USEB 018: IRAQI GOVERNMENT SIGNALS TOUGHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000017


STATE FOR NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2014
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: USEB 018: IRAQI GOVERNMENT SIGNALS TOUGHER
SENTENCES FOR CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS

REF: BAGHDAD 00001

CLASSIFIED BY DCM JAMES JEFFREY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. SENIOR IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT (IIG)
OFFICIALS ARE MAKING CLEAR THAT THEY BELIEVE TOUGHER
MEASURES NEED TO BE TAKEN TO DEFEAT VIOLENCE. THEY HAVE
BEEN CLEAR THAT TRANSPARENT RULE OF LAW PROCEDURES WOULD
STILL APPLY. THE ISSUE MAY BE MORE COMPLICATED IN THE
FIELD. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) SENIOR IRAQI OFFICIALS HAVE MADE A PARTICULAR POINT
OF MAKING SURE THAT WE ARE AWARE THEY INTEND TO TAKE A
TOUGH LINE AGAINST VIOLENCE. THIS WAS A THEME IN
AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTEQS PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS
(REFTEL) AS WELL AS IN FOREIGN MINISTER ZEBARIQS
CONVERSATION JUNE 28 WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD.


3. (C) FOREIGN MINISTER ZEBARI GAVE MORE DETAIL IN A JUNE
28 DISCUSSION WITH POL/MIL COUNSELOR NEUMANN. ZEBARI
CHARACTERIZED THE THREAT AS BEING THREE FOLD; BAQATHISTS,
TERRORISTS AND CRIMINALS. HE SAID THE THIRD CATEGORY IS
PROVIDING A LARGE BASE OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO THE
TERRORISTS. UP TO NOW THE COALITION HAS SUSPENDED THE
DEATH PENALTY BUT IRAQ IS NOW SOVEREIGN; LEAVING THE
IMPLICATION IT WILL BE RE-IMPOSED. HE CONTINUED THAT
IRAQIS ARE USED TO SEEING JUSTICE MORE DIRECTLY THAN THEY
HAVE UNDER THE COALITION. HE NOTED THAT IN MANY ARAB
COUNTRIES IT IS NORMAL TO SEE TELEVISED CONFESSIONS, BUT
THE CPA HAD NOT ALLOWED THIS. ZEBARI ASSURED NEUMANN THAT
REASONABLE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS WOULD CONTINUE TO
PREVAIL WITH TRIALS AND OBSERVANCE OF LAWS. HOWEVER, HE
LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT TOUGHER MEASURES.


4. (C) WE ARE HEARING SOME TALK OF THE PRIME MINISTER
IMPOSING A STATE OF EMERGENCY. HIS OFFICE SEEMS TO BE
RESEARCHING THIS WITH LAWYERS TO INSURE THAT IT IS
CONSISTENT WITH NORMALLY ACCEPTED LEGAL PRINCIPLES. BEFORE
THE END OF CPA, ALLAWI WAS BRIEFED BY CPA LEGAL ON WHAT HE
COULD AND COULD NOT DO IN THIS REGARD IN VIEW OF THE TAL
AND OPERATIVE IRAQI LAW. THE BOTTOM LINE POINT MADE TO HIM
WAS THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW DUE PROCESS STRICTLY, HAVE
VALID JUSTIFICATION, AND FOR MOST ACTIONS HAVE TO PASS A
LAW Q- NOT EASY CONSIDERING THE CONDITIONS THE IIG MUST
OPERATE UNDER.


5. (C) COMMENT. THE IIG IS FIGHTING FOR ITS LIFE,
LITERALLY IN THE CASE OF SECURITY FORCES AND OFFICIALS.
THESE CONVERSATIONS HAVE EXPLICITLY STATED THAT CHANGES
WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTED LEGAL NORMS. WE HAVE NOT
SIGNALED ANY DISAPPROVAL ALTHOUGH WE HAVE POINTEDLY ASKED
ABOUT LEGAL NORMS AND RECEIVED THE ASSURANCES NOTED ABOVE.
THE IIG KNOWS THAT IT HAS TO CONSULT WITH US ON
CONSTRUCTING A STATE OF EMERGENCY LAW SINCE ITS ENFORCEMENT
COULD INVOLVE COALITION FORCES. AN EMERGENCY LAW USED TO
STIFLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT BE
HELPFUL. AN EMERGENCY LAW THAT RESTORES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
ON SECURITY WHILE ALSO ALLOWING FREE POLITICAL DEBATE AND
COMPETITION WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. A SEPARATE
PROBLEM MAY BE TO EXPLAIN TO IRAQI SECURITY FORCES THAT
BEING SOVEREIGN DOESNQT MEAN THEY CAN BEAT PRISONERS. U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE ALREADY INTERVENED TO STOP ONE
SMALLISH INCIDENT BUT WE THINK OTHERS WILL BE LIKELY.
ORDERS TO COALITION FORCES NOT TO ALLOW SUCH ACTIONS ARE
CLEAR. END COMMENT.


NEGROPONTE