CHP LEADERSHIP WAITING FOR FAILURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006839

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: CHP LEADERSHIP WAITING FOR FAILURE

REF: A. ANKARA 02153


B. ANKARA 01358

C. ISTANBUL 01729

Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Main opposition Republican People's
Party (CHP) does not have a constructive political or
electoral strategy for confronting the governing Justice
and Development Party (AKP). CHP leadership is content
to maintain its grip over the party, maintain the party's
(eroding) representation in parliament, and wait for AKP to
fail. This approach, however, has contributed to the
party's intellectual stagnation and exacerbated internal
tensions. CHP leadership must change or alter its approach
if the party is to mount a serious challenge to AKP. End
Summary.


2. (C) CHP leader Deniz Baykal does not have a constructive
political or electoral strategy for taking votes from
governing AKP. According to CHP MP Abdulkadir Ates,
the CHP leadership is content merely to maintain its grip
over the party, maintain the party's representation in
parliament, and wait for AKP to fail. Baykal and his inner
circle, according to Ates, are waiting for an economic or
foreign policy crisis to sap AKP's popularity and cause the
party to divide into two or more groups. In this regard,
Baykal and his loyalists spare no opportunity to criticize
AKP for allegedly betraying the Turkish Cypriots and selling
out Turkey's interests to the EU. They also use every
opportunity to blacken U.S. policy, especially on Iraq,
Kurds in northern Iraq, and the PKK and to accuse AKP of
being a U.S. pawn. In the aftermath of AKP's fall, CHP,
according to this scenario, would come to power at the head
of a coalition government.


3. (C) The problem with Baykal's approach is that CHP may
fall apart before AKP. Since the 1990s, Baykal and his
inner circle have manipulated the party by-laws to centralize
the party machinery and tighten their grip over the party's
central apparatus. They have also moved ruthlessly to
silence
critical voices. Baykal's authoritarian style has, according
to several CHP contacts, led to the intellectual stagnation
of the party and alienated many CHP reformists.


4. (C) As a result, CHP's leadership has also been unable
to address the ideological and electoral crisis facing the
party. CHP faces a difficult electoral environment. Calling
itself social democratic, CHP is a pro-establishment,
status-quo, "secular party", but the majority of Turks are
angry with the establishment, unhappy with the status-quo,
socially conservative, and to a lesser or greater degree
religious. Since 1983 the left-of-center parties have seen
their combined vote generally hover between 25 and 35
percent.
Some CHP deputies believe that their party needs to adapt its
ideology to new economic, religious, and social realities.
The
most notable advocate of ideological reform within CHP is
former
economic minister Kemal Dervis, but he has resigned from the
party leadership (REF A). Contacts across the board
disparage his lack
of will to fight for control of the party and note that
he remains an advocate of top-down guidance (including an
important role for the military) of a populace he has limited
contact with.


5. (C) Many CHP contacts are frustrated with the party
leadership's inability or unwillingness to formulate a
political, electoral, or public policy strategy to counter
the rise of AKP. According to CHP MP Hasan Aydin, only 60
of CHP's 170-odd deputies support Baykal and the central
party
leadership. Only a small number of CHP deputies --
currently less than 30 -- are in open rebellion against
Baykal. The majority of deputies, however, are hoping for
new leadership, but afraid to publicly challenge Baykal and
his inner circle. This past summer a number of CHP
deputies tried to organize a party convention to oust
Baykal from the party leadership, but they failed (REF B).
This fall, CHP Istanbul Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul has been
sparring with Baykal, but most observers believe that
corruption allegations against Sarigul, his arrogance, and
divisions within the opposition will limit Sarigul's ability
to mount a successful challenge (REF C).


6. (C) Several Embassy contacts assert that Baykal and his
inner circle will face their most serious leadership
challenges in 2005 as the party elects new leaders at the
grassroots level. In the past, Baykal and his crowd have
successfully manipulated these elections to keep their
supporters in power, but given the increased
dissatisfaction with their leadership, the outcome of the
2005 party elections is less certain. It is clear,
however, that the CHP leadership must change or alter its
approach if the party is to mount a serious challenge to
AKP.
EDELMAN