Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BAGHDAD481
2004-08-15 17:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI SHIA PARTIES NOT EMBRACING SADR

Tags:  PINS PGOV KISL IZ 
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P 151728Z AUG 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0723
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000481 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2024
TAGS: PINS PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI SHIA PARTIES NOT EMBRACING SADR

Classified by POLCouns Robert Ford, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000481


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2024
TAGS: PINS PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI SHIA PARTIES NOT EMBRACING SADR

Classified by POLCouns Robert Ford, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Some angry remarks at the National Conference
notwithstanding, it appears that the Shia establishment is
not rallying behind Muqtada al-Sadr in his standoff against
the Iraqi Government. Late on the night of August 14,
PolCouns spoke to a top aide to Iraqi Government Vice
President and Da'wa Party leader Ibrahim Jaaferi. The aide
stated that Da'wa would not boycott the National Conference
under any circumstance. According to the aide, Jaaferi
stood by his call for a peaceful solution to the battle in
Najaf. Jaaferi understands that the Mahdi militia must
disarm and the city be returned entirely to Government
control. Jaaferi recognizes the danger of making
concessions to militias nationwide and the need to
reestablish law and order. Jaaferi's aide urged the U.S.
to stay engaged in helping to restore stability in Iraq and
assisting the country's political development.


2. (C) Meanwhile, a key Government minister from another
major Shia establishment party, the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),told the Ambassador on
August 14 that the National Conference must succeed.
Finance Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi said the Government made
a mistake in opening negotiations with Sadr and that, if
Sadr disavows violence and agrees to play a constructive
role, military operations against him should recommence.


3. (C) PolCouns spoke on the evening of August 14 with
Radwan Abbas, the custodian of Najaf's Imam Ali mosque who
fled Najaf four months ago and is now in Baghdad. Abbas
assured PolCouns that the Najaf cleric establishment
(Hawza) supports IIG and Coalition efforts to remove the
Mahdi militia from Najaf/Kufa and the religious sites. He
said many clerics had to flee Najaf for their safety and
many had come to Baghdad. Abbas discounted the likelihood
of public criticism from the Hawza if the Iraqi Government
sends in forces to free the mosque from Sadr forces. He
pointed to the silence of late from the Hawza and quoted an
Arabic proverb meaning that silence is a sign of consent.
(He urged that we not send Coalition forces into the
mosque, however.)


4. (C) On the morning of August 15, delegates from these
Shia parties attended the Conference in large numbers. A
top SCIRI official in troubled Basra told the Regional
Embassy Office on August 14 that he would attend the
Conference as planned. PolOffs at the Conference reported
that there would be some speeches in support of a peaceful
solution to the conflict in Najaf. Post has also seen
reports of a brief demonstration by Shia attendees of the
National Conference demanding peace in Najaf. The protest
reportedly ended quickly and the Conference continued.
There was also apparently some discussion of the Conference
organizing a mission to go to Najaf directly to help
facilitate a negotiated end to the standoff. It was not
clear if, in fact, such a team would actually go to Najaf.


5. (C) COMMENT: Publicly expressed concerns about Najaf
notwithstanding, the two main Shia political parties are
not rushing to help Sadr (their potential political
competitor). Instead, Dawa and SCIRI are holding fast to
the political process launched by the Government,
symbolized now by the National Conference. The lack of
criticism against the Government or the Coalition from the
Najaf Hawza, combined with the prospect of making inroads
into the National Council through participation in the
ongoing National Conference, give those parties incentive
to continue staying with the Government. The crowds
gathering at the Imam Ali mosque make good TV images, but
Post does not yet sense that Sadr is gaining any traction
with the Shia establishment.


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