DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007038

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2029
TAGS: ECON ECPS ELAB MARR TU
SUBJECT: DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT
INSPECTIONS, NOVEMBER 23 AND DECEMBER 6-10, 2004

REF: 2003 ANKARA 7157

Classified By: Political Military Counselor Tim Betts, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The annual Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement (DECA) inspections occurred on November 24 in
Ankara and the week of December 6-10 in Izmir and at Incirlik
Air Base outside of Adana. Due in part to new leadership and
attitude on the Turkish side and a new US strategy, and in a
noted contrast to previous years, the talks were cordial and
cooperative, even during discussions on historically
contentious issues. At Incirlik, it was agreed that many
small issues could be resolved by the local commands, and
exchanges on the top three issues were limited. Discussion
on the Turkish request to formalize an agreement on dependent
hires and the Army/Air Force Postal Office (APO) was deferred
to a later meeting and Turkish authorities expressed
satisfaction with informal arrangements made to address their
concerns regarding Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) officers carrying weapons off-base and liaising
directly with the Jandarma. Progress was noted on issues of
hiring the disabled and landfill clean-up. To address
discrepancies between the Turkish and US ammunition
accounting methods, the US team offered to assist in the
upgrade of the Turkish computerized system. In Izmir, the
relocation of 425th AB offices from the Hilton Hotel to
Bayrakli Park for Force Protection reasons raised Turkish
concerns regarding the carrying of weapons by U.S. personnel
at Bayrakli. Turkish authorities characterized all of these
issues as minor but urged both sides to cooperate to resolve
them in a timely manner. End Summary.


2. (C) New TU Leadership: Major General Sefer Ozturk, who
took over as head of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) J-5
Agreements Department in September, set the tone for the 2004
DECA inspections during the Ankara inspection of the Office
of Defense Cooperation (ODC) facility and the Ankara Support
Facility at Balgat Army Base when he said that the meetings
were not part of an inspection but rather a cooperation visit
to discuss progress. He repeated this characterization at
Izmir and Incirlik. His staff, led by Col. Yasar Karacoban,
appeared to have gotten the message, were generally courteous
and showed greater flexibility in resolving issues such as
the APO agreement and the AFOSI weapons usage than previously
offered. None of the top three issues - 1) Dependent Hires
(American dependents working on base),2) an APO agreement
and 3) AFOSI personnel carrying weapons off-base and talking
directly to the Turkish Jandarma without permission from the
Turkish Base Command at Incirlik - were discussed at length
and none were referred for more senior consideration.


3. (C) US Strategy: A change in the US strategy may also have
contributed to the success of the 2004 inspection. While
agreeing to accept the Turkish olive branch offered by
General Ozturk, the US team brought a list of US concerns to
the table -- a departure from past practice. These included
Turkish constraints on Incirlik base access; cost
implications of the Buy Turkish First provision; requirement
for original signatures on NATO orders; Host Nation approval
requirements; theft of US property from the base; AAFES
concessionaire rental requirements; and use of Incirlik's EOD
range. Another request, to base the US C-12 at Esenboga
Airport in place of Guvercinlik was deferred to a separate
meeting in Ankara at Turkish request. This strategy allowed
the US to hold the floor for a good portion of the inbrief
and diverted some Turkish energy to researching the issues.
Additionally, the US side took the Dependent Hire and APO
issues off the table at the inbrief by requesting separate
meetings on each issue in Ankara and offering specific
meeting dates in early 2005.


4. (C) The Big Three: While there had been little progress
to resolve the Dependent Hire, APO and OSI issues since the
2003 DECA inspection (reftel),the expectations of the
Turkish side appear to have slightly softened. On the
Dependent Hire and APO issues, Col. Karacoban and MFA Second
Secretary Ali Riza Guney said the Turkish government was not

SIPDIS
looking to impose new restrictions on the US operation but
only to place these operations within a legal framework as
required by Turkish law. Guney was particularly interested
in the US APO operation, including the route for items
entering and leaving Turkey and the security precautions
taken during transit from Istanbul to Adana and other
locations. A discussion of the process at the Incirlik APO
clarified that APO items all enter Turkey through Istanbul,
not through multiple entry points as Turkish officials had
assumed. Guney commented to Deputy PolMilCouns that the APO
issue should be easy to solve. He acknowledged, however,
that the Dependent Hire issue was more intractable since
Turkish law requires all foreign workers to have approved
work permits. The US is unwilling to cede authority to the
Turkish government to determine whether or not the base can
employ an American. On the OSI issue, an informal system in
which AFOSI notifies the MFA in advance that it plans to
carry weapons off-base in support of a protective detail has
met with tacit Turkish approval and AFOSI efforts to deepen
relations with the Jandarma have been well-received. While
the Turkish working group members agreed to consider this
issue closed, others in the Turkish delegation commented that
the issue had been raised to a "higher level" and was out of
TGS hands. However, neither the Embassy nor ODC has been
contacted by other officials regarding this matter.


5. (C) Bayrakli Park: Following the November, 2003 Istanbul
bombings, a decision was made to move the 425th Air Base
offices from the Hilton Hotel in Izmir to Bayrakli Park.
Security precautions at Bayrakli were correspondingly
increased. During the inspection, Col. Karacoban and others
expressed surprise at seeing US armed security guards at the
entrance of the compound. They further questioned the US
rationale for keeping the US security threat level at Charlie
when the TGS threat level was at Alpha. LTC Ozan Ozken from
TGS Security questioned whether the US was withholding
intelligence that might cause the Turkish side to change its
threat level. Col. Karacoban stated that, under DECA
Supplementary Agreement 3, Number 5, which pertains to
activities outside of the specific Turkish installations
covered under Article One of the agreement, the Turkish
government must give approval for US personnel to carry
weapons. The US side disputes this point and will respond
accordingly to a TGS complaint, if submitted.


6. (C) Final Report: In its final report of the meetings,
TGS acknowledged the "positive approach of the US side on
carrying weapons off-base and contacting TGS." While noting
some other steps taken by the US side to address local
concerns at Incirlik and Izmir, the report gave scant
acknowledgment to the concerns raised by the US side and, in
the case of base access, suggested that US personnel needed
additional training on the rules and rights pertaining to
base access under the DECA. In no case, did TGS take full
responsibility for identifying a solution. While the report,
as read, did not give as accurate an accounting as the US
side would like, General Ozturk ended the session on a
positive note by saying that none of the issues presented
were big problems but they shouldn't be left unresolved and
calling on both sides to be constructive and open to
dialogue. Additionally, Col. Karacoban expressed his
pleasure with the cooperation and coordination shown during
the inspection.


7. (C) Comment: The significant shift in tone during the 2004
DECA inspection was likely the result of a confluence of
factors. The first sign of change may have been the TGS
decision in September to take the bilateral High Level
Defense Group (HLDG) process away from the J-5 Agreements
Department, which was very focused on perceived US
non-compliance with the DECA, and give it to the Strategy
Department headed by MG Cengiz Arslan. As a result, the DECA
discussion during the HLDG Political Military Working Group
meeting on September 24 was marginalized, which could signal
a TGS decision to elevate and broaden the bilateral security
relationship and put the DECA issues in the appropriate
context. General Ozturk's concerted effort to reach out to
the US delegation during the DECA meeting was welcome, and
appeared to have had a positive impact on Col. Karacoban who,
in the past, appeared almost bitter about what he perceived
as US neglect of its DECA obligations. His agreement to meet
in early 2005 to discuss the APO and Dependent Hire issues is
hopeful. However, the outcome of those meetings will better
indicate whether the positive tone set at the DECA
inspections reflects a genuine interest in resolving
outstanding DECA issues and moving our security relationship
to a higher plane.
EDELMAN