Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA7067
2004-12-20 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S

Tags:  PREL PHUM IZ ECON TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007067 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM IZ ECON TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S
JANUARY 2-3 VISIT TO TURKEY


(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert Deutsch, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007067

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM IZ ECON TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S
JANUARY 2-3 VISIT TO TURKEY


(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert Deutsch, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) You arrive at a time when Turkey, having secured a
2005 start date for EU accession negotiations, will have
begun to wake up warily to the enormous challenges entailed
by harmonization. You arrive as well in a Turkey where much
of the public, fed massive, continuing disinformation by an
antagonistic media -- stoked by ill-considered remarks by PM
Erdogan, FM Gul and other ruling AKP figures -- emotionally
views the U.S. operation in Iraq as against their interests,
and broadly considers the U.S. a threat to world peace. We
will need to recalibrate our engagement with our ally Turkey
occupying strategic geopolitical and societal spaces, in
light of the experience of the past three years.


2. (C) Despite the deep resentment and suspicion of AKP by a
waning Kemalist elite, Erdogan appears unassailable: he has a
two-thirds majority in parliament; he remains highly popular;
his government continues to reform Turkey's political and
social space -- at least on the books; and he has pursued an
activist all-points foreign policy.


3. (C) In this context Erdogan knows that maintaining good
relations with the U.S. is important. He has had his
government take verbal steps to reaffirm the relationship,
but he has demonstrated no vision how to re-energize and
expand relations from Turkey's side. FM Gul, at heart a
Sunni Islamist despite his smile and seeming reasonable
manner, is much more problematic. President Sezer is a
narrow-minded statist with a tin ear for politics in general
and a demonstrated lack of enthusiasm for good relations with
the U.S. in particular -- he maneuvered to prevent U.S. troop
deployment through Turkey prior to OIF. CHOD Ozkok is a
solidly pro-Atlanticist senior commander; he has moved
step-by-step to try to bring more modern thinkers into senior
ranks, but nationalist, anti-Atlanticist sentiments are
strong at lower ranks.

Security relations
--------------


4. (C) Iraq is a major preoccupation of Turks in and out of
government and will be first on your interlocutors, agenda

with you. The GOT shares our goals for Iraq -- a secure and
stable, democratic country, united and territorially whole --
but our action in Iraq has always been unpopular in Turkey.
Concerns about the ethnic balance in and future of Kirkuk,
Kurdish desires for independence, our lack of action against
the terrorist PKK/Kongra Gel camps in northern Iraq and
perceived discrimination against Turkmen underpinned the
irresponsible statements by AKP leaders and spreading
anti-Americanism sparked by sensationalist and grossly
distorted media reporting about the Fallujah operation and
continued attacks on Turkish truck drivers.


5. (C) While the government took a couple of measures to
contain the damage to our relationship prior to the EU
summit, perceptions persist that we caused massive civilian
casualties, including in Fallujah; that we tolerate Kurdish
designs to seize Kirkuk and break away; and that the US
acquiescence to (or supports) the PKK,s presence in Iraq.
All of this remains true despite continuing broad efforts by
the Mission to hold the GOT and the media to a strict
standard of fact in their statements. Nonetheless, Turkey
has provided valuable assistance and cooperation, for which
you should express appreciation. Ankara offered to send
peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003, approved the use
of Incirlik Air Base for tankers to refuel aircraft on
support missions for both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),authorized the transit of
US troops from Iraq on rotation out, and permits the transit
of supplies for our forces and humanitarian goods. The GOT
has reached out to all major Iraqi groups to encourage
participation in elections on January 30. Turkey is also
active in reconstruction efforts, including providing
electricity for Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi
diplomats and, as its contribution to the NATO training
mission, Iraqi security forces.


6. (C) Iraq impacts our entire bilateral security
relationship. Our senior-most military leaders have worked
hard to repair the damage caused by Turkey,s failure to
approve passage of the 4th ID in March 2003 and our arrest of
Turkish Special Forces personnel in Suleymania on July 4 of
that year. Nonetheless, the relationship remains fragile.
Recent requests to increase our use of Incirlik AB (e.g.,
establish a logistics air hub, increase training deployments)
have been delayed as Turkish officials consider them part and
parcel with the idea that we might move F-16s permanently to
the base as part of the Defense Posture Review Initiative.
You could inform your interlocutors that we understand that
moving the F-16s to Turkey is a non-starter for the
foreseeable future. This could allow movement on the other
proposals.


7. (C) The public and official preoccupation with Iraq
overshadows the positive cooperation we have in other aspects
of the GWOT: Since 9/11 and the November 2003 Istanbul
attacks, our traditional intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation has improved. Our militaries coordinate
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their
abilities to protect important energy transportation routes.
Turkey subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security
Initiative. Ankara has been supportive of international
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA,
although they are more inclined to persuasion than coercion.
The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training Center
provides counterterrorism and other training to personnel
from PfP partner countries. The military has recently
established a NATO Center of Excellence for the Combat
Against Terrorism that will provide more specialized training
opportunities for both NATO partner nations and alliance
members. And Turkey will again assume the command of ISAF in
Afghanistan in February for a six-month period during which
they will significantly increase their contribution to this
important NATO mission.

Human Rights
--------------


8. (U) Over the past three years, Turkey has adopted eight
wide-ranging packages of legal reforms and two sets of
constitutional amendments aimed at meeting EU-related human
rights standards. The legal reforms are designed to crack
down on torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly,
reduce the political influence of the military, and expand
religious freedom. While the GOT has moved with impressive
speed at the legislative level, real change has been much
slower to take root. Elements of the military, police,
judiciary, and bureaucracy have criticized some of the
reforms as threats to national security, and have resisted
implementation. In some cases, bureaucratic offices have
drafted highly restrictive implementing legislation. For
example, Parliament lifted restrictions on Kurdish language
broadcasting, but the subsequent Radio and Television Board
regulation set strict time limits and restricted such
broadcasts to state-owned media outlets.


9. (SBU) Turkey faces a long, difficult path to full EU
membership. Many here do not recognize how wrenching the
changes ahead will be. The EU has made it clear that it
expects accession talks with Turkey will take at least 10
years, and a number of Turkish officials privately
acknowledge the GOT will need that time to adopt the full EU
acquis. Turkey is expected to face difficulty in a number of
areas, including environmental standards. In addition to
adopting new laws and regulations, EU contacts tell us that
during the accession process Turkey will have to revise some
of the recently adopted human rights legislation, which falls
short of EU standards in some respects.


10. (U) On trafficking in persons the Turkish authorities
have been slow to respond to a chronic problem, but the
opening of a TIP shelter (attended by Secretary Powell) and
recent establishment of a victim hotline show that Turkey is
beginning to make cohenrent progress.


11. (C) Despite statements designed to encourage hope,
Turkish authorities -- both governmental and in the State
bureaucracy -- continue to refuse to reopen the Ecumenical
Patriarchate's Halki Seminary, closed since 1971. Using a
false reading of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, Turkish
authorities also continue to refuse to acknowledge the
ecumenical status of the Patriarchate. Although Turkish
authorities portray property restitution for the Greek and
Armenian Orthodox communities as proceeding well, the
communities report the process continues to be subject to
bureaucratic delay and arbitrary rulings.

Regional Issues
--------------


12. (C) Under the influence of Gul, Turkey has sought to
improve relations with Iran and with Arab neighbors,
including Syria, over the past year. Erdogan visited Iran in
July 2004 and visits Syria December 22-23.


13. (C) At the same time Turkey still views itself as a
potential mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, but
has so far failed to produce any results. Turkish/Israeli
relations cooled in 2004 when PM Erdogan referred to Israeli
actions in Palestinian territory as "state terror" and as the
Turkish General Staff became convinced that Israel is
pursuing a pro-Kurdish policy in northern Iraq. For now,
economic relations and intel cooperation remain strong, and
FM Gul is to visit Israel and the Palestinians the last week
in December.


14. (C) Turkey made a major policy shift on Cyprus to support
the Annan Plan in spring 2004, but feels doubly aggrieved
because little has been done to ease the economic isolation
of the Turkish Cypriots and because the EU summit effort to
obtain Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus shows
the Greek Cypriots will increasingly have an upper hand. We
expect Turkey to seek new UN initiatives to drive home the
settlement in the new year.


15. (C) Relations with Greece continue to warm, despite
recent Greek complaints about Turkish air activity in the
Aegean. Greece gave firm public support to Turkey's EU
candidacy.


16. (C) Trade relations with Russia have ballooned in the
past several years. Turkey is strongly dependent on Russian
natural gas; during his December visit Putin reminded the
Turks of their energy dependence on Russia and proffered a
strategic partnership alternative to Turkey's ties with the
U.S. and EU. Turkey has strong ties to Azerbaijan and backs
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Turkey will not
open its border with Armenia or restore diplomatic relations
absent Armenian recognition of the border with Turkey and
concessions on occupied Azerbaijani territories. The Turks
publicly support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, but have not been forceful vis-a-vis Russian
designs in Georgia.

Economy
--------------


17. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual
pace of around 8-9 percent. However, the recovery remains
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity
structure. Unemployment and poverty remain high, and
ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the
overall macroeconomic improvement. Macroeconomic success has
also bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist
with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of
the banking, social security and tax systems. These reforms
are being addressed in the new three-year standby program
which the IMF and GOT have just agreed to.


18. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received
less foreign direct investment than other countries of
similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment if
the Turks get a date for EU accession negotiations later this
month. However, this is unlikely to materialize unless more
is done in the area of structural reform. In addition, there
appears to be a lack of appreciation for the enormous
challenges Turkey will shoulder in the accession
negotiations, for the fact that EU accession will affect
nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in the end be
quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU directives in
environmental protection and other areas.
DEUTSCH