ANDEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE COLOMBIA SCENESETTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011548

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SNAR PTER KJUS CO
SUBJECT: ANDEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE COLOMBIA SCENESETTER

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1.(C) With USG assistance, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe
has made great strides in fighting drug trafficking and
terrorism. The security forces have initiated a nation-wide,
multi-phased campaign to capture or kill key FARC leaders,
moved against the FARC in its rural strongholds, and
reestablished a presence in the country's 1,098
municipalities. Inter-service and civil-military cooperation
and Colombia's human rights record, although imperfect, are
improving. Uribe's support in Congress has dampened since he
took office but he has managed to push through some important
legislation. Three U.S. citizens have been held hostage by
the FARC for over 20 months now. Their safe recovery
continues to be one of our top priorities. End Summary.

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URIBE IS SHOWING RESULTS
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2. (SBU) Assistance to Colombia is premised on combating the
interrelated issues of drug trafficking and terrorism and
includes training, material aid, and guidance to the security
forces and other institutions. President Uribe and Colombian
Minister of Defense (MOD) Jorge Alberto Uribe (not related)
have characterized U.S. assistance as key to the GOC's
"Democratic Security Policy" and acknowledged the United
States as Colombia's most important ally. More than halfway
through his four-year term, Uribe has made the country safer
and more stable economically by implementing the following
strategies to promote security and economic recovery:

-- Plan Patriota: The military's multi-phased, joint campaign
to re-establish control over national territory and cripple
the FARC entered its second major stage (2B) in February
2004, an approximately 18 to 24 month-long phase to target
FARC-dominated regions in remote, tropical, southeastern
Colombia. The security forces have gained control over
numerous FARC mobility nodes and reporting indicates that the
FARC are feeling the effects of the campaign. Phase 2B is
logistically complex and supply shortages have caused
setbacks. The government will need to establish a permanent
presence in newly occupied territory to prevent the FARC from
returning. The U.S. MILGRP has Planning and Assistance
Training Teams (PATTs) to assist Plan Patriota. During the
campaign's first phase (2A) in 2003, the military dealt the
FARC heavy blows in Cundinamarca Department, which surrounds
Bogota, killing important mid-level commanders and destroying
the FARC's 22nd Front and several special mobile columns.

-- State Presence Established Nationwide: Upon taking office,
Uribe pledged to establish a permanent security force
presence in the 158 municipalities (equivalent to U.S.
counties) that lacked a military or police garrison. As of
January 4, all 1,098 municipalities had a police presence.
The USG facilitated this effort by training numerous police
units and building hardened police stations. Police
commanders have reported that most communities have welcomed
the new presence and that it has boosted the economy by
providing safe transportation and tourist protection.

-- AUC: The country's largest paramilitary group declared a
unilateral cease-fire in November 2002; formal peace talks,
including an agreement to begin demobilizing, began in July
2003; and 19 senior AUC commanders with several hundred
bodyguards concentrated in a 12 x 12 mile zone surrounded by
police and military in June 2004. Two small-scale
demobilizations occurred in late 2003 and AUC violence
continues at a comparatively low level. The OAS is verifying
the peace process. On October 7, paramilitary leaders
pledged to demobilize between 3,000 and 4,000 of their
members between November 3 and the end of 2004. The GOC
remains committed to a transparent, legitimate peace process
and has made it clear that extradition is a non-negotiable
issue and will not hinder any U.S. extradition petitions.

-- U.S. Assistance to Deserters, Demobilized: After a "no
objection" ruling was issued by the Department of Justice in
August, the U.S. has been able to support financially the
child combatant program. The U.S. is now the largest
contributor to the program. Justice is still working on a
legal opinion on U.S. funding for the broader reinsertion
program in light of provisions of the Patriot Act barring aid
to members of terrorist groups.

-- Drug Eradication On Schedule to Meet Goals: For coca,
130,000 hectares have been sprayed and 12,000 hectares
eradicated manually. We have sprayed 3,000 hectares of opium
poppy and eradicated another 1,200 manually. Manual
eradication remains problematic, however, as is spraying in
parks. The Council of State recently ruled to reinstate the
aerial spray program following a brief suspension based on
allegations of damage to health and environment by
glyphosate. However, ongoing appeals still threaten the
process.

-- Drug Interdiction: We are heading for records in air,
land, and sea interdiction; i.e., more than 140 tons have
been seized. There is substantial interest here about the
Brazilian air interdiction program and the possibility of
U.S. cooperation with it.


3. (C) Almost a year ago, Uribe named a new MOD and high
command with an eye toward improving cooperation and
rewarding operational performers. Uribe and his security
team have emphasized that inter-service and civil-military
cooperation and intelligence-based operations are key to
success. Nevertheless, long-standing institutional rivalries
are an on-going challenge. Changes to the high command,
possibly including a new Armed Forces Commander and Army
Commander, are expected in December. We enjoy excellent
relations with MOD Uribe, Navy Commander Admiral Soto, and
Air Force Commander General Lesmez. Our ties with Armed
Forces Commander General Ospina and Army Commander General
Carreno, while mostly good, are sometimes strained.

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INTERNAL POLITICS
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4. (C) Executive-legislative relations have been tense.
Uribe's presidential reelection initiative, however, has
passed its eight required debates, and only the Plenary vote
remains. Most observers are guardedly optimistic about its
passage. The mandatory review by the Constitutional Court
that will follow is less certain. The Administration's
pension reforms and a new tax on certain basic food products
-- controversial proposals that have already provoked
negative reactions from members of Congress )- face tougher
sledding. The Uribe administration and several Congressmen
are working to revamp and reintroduce a "Justice and
Reparations" bill -- which would allow the GOC to issue
alternate penalties and reparations requirements on
demobilizing paramilitaries -- before the current legislative
session closes.

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MULTILATERAL ISSUES
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5. (C) The GOC consistently votes for U.S.-supported
candidates for multilateral boards and commissions. However,
on Middle East issues, in particular Israeli-Palestinian
matters, the GOC seldom supports our position. The GOC was
pleased with the United Nations Human Rights Commission (CHR)
Chairman's Statement on Colombia and has expressed
appreciation for our support. We are skeptical that the GOC
will take a stronger position on the crisis of democracy in
Venezuela. Recent border incidents have contributed to
Uribe's careful diplomacy with Hugo Chavez. Colombia is
similarly reluctant to speak out against Cuba.

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GOC Generally Attuned to Human Rights
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6. (C) The GOC maintains an active human rights dialogue with
NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments. Human
rights training is mandatory for all members of the military
and police, and the Embassy vets units that receive USG
assistance. The State Department's 2003 Human Rights Report
on Colombia noted that GOC efforts to improve security had
led to major improvements in key human rights and violence
indicators. For example, homicides fell by 20 percent,
kidnappings by 30 percent, and forced displacements by 49
percent in 2003. Less than 2 percent of human rights
violations are attributable to government security forces.
However, most Colombian NGOs remain severely critical of the
GOC. Recent missteps by the armed forces, such a
police-military clash in Narino Department (Guaitarilla),the
murder of three trade unionists in Arauca, and the mysterious
circumstances surrounding the killing of a family of five by
the Army in rural Tolima Department (Cajamarca),show a need
for further improvement in respect for human rights by the
security forces.
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FARC Continues to Hold U.S. Citizens Hostage
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7. (C) In February 2003, a DOD plane carrying four USG
contractors and a Colombian military representative crashed
in FARC-controlled territory in southern Colombia. The FARC
killed one of the U.S. contractors and the Colombian and took
the other three U.S. citizens hostage. We believe they are
being held in a remote, heavily forested region the FARC has
long controlled and to which the Colombian military has
little access. Since the contractors were kidnapped, we have
worked closely with the GOC to track all leads that could
reveal their location. President Uribe has personally
pledged GOC cooperation and support in any effort to rescue
the hostages. As part of our efforts to secure their
recovery, we initiated the Rewards for Justice Program, which
offers up to USD five million in exchange for information
leading to the capture of FARC commanders or other
individuals involved in the kidnapping. President Uribe has
also given personal assurances that he would insist the U.S.
hostages be included in any "humanitarian exchange" with the
FARC.

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Economic Issues
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8. (U) In the third quarter of 2004, Colombia's macroeconomic
forecast showed strong growth in multiple areas. Increased
exports, a strong peso, and low inflation led the way and
helped to decrease the debt and increase investment. Foreign
Direct Investment for 2004 is currently at a five year high.
While the government is optimistic, many analysts worry that
unemployment remains high and fiscal reforms have not been
passed through Congress. These factors make the long-term
outlook less clear.


9. (U) The fifth round of FTA talks finished in Guayaquil,
Ecuador on October 29. Slow movement overall with
intellectual property and agriculture continue to be major
issues, specifically patents, medications, agricultural
subsidies and access to genetic resources. To increase public
awareness, Colombian lawmakers have begun a robust FTA
outreach program to compliment other FTA forums sponsored by
the GOC with assistance from USAID.


10. (U) The central bank has taken advantage of a strong peso
by purchasing additional reserves and paying off it dollar
denominated debt. Analysts expect that if the peso ends
December at its current level (instead of the 2,900 that the
government had originally forecast) the GOC will save CP 620
billion (238 million USD) in debt servicing. Recently, the
central bank has been purchasing dollars in order to curb the
appreciation of the peso.
DRUCKER