INTERAGENCY DELEGATION DISCUSSES AUC DEMOBILIZATION PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 001363 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2014 TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PREL, SNAR, CO, AUC, Demobilization SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION DISCUSSES AUC DEMOBILIZATION PLAN REF: A. BOGOTA 00993 B. BOGOTA 00815 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- 1. (C) On February 4, an interagency delegation led by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Peter DeShazo met with a variety of GOC and U.S. interlocutors to discuss the status of the GOC's planning for disarming and demobilizing the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and other paramilitary groups. The delegation underscored that the U.S. had not made a decision on whether to provide financial support for the process, that any such decision would be made only after the GOC had finalized its demobilization and reintegration plans, and that any eventual U.S. support could only be provided consistent with applicable U.S. law. The delegation examined GOC plans for organizing, monitoring, financing, and providing security for such a process. Since mid-January, the GOC agencies involved -- particularly, the Peace Commissioner's Office and Ministries of Defense and Interior and Justice -- have been working to develop and implement a coordinated approach. Although it has made notable progress, including creating a ministerial-level committee to oversee the process and signing an agreement for OAS support and verification, the GOC still needs to overcome shortfalls in its long-term planning. End Summary. -------------- The Inter-Agency Delegation -------------- 2. (C) On February 4, an inter-agency delegation composed of WHA DAS Peter DeShazo, DRL PDAS Michael Kozak, INL DAS Deborah McCarthy, USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Karen Harbert, and representatives from S/CT, SOUTHCOM, and OSD visited with GOC officials to discuss the GOC's plans for paramilitary demobilization. Ambassador accompanied the delegation to meetings with: a Creative Associates International (CAI) team contracted by USAID to conduct an analysis of paramilitary demobilization/reintegration; High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo; Minister of Defense Jorge Alberto Uribe; Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt; OAS representative Sergio Caramagna, who will lead an OAS mission to verify and monitor the paramilitary demobilization/reintegration process; and a GOC inter-agency team composed of Vice Minister of Defense Penate and working-level officials involved in implementation. The delegation also met with the International Organization for Migration (IOM),a USAID grantee that has been working with the GOC on the topic. 3. (C) DAS DeShazo emphasized with interlocutors that the purpose of the visit by the interagency delegation was informational -- to learn from the GOC about its interagency planning for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of paramilitary forces. He stressed that the U.S. delegation was not in Colombia to offer assistance, negotiate anything, or make decisions, but only to evaluate the state of GOC planning. He underscored the U.S. view that any demobilization and reinsertion process must include justice for the victims and accountability for the perpetrators of gross human rights violations and narcotrafficking, and stated that any U.S. support for a formal peace process with a group designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States -- in the case of Colombia, the AUC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),and National Liberation Army (ELN) -- would have to be consistent with applicable U.S. law. He also stressed that the U.S. will not drop its requests for the extradition of AUC leaders or other members of FTOs indicted now, or in the future, in the U.S. -------------- Organization: On the Right Path -------------- 4. (C) Echoing comments previously made to the Ambassador, GOC interlocutors admitted they are only beginning to develop a coherent interagency structure to implement the large paramilitary demobilizations the Government hopes to achieve over the coming three years. Minister of Interior and Justice (MOI/J) Sabas Pretelt, Minister of Defense (MOD) Jorge Uribe, and High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo have formed a committee, overseen by President Uribe, to manage the multi-phased demobilization and reintegration process. The Peace Commissioner's Office will be responsible for negotiations; the Ministry of Defense will provide security for paramilitary troop concentrations, oversee disarmament, and debrief former fighters; and the Ministry of Interior and Justice will manage reintegration. During the concentration phase, the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) will investigate former fighters to determine if they face criminal charges. The Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) will be responsible for all child ex-fighters. The National Registrar's Office and Department of Administrative Security (DAS, roughly an FBI equivalent) will provide legal documentation for former fighters. A wide range of other GOC agencies, such as the Ministry of Social Protection, as well as local government institutions, will contribute services during the reintegration phase. 5. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo noted that his office, which used to be responsible for the entire demobilization and reintegration process, including last year's demobilizations in Medellin and rural Cauca department, has begun to transfer responsibilities to the Ministries of Defense and Interior and Justice. Although the new organizational structures are still developing, the CAI team noted that Colombia's relatively well-developed infrastructure and large supply of human capital give it a significant advantage over other countries, such as Sierra Leone or Guatemala, that conducted demobilizations with an essentially non-existent state infrastructure. -------------- Confirmation, Verification, and Monitoring -------------- 6. (C) The GOC is exploring how to strengthen verification, including extending the so-called "CODA" process -- currently used in the GOC's individual desertion/reinsertion program -- to large scale demobilizations. During CODA, a team of officials from the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Justice, ICBF, Fiscalia, and the Human Rights Ombudsman Office review all deserters to verify they were members of an illegal armed group and do not face major criminal charges. Individuals facing charges are turned over to the justice system. Individuals who lie about membership in an illegal armed group, who are often displaced persons, are then turned over to the care of the Social Solidarity Network (RSS),the Government's displaced persons service agency. Individuals whose status as former fighters is confirmed join the reinsertion process. The CAI team recommends that CODA be adopted for large scale demobilizations, but recognizes that the program would have to be significantly expanded to accommodate the thousands of former fighters currently contemplated. 7. (C) Ensuring that former fighters fulfill the terms of any demobilization agreement and do not return to serious criminal activities is one of the paramilitary peace process's greatest challenges. Juan David Angel, a businessman recently tapped to revamp and manage the Ministry of Interior and Justice's reintegration program, noted that the best guarantee that former fighters not backslide is to offer them viable job and education options in civilian life. Virtually everyone agreed that OAS verification and oversight of the demobilization process could significantly assist the Government to fulfill its commitments and add legitimacy and accountability to the process. -------------- Finances: Shortfalls On the Horizon -------------- 8. (C) The GOC is not financially able to fund by itself a collective paramilitary demobilization, and is eager to receive assistance from the international community. The Peace Commissioner's Office estimates that the cost of demobilizing and reintegrating approximately 20,000 paramilitaries -- a number provided to the Office by the paramilitaries themselves -- between now and 2006 would be approximately USD 171 million. (Note: Restrepo's estimate includes what the AUC describes as its support network. The Embassy believes a more realistic estimate of AUC fighters is 13,000. End Note.) The national budget will cover approximately USD 47 million, leaving a shortfall of USD 124 million for which the GOC is seeking international assistance (ref A). The Ministry of Interior and Justice's reinsertion program has a USD 7 million budget, enough to cover only the individual reinsertion program and only until April. According to Vice-Minister of Defense Penate, the Ministry of Defense's USD 7 million budget for its demobilization role is insufficient to handle a large scale paramilitary demobilization. (Note: Penate serves as the Executive Secretary of the ministerial committee overseeing the peace SIPDIS process. End Note.) -------------- Participative Security -------------- 9. (C) MOD Uribe assured the delegation he is committed to providing adequate security for any demobilization. VMOD Penate was confident that the present level of security force presence, buttressed by hometown soldiers, rural police (carabineros),and radio-operated neighborhood watch systems, could provide adequate security in communities directly affected by demobilization. He asserted that it is a misconception that paramilitaries provide security in areas they control, characterizing them as criminals who want to establish a monopoly on criminal activities. -------------- A Hypothetical Demobilization -------------- 10. (C) DeShazo asked the group of working-level GOC officials to describe what would happen in the event that 500 hypothetical paramilitaries announced their demobilization tomorrow. Roughly, the process would be: -- The Peace Commissioner's Office would negotiate the terms of the demobilization and determine the location of the concentration zone. An organization, such as the National Statistics Institute (DANE),would be contracted by the Peace Commissioner's Offce to conduct a survey of the former fighers to identify them and determine their background (age, education, etc). To ensure that "they are who they say they are" they would have to produce their national identity card ("cedula"). They would be fingerprinted, as are all current defectors. -- Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, the former fighters would enter a concentration zone, turn in their arms to the military, and publicly sign documents renouncing their paramilitary membership. The Fiscalia would begin investigating each former fighter. All minors would immediately be turned over to the ICBF. During this time, the Ministry of Defense would debrief the former fighters for intelligence purposes. -- All paramilitaries facing criminal charges would be turned over to the justice system and eventually dealt with in accordance with Colombian law, including the finalized "conditional parole" law. The rest of the former fighters would enter the Ministry of Interior and Justice's 18 to 24-month reintegration program. -------------- Conditional Parole -------------- 11. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo asserted that the "conditional parole" ("ley de alternatividad penal") legislation will not prevent paramilitaries from being subject to extradition or Colombia's asset forfeiture law. Illicitly acquired paramilitary assets will be seized. In addition, the legislation requires beneficiaries to donate licit assets to a victims' reparation fund in an amount determined by a judge. Restrepo noted that paramilitary commanders are not pleased with the draft legislation but that he has not negotiated its terms with them. In his view, AUC leader Carlos Castano is the only commander currently willing to spend a limited time in prison. (Note: The vast majority of rank and file combatants are not expected to face criminal charges. End note.) When asked why the AUC leaders would be willing to turn in themselves and their troops under these circumstances, Restrepo said that the only option was to increase military pressure on them. -------------- OAS Committed -------------- 12. (C) OAS representative Sergio Caramagna explained why the OAS chose to support and verify the GOC's peace process with the paramilitaries (ref B): 1) Colombia has the largest conflict in the hemisphere, and part of the OAS's mission is to support peace and stability in the region; 2) the OAS views Restrepo as transparent, skilled, and committed to President Uribe's peace policies; 3) with two large-scale demobilizations planned for 2004, the GOC needs outside support immediately. Caramagna noted that the OAS has extensive experience in supporting demobilizations elsewhere in the hemisphere (he worked for 14 years in Nicaragua),and that the OAS's interest in supporting Colombia has several precedents and has been well-publicized since November 2003. The delegation emphasized that the U.S. is fully supportive of the OAS initiative. Caramagna welcomed the support and said he was working to persuade skeptical countries to back the agreement. -------------- Working to Develop a Strategic Plan -------------- 13. (C) The GOC recognizes the need to develop a well-organized structure and long-term strategic plan for the demobilization and reintegration of the paramilitaries. VMOD Penate asserted they could develop a written plan within several weeks. The potential benefits of a successful process are clear: removing several thousand terrorists from the armed conflict, reducing the internal conflict from a three- to a two-front war, and offering an incentive to the ELN or FARC to enter into good-faith negotiations. The plan developed for the AUC would, according to the GOC, be equally applied to the FARC and ELN. 14. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS DeShazo. WOOD