APPREHENSION IN URABA FOR AUC DEMOBILIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001704

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PINR SNAR CO AUC
SUBJECT: APPREHENSION IN URABA FOR AUC DEMOBILIZATION

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons
1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On January 29, a USAID contracting team
tasked to analyze the GOC's demobilization plans for the
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),USAID
personnel, and poloff visited Apartado, in the Uraba region
of Antioquia Department. The GOC expects to implement an AUC
demobilization in 2004 in Uraba, which has a heavy AUC
presence. Dario Mejia from the High Commissioner for Peace
Office arranged meetings with the local military commander,
Chamber of Commerce, a Church representative, a plantain
farming cooperative, and a private security firm to hear
their views on a potential AUC demobilization. Many of the
interlocutors expressed apprehension about the GOC's ability
to provide security if the paramilitaries units in the region
were to demobilize. Much of the Uraba region has been
controlled by the AUC since about 2001. The area has been
historically plagued by violence and instability until
recently when murder, kidnapping, and other crimes decreased.
End Summary.


2. (C) Uraba, which covers northern Antioquia Department and
western Cordoba Department, is likely to be one of the first
AUC demobilization areas in 2004. The GOC's ability to
provide legitimate state security and social services there
could prove crucial to the peace process's continued
progress.

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Potential Security For an AUC Demobilization
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3. (C) General Paulino La Torre, head of the Army's 17th
Brigade, which is responsible for Uraba and parts of Choco
Department, acknowledged that there is public concern that
the military and police will not be able to provide adequate
security in the event of an AUC demobilization and that the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) will seek to
re-take the region. However, he is confident that his
brigade is up to the task for the following reasons:

-- A greater public security presence since President Uribe
took office: there are now police units of approximately 40
men each and hometown soldiers in all 13 municipalities, in
addition to the permanent presence of three Army companies.
La Torre noted that there are over 3,000 soldiers and police
operating in Uraba. When asked why this many soldiers have
had problems subduing only several hundred illegally armed
combatants, La Torre replied that: (1) the brutal
intimidation methods used by both groups enables them to
control large parts of the region with a relatively small
fighting force; and (2) the region traditionally has had a
small state presence, especially in the heavily forested,
mountainous uplands.

-- Violence in the region -- while still a major problem --
has decreased dramatically in the past year. La Torre claims
this is in part because the paramilitaries who operate in the
area have largely obeyed the cease-fire agreed upon in late

2002. Data from the Vice Presidency's Office corraborates
this assertion: of the approximately 370 confirmed
paramilitary human rights violations nationwide since
November 2002, only three or four have been in the Uraba
region.


4. (C) La Torre estimated that there are about 300
paramilitaries in Uraba in three groups: Carlos Castano's
AUC, drug trafficker Diego Murillo's (alias "Don Berna")
forces, and the Central Bolivar Bloc. These groups have
dominated most of the region since about 2001 after several
years of violent clashes with the FARC. There are an
estimated 150 FARC guerrillas, who have been pushed by the
AUC into pockets of territory in the region's upland areas.


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Community Representatives Skeptical
--------------


5. (C) Several members of the Chamber of Commerce said they
were concerned about the consequences of a paramilitary
demobilization. Many acknowledged that they had personally
been extorted, threatened, or had family members killed or
kidnapped in years past by the FARC. They said that the AUC
presence had stabilized the region during the past four or
five years, resulting in increased investment, especially in
the banana growing areas. They feared retaliation by the
FARC if the paramilitaries were to demobilize. They
emphasized, however, that they are in favor of a paramilitary
demobilization, but only if the GOC can guarantee a secure
and viable state presence.


6. (C) Father Leonides Moreno from the Roman Catholic church
of Apartado supports all peace efforts, including the AUC
peace process. He acknowledged that an AUC demobilization
would be complicated, especially in light of the region's
widespread drug trafficking activity.


7. (C) Dario Mejia from the Peace Commissioner's Office
conducted a confidential question and answer session with
about 20 plantain farmers to determine their views of
security in the region. Very few said that they had been
directly hurt by the armed conflict. However, about one
third claimed that they did not think the GOC was capable of
providing adequate security at the present time, suggesting
that they feel that some other group -- most likely the AUC
-- is protecting them.

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Former CONVIVIR Confident
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8. (C) Two managers of a private security firm that was
founded ten years ago as part of the then-legal,
state-sponsored self defense groups (convivir) expressed
their opposition to all illegal armed groups, including the
AUC. The firm, which has about 100 employees, is willing to
offer jobs to ex-paramilitaries, in an un-armed capacity. It
currently employees several former guerrillas. The managers
expressed confidence that the GOC would not leave the area
vulnerable to attack from the FARC. They also suggested that
private firms, such as their own, could play an important
role in providing security after an AUC demobilization.
(Comment: In many respects the private security firms would
be performing much of the functions now performed by the AUC,
but presumably within a framework of law and without drug
trafficking. End Comment.)


9. (C) Comment: Uraba illustrates a complicated conjunction
of issues: (1) Citizen fear of violence, especially by the
FARC; desire to return to normalcy; and lack of confidence in
the ability, not the goodwill, of government forces; (2) the
benefits, already in place of President Uribe's policy to
strengthen the public security presence throughout the
country; and (3) the complexity of the paramilitary problems,
especially regarding the peace process.

WOOD