PUTIN VISITS TURKEY: RUSSIA BIDS TO TURN TURKEY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006887

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS EPET ETRD TU
SUBJECT: PUTIN VISITS TURKEY: RUSSIA BIDS TO TURN TURKEY
FROM WEST; TURKS KEEPING OPTIONS OPEN

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Putin's visit demonstrated both Russia's
assessment that Turkey is in play and the Turks' habit for
mixing wishful thinking, barbarian handling, and a desire for
(lucrative) attention. As of now, the visit appears not to
have been the total breakthrough the Russians and some Turks
are projecting it as. End summary.


2. (C) Putin's Dec. 6-7 descent on Ankara was the first
bilateral visit by a head of state from Moscow since
figurehead Soviet president Podgorny's 1972 visit. Some of
the more hyperbolic accounts, and even Russian polcounselor
Kunakov in his readout to us, cast his presence as the first
visit by a powerful Russian head of state in 500 plus years
of "bilateral" relations.


3. (C) The visit, postponed from Sept. owing to the Beslan
attack, took place in the context of sharply negative Turkish
opinion regarding the U.S. Fallujah operation, GOT edginess
over prospects for an acceptable EU decision for the start of
accession negotiations, and some Turkish circles' attempt to
pump up a "Eurasian" alternative for Turkey. The diplomatic
correspondent for Islamist "Yeni Safak", which in general is
supportive of ruling AKP, told us that, whereas the GOT
preferred the visit in early 2005, the Russians had insisted
on coming before the end of 2004, i.e., before the EU summit.



4. (C) Putin held lengthy one-on-ones with President Sezer
(one hour, extended from 30 minutes),PM Erdogan
(two-and-a-half hours, extended from one hour),and
parliamentary Speaker Arinc; he also addressed the Turkish
Union of Chambers (TOBB),the country's mainstream small- to
medium-sized business forum. FonMin Lavrov; Energy and
Industry Minister Khristenko; DefMin Ivanov, who stayed on an
extra day to press for sale of Russia's "Erdogan" attack helo
and for mil-industrial cooperation; and the presidents of
Gazprom, Transneft, RAO, Strojprom, and others accompanied.
The motorcade at its height had 150 cars.


5. (C) The press fawned in the run-up and the day following
the visit, when reports focused on normally wooden president
Sezer's ultra-warm reception of Putin, Russian talk of a $20
billion commercial and investment package, Putin's supposed
tact and consideration, the Russian ambassador's
carefully-planted comment that the Russians had been met with
much greater interest than expected, and proclamation of a
"multi-dimensional partnership". The press, led by
sycophantic "Hurriyet" Ankara bureau chief Sedat Ergin, even
managed to cast the Dec. 6 massive three-hour gridlock at
rush hour as a moment for Putin to show his reported tact by
apologizing, although another news story of his apology noted
its backhanded nature since he put the blame for the snafu on
the Turkish authorities. Much commentary turned cold
overnight when most of the press (except for "Yeni Safak",
which continues to emphasize what it sees as the visit's
strategic importance) decided Putin had given nothing on
neuralgic issues like Cyprus and the PKK.


5. (S) The visit pivoted around Putin's meetings with Sezer
and Erdogan. Turkish interpreter Habil Topaloglu told
"Aksam"'s diplomatic correspondent, who asked her for an
evaluation of the visit at our request, that in all her
years' interpreting she had never seen such effusive
expressions of friendship as offered by Sezer, expressions
which went "way beyond the dictates of protocol." Topaloglu
described Erdogan as warm toward Putin, but not to the degree
displayed by Sezer. In a Dec. 10 conversation with us,
Russian polcounselor Kunakov, whom Putin regularly uses as an
interpreter and who interpreted the Erdogan one-on-one from
the Russian side, described Erdogan's welcome as very warm.


6. (S) "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran, who has the
deepest and most comprehensive set of contacts in the AKP
cabinet of all the journalists we know, told us Dec. 8 and 9
that, based on her inside sources, Putin delivered the
following messages to Sezer and Erdogan:

--EU: The Turks should forget their "EU fantasy"; if they
join the EU and implement Schengen criteria, Russia will cut
off trade and reduce the volume of visits (including
tourism),so they shouldn't implement Schengen. Turkey is
bending its neck to the EU. It doesn't need to. Putin
stands fully behind Turkey, so Turkey can stand up to the EU
(note: Basaran said some of Erdogan's advisors pressed him to
use Putin's words to defy the EU openly; Erdogan refused.
End note).

--U.S.: Russia and Turkey are living through a period when
the U.S. is assaulting the whole region just to control oil
and energy flows.

--Ukraine: Putin claimed to be dispirited that, despite
American commitments to respect Russia's backyard, the U.S.
has interfered in Ukraine's affairs,

--Energy and trade: If Turkey joins the EU, Russia will no
longer be able to supply natural gas so cheaply (sic). Oil
supplies will run out in the not too distant future and
natural gas will be the main energy source for the next 500
years. In this regard there are only two suppliers who
matter, Russia and Iran. Russia looms right on your
doorstep. Russia and Turkey have the opportunity for
cooperation on many issues: Caucasus, trade, oil and energy.

--Activities of the Fethullah Gulen lodge (Turkey's most
powerful Islamist grouping, feared by the core institutions
of the Turkish State; the Gulen lodge controls major
business, trade, and publishing activities, has deeply
penetrated the political scene -- including AKP at high
levels -- and the Turkish National Police; and has a
world-wide network of schools, including a number in the U.S.
and the Russian Federation, schools whose opening Putin
earlier appeared to have facilitated): Russia is concerned by
what it sees as the Gulenist lodge's insidious Islamist
agenda (note: Russian polcounselor Kunakov dodged and weaved
but acknowledged the subject had been broached, although he
claimed it was the Russian FSB rep who did so in the
inter-service meeting. Ekrem Dumanli, editor of the Gulenist
"Zaman" daily, one of the most widely read Turkish
newspapers, and "Zaman" Ankara correspondent Mustafa Unal
separately -- but very grudgingly -- conceded Dec. 9 that
Putin indeed raised concerns about the Gulenist activity in
Russia. Gulenist "Writers and Journalists Foundation"
director Erkam Aytav has reluctantly acknowledged to us three
times in recent months that the schools face pressure from
the Russian authorities and that the Gulen lodge is trying to
reach an accommodation with the regime since the schools lie
at the heart of the Gulenist "mission" to Russia, i.e., the
step-by-step conversion of Russia to Gulen's brand of Islam.
Aytav also acknowledged the possibility that Russia wants to
use the threats to close the schools to leverage Gulenist
lobbying power for Russian interests in Turkey. Aytav and
Dumanli have admitted to us separately that "Zaman"'s
coverage of Russia has been kept bland as a means to mollify
the Putin regime. End note).


7. (C) Turkish MFA's Dec. 7 briefing for EU, U.S. and ANZAC
diplomats revealed no more than that (1) the MFA was kept
less than minimally in the loop by both the presidency and
prime ministry (DirGen Akinci admitted repeatedly that the
MFA had no information about Putin's lengthy one-on-ones with
Sezer and PM Erdogan); (2) the session between full
delegations covered bilateral and regional issues in a
set-piece manner and emphasized energy and economic ties
(septels for trade/investment and energy discussions); (3)
Akinci, considered a Russophile both within the MFA and
elsewhere, incompetently handled the sharp complaints from
the Polish charge and Lithuanian ambassador that they had
been the only neighboring countries excluded from Sezer's
Dec. 6 state dinner. Both the Pole and the Lithuanian asked
whether they had been excluded at Turkish or Russian
insistence, and whether so owing to Kwasnievski and Adamkus'
efforts to mediate the Ukraine crisis. Receiving Akinci's
limp comment that the MFA had not been involved in the
planning and that the exclusion had merely been an
"oversight," the Lithuanian ambassador remarked that this was
an imprudent gesture in the run-up to the EU's Dec. 17 summit
and stormed out of the briefing. Kunakov opined it was all
the fault of Turkish protocol.


8. (C) Full delegation political discussions: Akinci asserted
the two sides "agreed on almost everything" but provided
meager details, even when pressed during Q&As. Putin thanked
the Turks for support for Russia's observer status in OIC and
for humanitarian aid after the terrorist attack in Beslan.
The two sides agreed to enhance existing anti-terrorism
cooperation. When asked about reports the Turks arrested
some Chechens before the visit, Akinci defensively replied
the Turks arrested "thousands" of people prior to the Bush
visit in June. A well-connected journalist told us Dec. 7
that at the delegation meeting Putin put on table folders
with details of Chechens who he insisted had received
terrorist training in Turkey, where they received the
training, who trained and sheltered them. Saying they would
evaluate the material, the Turks responded immediately by
asking why Russia hasn't yet declared PKK/Kongra-Gel a
terrorist organization. Kunakov told us it is the Russians'
assessment that the Turks had not expected Putin to agree on
the spot; in any case, he said, it will be complicated for
Russia to put PKK/Kongra-Gel on its terrorism list since an
executive decree will not suffice; a court decision is
required.


9. Regional issues:

--"Eurasia": in response to a question regarding Turkey's
understanding of the "Eurasia" thesis of Alexander Dugin (who
participated in the visit) and Turkish policy, Akinci airily
called "Eurasia" a flexible term, "but whatever it is, Russia
and Turkey are included."

--Cyprus: Akinci reported Putin as saying Russia is doing
nothing to prevent Russian businessmen from doing business in
northern Cyprus but the goal should be to equalize the
economies of the two sides; Russia is working with both sides
in this regard. The Turks asked Putin to support UNSC
resolution supporting the Annan Plan; in what Akinci asserted
was a more forthcoming approach than that of FonMin Lavrov
(whom Akinci implied is jaded, having done Cyprus now for 15
years),Putin agreed to "study it" (septel for MFA Cyprus
Department's view that Putin was more forward-leaning than
that). Basaran and Kemal Kaya, head of the Turkish
parliamentary administrative office, told us separately
subsequently that Putin merely hid behind the EU, saying that
Russia will shape its policy on northern Cyprus according to
what the EU does. In describing Putin's approach in
identical terms, Russian polcounselor Kunakov admitted that
Russia still has strong equities in its current stance.

--Caucasus: Akinci said the Turks asked Russia to encourage
Armenia to settle N-K; if Armenia recognizes the Turkish
border and withdraws from occupied Azerbaijani territory,
Turkey will respond with five positive steps for every
Armenian one. The Russians charged Georgia with not being
accommodating regarding settlement of Abkhazia or South
Ossetia; in neither case has Georgia proposed a solution,
Putin asserted. Only when pressed in the Q&A session did
Akinci give any detail on the Turkish response, and then only
offered thin gruel: Turkey respects Georgia's territorial
integrity and calls for a peaceful settlement. Akinci
claimed the Turks "took note of Russian views." He asserted
that Turkey's position has not changed since 1991; it's only
the positions of Georgia and Russia that have changed. The
two sides agreed to continue bilateral consultations on the
Caucasus.

--Meskhetian Turks: Akinci said the Turks asked the Russians
to end discrimination against Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar
by placing them under federal law and removing them from the
arbitrary administration of the Krasnodar governor. The
Russians responded that Turkey should pressure the Georgians
to take the Meskhetian Turks back as Georgia had agreed to do
as a condition for its acceptance into the Council of Europe;
the Turks agreed to pursue with the Georgians. Russian
polcounselor Kunakov described the Turks' stance to us as
reasonable and constructive on what is a "sensitive" subject
for the Russians.

--Turkey's UNSC non-perm member bid: Putin said Russia will
give "favorable consideration" but ducked a clear answer
regarding Turkey's bid (for 2010-11); Akinci said the Turks
figure the Russians will not show their hand until the last
moment.

--Iran, Central Asia: Akinci claimed there was no discussion
of Iran or Iranian nukes in the general delegation meeting,
no detailed discussion of Iraq or Central Asia or EU: "Our
relations with Russia have their own dynamics, our relations
with the EU have their own dynamics."

--Iraq: both sides agreed security is not yet established,
both agreed elections must not be postponed, Akinci said.
Kunakov told us the Russians' assessment of the visit is that
they and the Turks see eye to eye on regional issues such as
Iraq.


10. (S) Comment: we will be pursuing answers to several
questions that remain open: (1) how deeply Putin's offer of a
strategic alternative to the U.S. and EU will influence
Erdogan; (2) how well Energy Minister Guler will be able to
resist commercial and political pressures to concede more of
Turkey's up- and downstream energy sector activity to the
Russians (in this regard Guler would like more consultations
on strategy with U.S. officials to counter Russian moves);
and (3) how far the Turks are willing to go on mil-industrial
cooperation.


11. (S) But several points are clear. From the perspective
of keen Russia watchers like pre-eminent national security
analyst Faruk Demir, Putin, flush with petrodollars, is
carrying out a four-pronged Great Game strategy to woo Turkey
from the West, a strategy Demir and others expect the
Russians will continue to push when Erdogan, Sezer, and Arinc
each visit Russia in 2005.


12. (C) First, dangle the prospect of further lucrative
contracts for Turkish businesses already in the Russian
market and big trade/investment deals to strengthen the
pro-Russian business lobby as a platform for political
influence. In this regard, Putin is gambling that what is
most important to Turks in the world is the prospect of money
in the pocket. Second, squeeze the Turks on energy by
underscoring Turkey's dependence on Russia and (by
implication Russia's friend) Iran for natural gas and on
trade by threatening a cut in commerce and tourism as a
consequence of any Turkish move to join Schengen. Third,
project the image of Russia as sharing Turkey's sense of
being wrongly excluded (Rappallo Syndrome),as being more
culturally attuned to Islam than the West, and as ready for
more comprehensive and consistent political cooperation in
the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia regions than the
U.S. or EU are willing or able to offer. Fourth, expand
Russia's network of agents of influence in Turkey.


13. (C) In this latter regard there are strong rumors
circulating that Foreign Trade Minister Tuzmen is so
interested in pumping up the view that Turkey's best trade
partner is Russia because the Russians gave him several
lucrative personal deals when he recently led a trade mission
to Moscow. As we have heard from a source close to retired
NSC SecGen and "Eurasia" promoter General Kilinc, Putin sent
"Eurasia" architect Alexander Dugin to visit Kilinc preceding
Putin's arrival to consolidate a Turkish "Eurasia" bloc. We
have heard from good sources that the Russians are pressing
to buy widely-watched Star TV, currently in government
receivership. We see a concerted Russian effort to reach out
with financial support to traditional civic organizations
(e.g., core Turkmen organizations representing the more
conservative heartland) and to religious brotherhoods and
lodges.


14. (C) On the official Turkish side we see a conspicuous,
across-the-board lack of analytic capability to assess
Russia's motives or strategy. In addition, we observe -- in
an ill-considered and emotional reaction against the
perceived perfidy of the U.S. and EU -- the desire of a
disparate and unreasonable, but vocal, range of people to
turn their backs on the West and try something new, at a
minimum as an alternative policy choice with which to stand
up to the U.S. or EU. This group, which includes some
politicians and academics (e.g., FonMin Gul ally and foreign
policy advisor Davutoglu),a fair number of journalists (both
left-wing and Islamist),some in the MFA, some active duty
and many retired military officers, is currently fractious,
but as long as the U.S. is in Iraq and negotiations with the
EU are up and down, Russia will have fertile ground to
exploit.


15. (C) Not all went Putin's way, however. First, Turkey --
both officialdom and public opinion -- will want to see
whether Russia's policies toward Cyprus and the PKK evolve in
Turkey's favor. Second, the Turks have their own
centuries-old, multi-layered tradition of barbarian handling.
Third, the Turks were irritated at Putin's heavy-handed push
to sell the Russian attack helo, which the Russians have
named the "Erdogan". Fourth, and most important, Putin is
misleading himself if he thinks his projection of empathy
gained a purchase beyond an old leftist-statist like Sezer.
In this regard, Putin is his own worst enemy. Speaking to
TOBB, the embodiment of conservative, heartland Turkish
values, he tried to illustrate the growing bonds between the
two peoples by noting that 500,000 Russian women have married
Turks. Turkish girls are pretty as well, and now it's time
for them to come to Russia to marry Russians, he said. As a
broad section of our contacts -- "secular" and pious --
noted, what has lodged in the collective Turkish mind is the
thought that "Russia has exported 500,000 women of ill
repute, and now the infidel wants to take our daughters."




EDELMAN