Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BOGOTA12938
2004-11-02 18:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

DAS SHAPIRO DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH PEACE

Tags:  PTER PHUM KJUS PINR CO AUC 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 012938 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014
TAGS: PTER PHUM KJUS PINR CO AUC
SUBJECT: DAS SHAPIRO DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH PEACE
COMMISSIONER


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 012938

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014
TAGS: PTER PHUM KJUS PINR CO AUC
SUBJECT: DAS SHAPIRO DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH PEACE
COMMISSIONER


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) December 14, 2004, 7:30-8:30 p.m., Ambassador's
residence, Bogota


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
--------------

DAS Charles Shapiro
Ambassador William B. Wood
Jeff DeLaurentis, POLCOUNS
David Henifin, Deputy Director for Andean Affairs
Sarah LaGier, notetaker

Colombia
--------------

Luis Carlos Restrepo, Peace Commissioner

--------------
Summary
--------------


3. (C) Restrepo told DAS Shapiro that the peace process with
the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was going
well and that the Calima Bloc in Valle Department was next to
demobilize. AUC strongmen Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente
Castano, and Hernan Hernandez have become allies of the peace
process. Restrepo agreed that it was important to have a
legal framework for the process but said the GOC would wait
until February to present its version of the Law for Justice
and Reparations. It is trying to avoid a long, drawn-out
national debate on the law. Restrepo also said the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) would not
negotiate until they suffer a serious military defeat. The
GOC authorized Mexican facilitator Ambassador Valencia to
invite the National Liberation Army (ELN) Central Command
(COCE) to meet with him in Mexico without GOC participation
provided they halt all violence during the meeting. Valencia
expects the COCE to agree.

--------------
AUC Demobilizations Going Well
--------------


4. (C) Restrepo told DAS Shapiro that the recent
demobilization of the Catatumbo Bloc in Norte de Santander
Department was a success. The group turned in over 1,000
weapons, 150 farms, and 57 houses and commercial outlets.
However, the threat of a FARC resurgence in the area remains
real. In order to guarantee state control of the Catatumbo
region, Restrepo said the government needs:

- Aerial eradication in the mountainous, FARC controlled
coca-growing region in Catatumbo. The GOC estimates there
are 3,800 hectares of coca including 800 in the Bari national
park. Eradication in the formerly AUC-controlled plains of

Catatumbo has been successful. (Embassy is reviewing our
coca estimates and spray plans for the region.)

- At least four Navy patrol boats on the Catatumbo River;

- One to two helicopters for aerial coverage; and

- 42 kilometers of paved roads and about 50 kilometers of
secondary dirt roads


5. (C) The Calima Bloc in Valle del Cauca Department has
begun concentrating and is scheduled to formally demobilize
on December 19. This would bring the total demobilized in
2004 to approximately 2,500.


6. (C) AUC strongmen Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente Castano, and
Hernan Hernandez have become government allies in the peace
process. Castano, who is the behind-the-scenes powerbroker
of the AUC, called Restrepo to tell him personally that he
had decided to support the peace process. Mancuso and
Hernandez are demobilizing the blocs they command. However,
AUC "narcoparas" Diego Murillo and Jorge Tovar Pupo are
trying to stall demobilization and view Mancuso as a traitor.
Restrepo has tried to take advantage of internal AUC
dissention since the onset of the process. He explained
that, although the AUC has talented advisers, they are poor
negotiators when left alone at the negotiating table. This
allowed Restrepo to convince the AUC to sign the July 15,
2003 agreement to demobilize all their troops by the end of

2005. In response to Shapiro's question about local support
for the AUC, Restrepo explained that the rural elites in
areas such as Cordoba, Magdalena, and Uraba believe the AUC
are necessary for their safety. Local elites fear the
government does not have the capacity to prevent the FARC
from returning after the AUC demobilizes. These are areas
plagued by FARC violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

--------------
Law of Justice and Reparations
--------------

7. (C) Restrepo agreed that it was important to have a legal
framework to deal with demobilized paramiltaries who are
charged with major crimes. The GOC plans to present its
version of the Law of Justice and Reparations in February,
possibly during the G-24 London conference follow-on in
Cartagena. Senator Rafael Pardo wrote his own draft of the
law to counter the GOC's version. Restrepo explained that
the GOC had four main concerns about Senator Pardo's version:

- Pardo's draft requires that all demobilizing members of an
illegal armed group (IAG),including those not accused of any
crime beyond membership in an IAG, go through a complete
legal investigation before being pardoned. The GOC's version
only applies to IAG members who are accused of major crimes.
The rest are pardoned for membership in an IAG and related
non-violent crimes under current Colombian law. Restrepo is
concerned that a prior full investigation for each IAG member
is counterproductive and too time consuming.

- Pardo's draft requires that a judge decide if a potential
beneficiary can be pardoned only after he has completed the
punishment imposed by the Tribunal for Truth, Justice, and
Reparations. The GOC version states that the Tribunal both
imposes the punishment and pardons the beneficiary for the
remainder of the original sentence at the same time (the
pardon could be revoked). Restrepo explained that this would
streamline the process.

- Pardo's version requires that the IAG submit a list of all
crimes before demobilizing. The GOC requires that each
demobilizing IAG member confess all crimes to the Prosecutor
General's Office and have dental identification records and
fingerprints taken for purposes of investigation, but only
after he demobilizes. Restrepo fears that requiring a full
confession before demobilization would prevent groups from
even considering demobilizing. He asserted that the GOC
sequence allows better control over former IAG members
because they would first be identified and put under state
supervision and then required to cooperate with authorities.

- Pardo's version allows the Supreme Council of the Judiciary
to choose the Tribunal members. The GOC version allows the
President to nominate them. (This distinction between a
"legal" versus "political" leadership could be central to
future negotiations with the ELN and FARC.)


8. (C) Shapiro urged the GOC to share its approach with the
international community and human rights organizations.
Pardo was skilled at lobbying for his draft and had framed
the terms of the debate, but little was known about the GOC
draft. Restrepo explained that the GOC had been
intentionally silent on the issue to avoid starting a
national debate but he believed the GOC had little choice but
to challenge Pardo's version. The Ambassador urged the GOC
to work for early consensus with Congress behind the scenes
instead of debating in public.

--------------
FARC: Military Pressure
--------------


9. (C) When asked if the FARC was willing to negotiate,
Restrepo said not until the group suffered a serious military
defeat. Restrepo asserted that the GOC needed to disprove
the myth that the FARC Secretariat was untouchable by killing
or capturing several of its senior commanders. In contrast
to the AUC, Restrepo said the FARC was hierarchical with a
united leadership and provincial mindset. For example,
two-thirds of the 35 imprisoned guerrillas whom the GOC
pardoned and released in November were illiterate or just
barely able to read.

--------------
ELN: Possible COCE Meeting in Mexico
--------------


10. (C) Restrepo said the GOC had authorized Mexican
facilitator Ambassador Andres Valencia to hold a meeting with
the COCE in Mexico provided the ELN ceased all violent
activity during the meeting. The proposal was presented to
the COCE as an invitation from Valencia with no involvement
from the GOC as a way to get around the ELN's refusal to
declare a cessation of hostilities to the government. The
ELN has responded positively, and Valencia told Restrepo that
he expects the COCE to agree to the meeting. Restrepo
asserted that COCE member Antonio Garcia's recent interview
in which he said the group would agree to a bilateral
cease-fire was nothing new and remained unacceptable for the
GOC because (1) the ELN has refused to include a cessation of
kidnapping in the cease-fire, and (2) the GOC wants a
unilateral cease-fire.


11. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Shapiro.
WOOD