Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BOGOTA11753
2004-11-02 18:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES DEMOBILIZATION DETAILS

Tags:  PTER KJUS SNAR PHUM PINR PREL CO AUC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011753 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014
TAGS: PTER KJUS SNAR PHUM PINR PREL CO AUC
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES DEMOBILIZATION DETAILS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011753

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014
TAGS: PTER KJUS SNAR PHUM PINR PREL CO AUC
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES DEMOBILIZATION DETAILS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) On November 12, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos
Restrepo reviewed for the Ambassador recent developments in
demobilizing the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
and clarified key steps in the process. Restrepo's principle
concern is that without adequate security, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) could occupy AUC areas and
gain access to key mobility corridors and coca growing areas,
especially in the conflictive Catatumbo region. Meanwhile,
the Catatumbo Bloc has submitted a list of names and
identification numbers of those who will demobilize and the
GOC has selected a demobilization zone. The GOC is beginning
to receive lists, select demobilization zones, and prepare
security for other AUC groups scheduled to demobilize before
the end of the year.


2. (C) Restrepo detailed parts of the demobilization process:

- Monitoring: He asserted that monitoring former
paramilitaries' behavior was key to the process' legitimacy
but emphasized that local government and police had to
cooperate with him.

- Identification: Restrepo will consider issuing each
individual demobilizing a provisional identification card
when they enter the demobilization zone.

- Interviews: Each demobilized paramilitary is required to
report to a local reinsertion center to be interviewed by the
Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia),with whom he must
cooperate. If this does not happen, the individual would not
be pardoned for having belonged to an illegal armed group and
would be arrested.

- Renunciation: Before leaving the demobilization zone, each
individual is required to sign two documents: one renouncing
membership in an illegal armed group and the other requesting
pardon for the crime of sedition. End Summary.

--------------
Security Biggest Challenge
--------------


3. (C) Restrepo said his biggest concern was securing the
Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander Department, where

1,400 paramilitaries are scheduled to demobilize in the
coming weeks. He explained that the AUC controls territory
around the Catatumbo River thereby depriving the FARC of a
key mobility corridor into Venezuela. The security forces'
presence is minimal. The Navy does not patrol the Catatumbo
River and there is no police or military presence west of the
river, where the government estimates there are 1,800
hectares of coca. Restrepo is worried that without patrols
on the river and an increased presence on the ground, the
FARC would occupy the former AUC territory, especially the
coca-growing areas. Restrepo would like at least four Navy
patrol boats on the river and aerial and manual eradication
of coca.


4. (C) Restrepo warned that a FARC takeover of the
demobilized region would de-legitimize the peace process and
strengthen the AUC's negotiating position. AUC Commander
Salvatore Mancuso has already threatened to halt
demobilization if the government cannot prevent the FARC from
taking over Catatumbo. Restrepo hoped the U.S. could provide
support for security, but noted that he had not yet discussed
this idea with President Uribe.


5. (C) In a subsequent conversation, Ambassador raised
Restrepo's concern about Catatumbo with Armed Forces
Commander General Ospina and Navy Commander Admiral Soto.
Both already were aware of the issue, and promised at least
some level of action. We will follow up.

--------------
Some Zones Identified, Lists Submitted
--------------


6. (C) Restrepo described recent progress:

-- Catatumbo: The Catatumbo Bloc, led by a retired Police
Captain "Camilo Catatumbo," submitted a list of 1,400 members
to demobilize, including 900 full names and cedula (national
identification document) numbers. The Fiscalia, Department
of Administrative Security (DAS, rough FBI equivalent),
police, and military intelligence have begun researching the
names. The Bloc also submitted a list of weapons, which
includes 470 rifles, 350 pistols, and several machine guns.
A two-hectare demobilization zone about 28 kilometers from
the town of Tibu has been selected (reported in the press on
November 14). During the week of November 15, the government
will prepare the zone's infrastructure. The publicly
announced target date of November 29 for formal
demobilization will probably be pushed back a week or two.

-- Uraba: The government has identified a demobilization
zone but the AUC groups operating in Uraba have not submitted
a list. The AUC's territory in Uraba is relatively
controllable, and Restrepo has been working closely with the
Army's 17th Brigade to develop a strategy to protect it. The
police have a permanent presence in much of the region. The
only potential problem area is the Nueva Antioquia region
where the FARC and AUC have competed for control.

-- Valle and Valle del Cauca: The Calima Bloc is scheduled to
demobilize there but has not submitted a list and the
government has not identified a demobilization area. Restrepo
is concerned about security because the FARC has a strong
presence and could regain key mobility corridors.

-- Cordoba: Mancuso submitted a list of several hundred names
and cedula numbers. Restrepo expects his biggest challenge
to be winning public trust. The population there generally
believes the AUC is needed for its safety and has little
faith in state security forces.

-- Llanos (eastern plains): Since AUC Centauros Bloc
Commander Miguel Arroyave was killed and the independent Self
Defense Forces of Casanare (ACC) have suffered heavy military
blows, the region has become more stable and less violent.
However, demobilization of the AUC groups is complicated.
The Centauros Bloc has broken into two groups, one led by
"Mauricio," a former guerrilla, in the north and the other
led by "Jorge Pirata" and "Cuchillo" in the south. AUC
commander Miguel Mejia, who is in Santa Fe de Ralito, offered
to demobilize the 300-member Vencedores of Arauca but
insisted that his twin, Pablo Mejia, be included in the
demobilization. Both brothers are major drug traffickers and
Restrepo has refused to let Pablo participate in the
demobilization. The paramilitaries and the FARC groups
operating on the eastern plains are deeply involved in drug
trafficking, making any demobilization complicated.

--------------
Law for Justice and Reparation
--------------


7. (C) After the GOC's last draft of the Law for Justice and
Reparations was completed in April under the supervision of
the Peace Commissioner's Office, Restrepo asked President
Uribe to put the Ministry of Interior and Justice in charge
of the bill. Given the AUC's dislike of the legislation,
Restrepo said negotiating with the AUC and being responsible
for the law put him in too difficult a position. Restrepo
has not seen Senator Rafael Pardo's version of the law.

--------------
Monitoring
--------------


8. (C) In response to the Ambassador's comment that close
monitoring of the demobilized paramilitaries was key to
preventing paramilitaries from returning to criminal
behavior, Restrepo said he needed the local governments and
security forces to cooperate with him. He expressed
frustration with the Medellin city government's reluctance to
punish or even publicize crimes carried out by demobilized
members of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN). To prevent
similar problems in future demobilizations, Restrepo's office
hired a police Colonel to help coordinate demobilizations
with local police units.

-------------- --
Identification, Investigation, and Renunciation
-------------- --


9. (C) Restrepo agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that
each paramilitary be given a provisional identification card
upon entering the demobilization zone.


10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that each
demobilized member be interviewed by the Fiscalia, Restrepo
clarified that the former paramilitaries are not pardoned for
rebellion until they speak with the Fiscalia at the
government-controlled reinsertion centers. Upon leaving the
demobilization zone, each former paramilitary is required to
report to a local reinsertion center. At these centers, the
Fiscalia interviews each former paramilitary, dental records
are taken to verify identity, a pardon for sedition is issued
after a thorough investigation by the Fiscalia, and each
individual enrolls in reinsertion programs. Any former
paramilitary who fails to report to one of these centers or
cooperate with the Fiscalia's investigation can and will be
arrested for having belonged to an illegal armed group.
Restrepo also is creating an intelligence team that will
interview the paramilitaries while still inside the
demobilization centers.


11. (C) Restrepo underscored that before leaving the
demobilization zone, each paramilitary is required to sign
two documents: one renouncing his/her membership in an
illegal armed group and pledging not to return to criminal
behavior and one requesting pardon for rebellion against the
state. Without signing these documents, the individual is
not eligible for reinsertion benefits.


WOOD