitaries concentrate their forces; a concentration
would enable the GOC to verify paramilitary compliance with
the ceasefire and agreement terms. It would also separate
paramilitaries that genuinely want to demobilize from those
who do not. Some paramilitary elements would remain heavily
involved in narcotics trafficking. The United States
rejected the AUC's argument that they provided security in
certain regions; they were terrorists. Security was the job
of the GOC.


8. (S) The Ambassador urged against formally lifting arrest
warrants against paramilitaries, especially prior to their
having complied with all the terms of any agreement. Such a
concession would reduce the GOC's leverage. Regarding
extradition, the Ambassador recalled that Uribe assured the
United States that neither the "conditional parole" bill nor
any agreement reached with the AUC would impair the
extradition process. The United States still relied on this
position.

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Restrepo Pushed for Temporary Mechanism
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9. (S) Restrepo said he accepted the Ambassador's rationale
for not formally lifting arrest warrants on the
paramilitaries to maintain GOC leverage during the
demobilization/reintegration process. However, he insisted
that some kind of temporary, carefully-defined mechanism was
needed to shield paramilitary leaders from arrest while they
carried out accord commitments. The paramilitaries would not
enter into a concentration phase without some guarantee. The
Ambassador advised Restrepo to seek a practical solution,
leaving arrest warrants in place. AUC leaders could acquire
the freedom to move within and between zones of
concentration, solely in order to ensure that concentration
was a success.

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Judicial Screening
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10. (S) Restrepo said that the paramilitaries' wariness
about being arrested after concentrating led them to refuse
to have their personnel reviewed by the Prosecutor General's
Office (Fiscalia) during the concentration phase. The
judicial screening approach used in the Medellin
demobilization had led to the prosecution of a substantial
number of Cacique Nutibara Bloc members. Because a
"conditional parole" law was not in effect, the Fiscalia was
obligated to prosecute those wanted for serious crimes. As a
result, the paramilitaries wanted to wait three months after
concentration, ostensibly to build confidence, before being
interrogated by the Fiscalia.


11. (S) The Ambassador said that concentrating paramilitary
forces would be a positive development. Nevertheless,
delaying judicial screening would create a break point in
negotiations that the paramilitaries could exploit. Restrepo
conceded the Ambassador's point, but reiterated his doubt
that he could persuade the paramilitaries to accept judicial
screening soon after concentration.

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Medellin Process
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12. (S) The Ambassador observed that the public's limited
understanding of the Medellin demobilization negatively
affected the overall perception of the AUC peace process.
The GOC should publicize details of the Medellin process to
overcome the perception that it was synonymous with impunity.
Restrepo responded that the division of institutional
responsibilities complicated projecting a unified message on
the Medellin process. (Note: The High Commissioner for Peace
had a coordinating role, the mayor's office provided jobs and
training, the Peace Commission of Antioquia and the Church
helped verify compliance, and the Fiscalia conducted judicial
screening.) Restrepo acknowledged that releasing information
on Medellin demobilization's judicial screening would correct
the perception of immunity. He noted that, of approximately
870 demobilized in Medellin, 75 faced legal charges and 18
were in prison awaiting prosecution. To overcome AUC
concerns, Restrepo wanted to downplay the judicial screening
process until after the "conditional parole" bill was
approved.

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Central Bolivar Bloc
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13. (S) Restrepo said that the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB),
which had skittishly participated in demobilization
discussions, had announced -- and appeared committed to
carrying out -- a withdrawal from key points in the Middle
Magdalena region, including the city of Barrancabermeja.
Restrepo judged that a key factor behind the BCB's withdrawal
had been increased GOC military pressure. Another possible
factor was that the BCB wanted to create a security vacuum.

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Castano
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14. (S) Restrepo noted that Castano had played a decisive
role in moving the AUC demobilization discussions forward.
Of all the paramilitary leaders, he was the most committed to
reaching an agreement. As a result, many of the other
paramilitary leaders viewed Castano as a potential traitor,
and he was clearly apprehensive about his own security.
Within the AUC, military power had decisively shifted to
Salvatore Mancuso. Restrepo characterized Castano as
schizophrenic on the possibility of turning himself in to
U.S. authorities. At times Castano defiantly scorned the
danger he faced, while at others he voiced the possibility of
turning himself over to the U.S. The GOC, said Restrepo,
would welcome such a voluntary handover.

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Greater GOC Coordination
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15. (SBU) The Ambassador urged Restrepo to work closely with
Minister of Defense Uribe and Minister of Interior/Justice
Pretelt to develop a coordinated interagency structure, with
clearly defined responsibilities to support the AUC
demobilization process. U.S. assistance to the process could
not be considered until the process was fully defined.
Restrepo concurred, noting that the Ministries of Defense and
Interior/Justice were finalizing their proposed division of
labor.
WOOD