UN MAY CONSIDER DDR PROGRAM FOR COLOMBIA;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 012603

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014
TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM PINR PREL CO
SUBJECT: UN MAY CONSIDER DDR PROGRAM FOR COLOMBIA;
HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN IN TROUBLE

REF: BOGOTA 11339

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Begin Summary: UN Special Advisor on Colombia James
LeMoyne, visiting Bogota this week, told major donors on
December 8 that the UN was considering a demobilization,
disarmament and reintergration (DDR) program for Colombia,
assuming certain conditions were met. UNDP is also exploring
the possibility of a major conference on DDR to highlight the
issue in Colombia. Per reftel, LeMoyne expressed continuing
concern about the "deteriorating" GOC-UN relationship in all
three areas of engagement -- human rights, good offices, and
humanitarian assistance. He said that UN officials in New
York "were stunned" that a presumed agreement on a
humanitarian action plan had recently unraveled, and appealed
to donors to help the UN and GOC fix it. He believes that
GOC officials are convinced that the document in its current
form would have been used as another vehicle to criticize
Colombia. Worse, he believes conceptual and ideological
differences have emerged between the GOC and UN over how the
conflict is seen. LeMoyne noted that the UN-GOC, high level
working group would finally meet in New York the week of
January 17 and hoped these issues would be addressed. End
Summary.


2. (C) On December 8, Swedish charge arranged a meeting with
major donors for visiting UN special advisor on Colombia
James LeMoyne. Along with the UNDP Resident Representative,
Ambassadors from Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
the UK were present. Polcouns represented the U.S. LeMoyne
will remain in Bogota until December 10, and has meetings
planned with FM Barco, Peace Commissioner Restrepo, Senator
Pardo, the Papal Nuncio, and various other embassies. Issues
covered included UN discussions about a demobilization,
disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program, delays in the
launch of the humanitarian action plan (HAP),and the GOC-UN
relationship.

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DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)
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3. (C) LeMoyne said that preliminary discussions were
underway at UN Headquarters about committing to a DDR program
in Colombia. The focus was reinsertion. While the GOC was
offering as much as it could, it would not be enough,
resulting, he said, in the return of ex-fighters into
guerrilla or criminal groups. According to LeMoyne, senior
UN officials including the SYG, U/SYG Prendergast and Chef de
Cabinet Riza, were signaling a "qualified maybe" and had
solicited possible parameters and conditions for such a
program. While acknowledging that the UN had been too
extreme in the past on the conditions it demanded of the GOC,
LeMoyne said the UN would probably insist on at least three:
(1) an official GOC request; (2) the creation of a separate
GOC agency to manage DDR; and (3) passage of the "Law for
Justice and Reparations." He stressed that these were still
at the discussion stage, and while he awaited a political
green light from the 38th floor, he did have instructions to
consult with major donors on the issue. The group's reponse
to the conditions was unenthusiastic (except for Switzerland)
and LeMoyne was asked to investigate whether the UN had
imposed similar conditions on other governments which hosted
a UN DDR program.


4. (C) UNDP Resident Representative Alfredo Witschi said
that, in light of the discussions in New York, local agency
reps were reviewing how the UN system could become involved
in DDR. He recommended that the issue be discussed in
Cartagena in February to ensure a strong signal of support
from the international community. One idea being considered
was an international conference on DDR, led by Iqbal Riza,
featuring countries which had "come out the other end" of a
DDR process. Witschi also noted that the humanitarian action
plan still under discussion (see para 7) with the GOC did not
include a DDR component, but UN agencies were preparing
themselves should a consensus emerge to add one. Swedish
charge Ingemar Cederberg announced that the GOS had
identified an additional USD 300,000 as a potential
contribution to UNDP, a substantial portion of which would
likely be earmarked for DDR activities.

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UN-GOC RELATIONS DETERIORATE FURTHER: GOC BALKS AT
HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN
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5. (C) LeMoyne underscored that discussions on a DDR program
could be affected by the increasingly strained relations
between the GOC and the UN. He reviewed the state of play,
mostly repeating what he shared with the Ambassador on
October 30, reported reftel. He said that, in addition to
the ongoing problems with the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights and with the good offices role (i.e. his own
operation),the GOC was now balking at the latest version of
the humanitarian action plan.


6. (C) LeMoyne hypothesized that GOC officials, including the
President, Vice President, Foreign Minister, UN permrep, and
Peace Commissioner, have concluded that the GOC erred in
permitting a large UN presence in the country, and that the
UN has taken unfair advantage. These same officials believed
that there remains a conceptual and ideological difference
between the way they and the UN see the conflict. According
to LeMoyne, the GOC views it as terrorism, "in the Chechnya
model," not an internal conflict as the UN labels it.
Furthermore, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights in Bogota has become the enemy, neither transparent
nor effective, and the GOC was now prepared to "take it on."


7. (C) According to LeMoyne, the apparent failure of UN
humanitarian agencies and the GOC to reach final agreement on
a humanitarian action plan "stunned us in New York." He
surmised that the GOC, in particular its permrep in New York,
concluded that the current version was drafted like a new
human rights instrument that would be used to judge the GOC,
and ultimately block support. He appealed to the government
reps present to help the GOC and UN fix it.


8. (C) With respect to the good offices role, LeMoyne again
reported that UN Secretariat officials remained inclined to
suspend the good offices operation or reduce it
significantly. He also hinted that this would lead to his
departure.


9. (C) LeMoyne reported that the GOC-UN, high level working
group, led by FM Barco on the Colombian side and U/SYG
Prendergast on the UN side, would finally meet the week of
January 17 in New York. Given the ongoing difficulties with
the relationship, LeMoyne had been ordered back to New York
on Monday by Prendergast for two days of meetings, scrapping
a scheduled visit to Brussels. A note for the SYG on the
state of play will be prepared before Christmas in
preparation for the January meeting.

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COMMENT
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10.(C) Following the meeting, UK Ambassador Thomas Duggin
suggested that LeMoyne was "in overdrive crisis mode,"
exaggerating the problem between the GOC and the UN. That
said, GOC confidence in the UN has deteriorated to the point
that any UN initiative, including one as potentially useful
as a humanitarian action plan, is suspect. This is something
we should work to reverse in New York, Geneva and Bogota.
UNDP's Witschi admitted to considerable dissension within the
UN country team over the "pro-consul attitude" of OHCHR
director Michael Fruhling. According to Witschi, Fruhling
was fuming that UNDP/Bogota recommended HCHR Louise Arbour
attend the GOC-UN high level meeting the week of January 17
instead of Fruhling. Witschi believes that a high level GOC
intervention with the HCHR is the only way to rein in
Fruhling, and remains puzzled as to why it has not happened
yet.
WOOD