Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA6844
2004-12-10 05:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

MFA OFFICIAL: TURKEY MAY/MAY RE-THINK A PRT IN 2005

Tags:  PREL MARR AF TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006844 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR AF TU
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL: TURKEY MAY/MAY RE-THINK A PRT IN 2005

REF: ANKARA 6257

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006844

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR AF TU
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL: TURKEY MAY/MAY RE-THINK A PRT IN 2005

REF: ANKARA 6257

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) On Dec. 9, PolMilCouns and PolMilOff discussed ISAF
Stage Two expansion and the apparent shortfall in Stage Two
PRTs with Aydin Evirgen, MFA Deputy Director General for
South Asia. Evirgen, who was deeply involved in our last
effort to get a PRT from Turkey, said he had serious doubts
about whether the GOT would be willing to revisit the issue
now, especially during Turkey's command of ISAF VII from
February to August of 2005. However, he added that he has
begun "a mental exercise" on PRTs. He plans to evaluate the
attitude of senior government officials in early 2005 to
revisiting the PRT issue, and said he would let us know then
whether the time was ripe (or not) for us to make a more
formal approach.


2. (C) Comment: Though the Turks felt burned during the last
attempt at PRT force generation (see reftel for a synopsis of
that process),and it was evident that Evirgen himself felt
personally burned, it was clear from his language and
demeanor that Evirgen supports sending a Turkish PRT to
Afghanistan, and that he was willing to make another attempt.
Evirgen noted that Turkish military officers have told him
how positive it was for Turkey to command ISAF last year,
since it gave Turkish officers valuable experience in working
in a multilateral military setting. This will, we expect, be
part of his pitch to both civilian and military leadership
here.


3. (C) Comment, cont.: Seeking a PRT commitment from the
Turks now would likely be counter-productive. When and if we
make a later approach, it must be both coordinated and
coherent in order to be successful, indicating from the
outset where a Turkish PRT might best be located. Evirgen
hopes to bring senior MFA officials to Washington in early
2005 for consultations on Afghanistan. This would serve as
an excellent opportunity for further informal discussions on
a Turkish PRT.
EDELMAN