SECURITY IN SADR CITY AND BAGHDAD: PROGRESS IS

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000586

STATE FOR NEA/I, PM DAS LIKENS, PMAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/14
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PTER PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN SADR CITY AND BAGHDAD: PROGRESS IS
SLOW

Ref: Baghdad 0320

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD FOR REASONS
1.4 (A) (B) AND (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY. In the past, cooperation between U.S.
military units operating in Baghdad -- especially in Sadr
City -- and Iraqi police has been problematic. Indeed, the
police chief in Sadr City on occasion has been positively
unhelpful, if not hostile. Local U.S. military commanders
have been trying to gain more cooperation by engaging
Deputy Minister of Interior Hekmat Musa Salman, Baghdad
Iraqi Police Chief Abdul Rasaq and Baghdad Governor Ali
Rahdi al-Haidary. It remains to be seen whether these
efforts will bear fruit. Initial results from the past
week of fighting in Sadr City suggest that the Iraqi police
there have not yet turned the corner. Notably, that
unhelpful police chief in Sadr City is hanging onto his job
despite promises that he would be removed. END SUMMARY.

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IRAQI POLICE LEADERSHIP FAILURES
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2. (S) During the negotiations for the Sadr City Security
Agreement outlined in reftel, Colonel Maaruf (Sadr City
District Iraqi Police Chief) was one of the principal
obstacles in moving forward and he openly refused to
support the signing. Sadr City District Council members,
to include Ali Saudy and Kudair Alami, pointed to Colonel
Maaruf as the source of IP intimidation of local political
leaders. Most recently, the Ministry of Interior (MOI)
approved a local curfew in Sadr City beginning on August 5
to minimize civilian casualties/interference with security
operations. Initially, the Ministry chose to use the IP as
the principal means of disseminating this information. An
MOI follow-up of the curfew notification revealed that
Colonel Maaruf had ordered his stations to stand down
during the recent fighting, which prevented the message
from reaching most of the public. On August 7, the downing
of a U.S. helicopter occurred near a Sadr City IP station.
U.S. soldiers observed Colonel Maaruf leading several IP
units in celebratory fire at the time of the helicopter
downing. When the IP station was engaged by JAM members
shortly after this incident, Colonel Maaruf ordered his
forces to take refuge in the station and not assist U.S.
military units in suppressing the JAM gunfire. To
underscore the level of collaboration, Chief Rasaq advised
PolOffs that Colonel Maaruf established a truce with JAM
that is now in effect.

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AGREEMENT ON MORE COOPERATION
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3. (S) Deputy Interior Minister Hekmat and IP Chief Rasaq
have argued that the IP units in the field are sorely
outgunned, ill-equipped and poorly trained, while local
U.S. military commanders have pressed for a greater
supporting role for the local police in combat operations.
Following a series of discussions, Deputy Minister Hekmat
and Police Chief Rasaq agreed to remove Colonel Maaruf from
office and provide a suitable replacement for him supported
by Ayatollah Sistani. In addition, Deputy Minister Hekmat
called for increased, aggressive sweeps by 1st CAV and the
Iraqi Police of Sadr City to clear out the JAM. Chief
Rasaq pointed out that the National Conference posed a
significant target for JAM forces in the area; urgent
action was needed. Deputy Minister Hekmat proposed that
such operations should involve cordoning off Sadr City, to
include the establishment of checkpoints on all seven
bridges leading into this district.

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PROMISES SO FAR NOT KEPT
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4. (C) In the end, however, the Iraqi Police response in
Sadr City was minimal. They manned checkpoints at some
access points to the district. They did not actively
participate in any of the 1st CAV clearing operations,
despite the promises and urgings from the Deputy Interior
Minister and the Iraqi Police Chief.

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COMMENT
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5. (S) We want a greater Iraqi security role in Sadr City
in order to help promote the legitimacy of Iraqi Government
entities with Sadr City residents. Promises from the
August 11 meeting notwithstanding, the actual conduct of
operations in Sadr City have been carried out with U.S.
forces and without much help from local police forces.
Moreover, Colonel Maaruf still has his job despite promises
from the Ministry of Interior to remove him. This is in
light of new reports of (unspecified) foreign fighters, the
introduction of more sophisticated weapons -- to include
surface-to-air missiles -- and daylight attacks on U.S.
tanks. This suggests a new vigor in the tempo of JAM
operations in Baghdad. If such reports prove true, it will
be even harder for Coalition Forces to reestablish durable
security in Sadr City without real cooperation and
coordination from the Iraqi security forces.


JEFFREY