Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA6257
2004-11-04 15:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO ASK TURKEY FOR A PRT

Tags:  PREL MARR AF TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006257 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR AF TU
SUBJECT: NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO ASK TURKEY FOR A PRT

REF: A. USNATO 983

B. ANKARA 4485

C. ANKARA 2293

D. ANKARA 5836

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006257

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR AF TU
SUBJECT: NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO ASK TURKEY FOR A PRT

REF: A. USNATO 983

B. ANKARA 4485

C. ANKARA 2293

D. ANKARA 5836

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) We read with interest USNATO's thoughtful piece on
ISAF Stage Two expansion (ref a). While we agree that it
would be beneficial to have a Turkish PRT in Afghanistan, any
request to the Turks should not be made until after their
February-August 2005 stint as ISAF VII commander, during
which fall the Afghan parliamentary elections. Instead, we
should focus on getting the Turks to send as robust a
presence as possible for ISAF VII.


2. (C) The Turks felt burned in the last go-round of PRT
force generation, and they are perplexed and angered by harsh
Congressional criticism of their presence in Afghanistan
given that they have provided the command element for ISAF
once, are ready to do so again, and also offered a PRT only
to have it turned down by the Alliance. They believe that
they made a good-faith offer to provide a PRT in Takhar (in
the northeast),and also believe that the U.S., the Afghans,
SHAPE, ISAF on the ground in Kabul, and the Germans sent them
many mixed signals on PRT placement (ref c). They restricted
their proposal to areas already familiar to the GOT or
private-sector Turks, and resisted efforts to locate their
PRT in the Stage Two area. When we were finally willing to
accept a Turkish PRT in northern Afghanistan, the Foreign
Minister had already decided to withdraw the offer. Our
attempt to convince the GOT to reconsider failed.


3. (C) The Turks have a large and capable military, but IMF
requirements and budgetary reforms have placed real limits on
their ability to pay for deployments such as commanding ISAF
VII. The military was only reluctantly convinced to support
Turkey's pre-Istanbul Summit proposal, and we expect they
will be again reluctant to make the kind of long-term
commitment a PRT entails. Certainly this will be the case at
least until they have finished with ISAF VII. Depending on
NATO's needs for ISAF VII, Turkey is prepared to send a Corps
HQ element, HQ plus one battalion, or HQ plus two battalions
(ref d). Given that the elections will occur on their watch,
encouraging a larger presence seems to us to make sense.


4. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN