THAILAND: IMPRESSIONS FROM THE SOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006647

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/;BCLTV, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO),JICPAC AND J2

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPAO TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: IMPRESSIONS FROM THE SOUTH

REF: A. BANGKOK 6619


B. BANGKOK 6554

C. BANGKOK 6477

Classified By: DCM ALEXANDER A. ARVIZU. REASON 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT: In an effort to gage the current
situation in Thailand's south, Bangkok PolOffs recently
completed an extended trip through Narathiwat, Pattani, and
Yala provinces, meeting with a cross-section of interlocutors
including local Islamic groups, security officials,
academics, journalists, and businessmen. The visit focused
on three main themes: security; education; and local
sentiments. On security, we heard a wide range of
assessments of the situation in southern Thailand, from Thai
security officials who claimed it was improving, to local
businessmen who predicted worse to come. Education was a
major theme in all our meetings. Many locals are upset over
Royal Thai Government interference in Islamic "pondok"
schools and the general lack of educational opportunities;
the government remains concerned over the pondoks' role in
the violence. Local Muslims uniformly expressed frustration
and anger over perceived historical "injustices" that
continue, in their minds, to be perpetrated by the police and
military. Local anger continues to be directed at symbols of
the Thai central government, especially the police. We did
not detect strong or overt anti-U.S. sentiment. END
SUMMARY/COMMENT.


2. (C) Bangkok PolOffs traveled to Thailand's southernmost,
Muslim majority provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala
from September 7th - 9th. In Narathiwat province, PolOffs
met with the leader of the Provincial Islamic Council, Abdul
Rahman Samad; Deputy Provincial Police Commander Col.
Krachang Suwannarat; and with local business leaders from the
Narathiwat Industry Council. In Pattani, PolOffs met with
Dr. Phirayot Rahimmula and Dr. Chidchanok Rahimmula from
Prince of Songkhla University; local Army Commander Col.
Yotchai Yangyuen; prominent journalist Paret Lohasan; and
local businessman Anusat Suwanmongkon. In Yala PolOffs met
with Dr. Ismail Lufti Japagiya, Rector of Yala Islamic
College, and with leaders of the Young Muslim Association of
Thailand.

APPEARANCES
--------------


3. (C) Traveling through Thailand's southernmost, Muslim
majority provinces is surprisingly easy. There is a
deceptive calm for a region that is supposed to be under
selective martial law. The atmosphere has the outward
appearance of normality as people go about their business,
and security forces maintain a lax approach. The roads are
excellent, and the roadblocks set up by Thai security forces
go mostly unmanned during the day. There are large numbers
of people on the streets, and businesses are open. People in
public reacted generally positively when our obviously
foreign group passed by. Even at the Krue Se Mosque, the
center of fighting during the attacks of April 28, locals
seemed pleased to see a group of "tourists," complaining that
the tourists who used to visit from Malaysia and Singapore no
longer came.

SECURITY SITUATION
--------------


4. (C) Despite almost daily incidents of violence directed
against symbols of Thai authority, local Thai security
officials presented generally optimistic assessments of the
violence. Narathiwat's deputy Police Commander, Col.
Krachang Suwannarat, characterized the ongoing violence as
directly related to the activities of separatist groups.
Col. Krachang said that local students who had studied
abroad, specifically those who had studied in Indonesia, had
been radicalized, and were returning to commit violence.
However, Krachang felt that the situation in the south was
improving. He said recent arrests of pondok teachers
involved in recruiting students to commit violence had
disrupted separatist activity. (Note: While insisting that
the situation was improving, Krachang did admit that the
technology and sophistication of the attackers was continuing
to improve. During our conversation, Krachang casually
showed PolOffs a cell phone detonator that he said had been
removed from a diffused bomb, noting that bomb technology had
improved. End Note)


5. (C) Col. Yotchai Yangyuen, Commander of the Pattani Army
Circle, also put a positive spin on this year's increase in
violence, claiming that recent attacks were in the "normal
pattern." Yotchai said army efforts to stop the violence are
being hampered by inexperienced soldiers, and by the
difficulty of getting information from locals unwilling to
cooperate with uniformed security forces.


6. (C) The feelings of local business leaders over the
security situation was mixed. Chinese-Thai Pattani
businessman Anusat Suwanmongkon, owner of the CS Pattani
hotel, gave an optimistic assessment of the security
situation, blaming the sensationalist Bangkok media for
exaggerating reports of violence in the south. Anusat
highlighted his personal good relationships with his Muslim
neighbors and employees. A much more grim outlook was
provided by members of the Narathiwat Industrial Council.
Also ethnically Chinese, they felt increasingly threatened by
their Muslim-Malay neighbors. They noted that local
Chinese-Thai businessmen were usually armed and probably
would leave if the situation continued to deteriorate.

EDUCATION - THE CENTRAL ISSUE?
--------------


7. (C) Local Muslims remain extremely sensitive to outside
interference with their traditional religious schools, but
showed strong interest in broadening educational
opportunities for their community. Dr. Lutfi Japagiya, the
controversial Rector of the Yala Islamic College, said that
he hoped his rapidly expanding Pattani campus would be able
to offer greater opportunities for local Muslims. Japagiya
readily admitted that his school received large donations
from foreign sources, but said he was forced to accept
international donations because of lack of funding from the
Thai government. Sounding a conciliatory tone, Japagiya said
his role as an educator was to provide educational
opportunities for his students. To do that, Japagiya hopes
to expand his college to 10,000 Muslim students, including
1,000 foreign students, and teach them subjects beyond Islam,
including IT, economics, Chinese, and English. He said he
wanted to teach his students who believe that non-Muslims are
the enemy that this is not the case.


8. (C) Abdul Samad, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Narathiwat Islamic Council, oversees pondok schools in the
province. He claimed that local pondoks were not being used
to distribute separatist literature or indoctrinate students.
He said that local youths were instead being "brainwashed"
by outsiders. Samad said the NIC held regular training
programs for provincial religious teachers to prevent
extremist teachings. Like Japagiya, Samad hopes that a
planned Islamic university for southern Thailand -- which he
is lobbying to have located in Narathiwat -- would help
prepare his students for a "globalized" world, by teaching
them English and Chinese, in addition to Islamic studies.
Samad was very moderate in tone and went out of his way to
praise the U.S. tradition of religious freedom. (Note:
Samad invited PolOffs to view an ongoing training session for
pondok teachers at the central Mosque. PolOffs visited the
training session and observed 200 teachers, male and female,
participating in a "brainstorming" activity on how to improve
education in the pondoks. The group received PolOffs
politely. End Note.)

"INJUSTICES" - WHAT DOES THE POPULATION REALLY WANT?
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The consensus among our interlocutors was that most
southern Thai Muslims do not necessarily want a separate
state, but rather an end to the historical injustices they
attribute to government authorities. In some conversations,
local Muslims blamed the Bangkok-based media for exaggerating
the level of violence in southern Thailand, and asserting
that many incidents were separatist related (Ref C),when in
reality many are related to local business or personal
conflicts. Many Muslims complained that heavy-handed
police tactics were contributing to local resentment towards
security forces.


10. (C) According to Professor Perayot Rahimmula of Prince
of Songkhla University in Pattani, the RTG exaggerates the
threat of separatism. Most southerners only want security,
three meals a day, and the opportunity to send their children
to school, he asserted. Pirayot called the problem "a local
issue," and denied a link to international terrorism. The
professor commented that the youths who participated in the
28 April attacks against government targets had been
manipulated into believing they were carrying out a religious
jihad as expounded in the "Jihad in Pattani" booklets some
carried. In general, he felt that police brutality and
insensitivity towards Muslims, and not separatism, was the
key contributing factor for the worsening violence.


11. (C) Pattani based journalist Paret Lohasan, who works
for large, Bangkok-based outlets, agreed that the local
population is not really interested in separatism, but is
vulnerable to manipulation by separatists who exploit
grievances stemming from everyday poor treatment at the hands
of security forces and civilian officials.


12. (C) PolOffs met with a several members of the Young
Muslims Association (YMA) of Thailand in Yala. Comparing
this year's unrest to the historical separatist movement,
they noted that the significance of religion was a new
element when compared to separatist movements of the past.
They claimed the public was more supportive of previous
movements that based claims of autonomy of historical and
cultural grounds, rather than for religious reasons. Members
also said that the youths behind the 28 April attacks had
been misled by poor religious teachings, a belief that black
magic would protect them, and a sense they were part of a
jihad. The YMA members are angry over Thai security forces
raids of mosques and pondok schools, and suspicious over U.S.
intentions in the region. They asked PolOffs about rumors
that circulate in the South that the USG is inciting the
violence for its own ends, and politely listened to denials.


13. (C) COMMENT: In our assessment, the problem of
Thailand's "south" is localized in the southernmost, Muslim
majority provinces. The good infrastructure, clean streets,
and large numbers of people going about their business might
be deceptive given the many violent attacks that have
occurred this year, but they do provide important context
when measuring the scope of this problem. Southern Thailand
is not burning.


14. (C) In our series of meetings we heard two common
themes over and over from local Muslims: concerns about
education; and a strong local feeling of "injustice." Our
Muslim interlocutors tend to blame the government and
"outsiders" for southern problems, without exhibiting much
willingness to assume responsibility for promoting
non-violent solutions to grievances, however legitimate.


15. (C) COMMENT: Embassy believes that expanded public
diplomacy efforts, focused on education/skills training,
would be welcomed by a large part of the population.
Bilateral security assistance focused on expanding the
coordination and analytical ability of Thai security forces
should also remain a priority for the USG. However,
uniformed Thai officials and other manifestations of the Thai
central government presence are deeply resented by much of
the southern population. Accordingly, U.S. assistance to
Thai law enforcement and security officials in the south
should be kept as low-key as possible. END COMMENT.
JOHNSON