USEB 143: SUNNIS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000229

E.O. 12958: DECL 07/22/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: USEB 143: SUNNIS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT SAYS
INFORMED SOURCE

(U) CLASSIFIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR
REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. Sunnis are hostile, divided, leaderless,
and unable to envision a political solution acceptable to
others according to a very well-informed Jordanian
diplomat. Some would like to enter into an agreement with
us to resume rule, an approach we find illusionary. End
summary.


2. (C) Pol Counselor Ford and Pol-Mil Counselor Neumann
met July 20 with Jordanian Charge Demi Haddad (strictly
protect). Haddad has extensive Sunni contacts built up
over several years in Iraq. He reports that more Sunnis
than ever are coming through his doors. The picture he
painted was depressing. Haddad said that after nearly 100
years of repressive rule the Sunnis cannot envision a
situation in which they can protect their interests without
domination. The only alternative appears to be permanent
suppression. Although outsiders see the potential for an
alliance with the Kurds to block Shi'ite domination, Haddad
said there is too much bloodshed between the communities.
The logic might work in another decade but the Sunnis do
not believe in it now.


3. (C) There are multiple Sheikhs and sheikh-ly contenders
in the Sunni ranks. There is no agreement on leadership
among them. Efforts to consolidate under any one leader
meet internal opposition. Without a single strong leader
to give form to new ideas, the tribesmen fall back into
hostility and resentment.


4. (C) Haddad said he finds the Sunnis chasing half-formed
conceptions. Several Sheikhs have suggested that the only
way to impose leadership on Iraq is to return to a
monarchy. But they cannot name an acceptable candidate.
They typify Sharif Ali as the "son of an Egyptian whore."
They believe the U.S. is hostile to Prince Hassan bin
Tallal of Jordan and therefore discount him. A third
candidate is said to be timid and attracts no support. Yet
Sunni Sheiks continue to argue for a monarchy as a
principle, even though they cannot figure out how it would
work.


5. (C) Some of the Sheiks continue to hope they can make a
"deal" to rule Iraq in return for concessions to U.S.
interests. This view is supported by many conversations we
have had that focus on themes of "give us jobs, pay us" and
all will be calm. "You can realize your American interests
and we'll all be rich."

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) Clearly not every Sunni falls into this
description. Yet it suggests that for many the continued
fighting is seen as their only alternative to being ruled.
Their image of a deal to make them again the rulers of Iraq
strikes us as fanciful.


7. (C) The Shia genie is out of the bottle. The Kurds
have too many memories of suppression to go down the Sunni
road. And the Sunni themselves are far too divided to make
and keep a bargain. Probably the best we can hope for is
that as the IIG gains credibility and strength, Sunni
elements will decide, incrementally, to cut deals to join a
process they cannot stop. Some, like President Ghazi, have
already made their accommodation.


NEGROPONTE