CYPRUS/MALTA PROBLEM: THE VIEW FROM ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006003

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR PDAS BRADTKE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL GR TU CY MT
SUBJECT: CYPRUS/MALTA PROBLEM: THE VIEW FROM ANKARA

REF: A. BRUSSELS 4082


B. NICOSIA 1974

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkey will base its decision on how to break
the impasse over Cyprus and Malta's participation in NATO-EU
security cooperation on several factors: EU action to reach
out to the Turkish Cypriots, EU leaders' Dec. 17 decision on
beginning accession talks with Turkey, and Turkey's
evaluation of other concrete elements of NATO-EU cooperation,
such as Operation Althea and Turkish participation in the
Battlegroups concept. In any case, we doubt Turkey will move
until after, perhaps even well after, Dec. 17. When they are
ready, we expect the Turks will insist on breaking the
impasse on their own, very legalistic, terms. End summary.


2. (C) Embassy Ankara appreciates USEU-USNATO's thoughtful
and coherent ref a suggestions--as well as Embassy Nicosia's
equally helpful ref b analysis--for untying the knot of the
impasse over the participation of Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU
strategic cooperation. From a Turkish perspective, this
issue is wrapped up in the broad net of Cyprus and Turkey's
status with the EU. Thus, we believe that there can be no
Turkish movement on this problem until after, perhaps well
after, the EU's leaders decide Dec. 17 on the core question
of how they will proceed on accession negotiations with
Turkey.

The Cyprus Problem
--------------


3. (C) The Turks believe that the international
community--and particularly the EU--has done little to reward
the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) for their vote in the April
referendum on the island, and that the Greek Cypriots (GCs)
have avoided any negative consequences. Specifically, Turkey
is angry that the GCs have apparently used their EU
membership to block EU aid and direct trade regulations for
the TCs. The GOT believes it has given enough concessions on
Cyprus, especially given its recent decision to extend its
Customs Union agreement with the EU to include Cyprus.
Ankara showed the depth of its displeasure with the GCs and
the EU in its willingness to cancel the EU-OIC Forum
scheduled for earlier this month in Istanbul over the GOT's
insistence on according the TC delegation a higher form of
recognized representation than the GCs--and thus the
EU--could live with. The GOT sees NATO-EU strategic
cooperation as one of the few cards it holds in this game,
and it could agree to move only after it is reassured by
developments on the Cyprus issue.

EU Accession Decision
--------------


4. (C) It goes without saying that what decision EU leaders
take on Dec. 17 will have an impact on the Turks' attitude
toward the EU. The Turks will reserve NATO-EU strategic
cooperation for its menu of policy options to reward--or
punish--the EU for whatever decision it takes in December.
The GOT will also monitor very closely in particular the
GOC's attitude toward Turkey's membership bid as Dec. 17
approaches.

Other NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation Issues
--------------


5. (C) Parallel to the accession negotiation decision, Turkey
is also tracking its satisfaction with other areas in NATO-EU
strategic cooperation, specifically Operation Althea and the
EU Battlegroup concept. So far, this appears to be the only
unalloyed good news to announce. The Turks report that they
are generally pleased with how the EU has worked with them on
planning for the transition from SFOR to Althea.
Additionally, we understand that the EU has opened its call
for Battlegroup contributions to the Turks, and the Turks
have responded enthusiastically. Indeed, Turkey is one of
the few European countries that can offer real capabilities
to Battlegroups or even make one on its own. By January the
Turks will have more data points on both these key areas of
strategic cooperation, and will enter these into their
equation.

The U.S. Influence
--------------


6. (C) Unfortunately, we have less influence with the Turks
on these EU-NATO issues than we had when we negotiated the
Istanbul Documents on ESDP. The Turks believed that if the
Cyprus referendum failed we would persuade the Europeans to
move smartly to reward both the Turks and the TCs in tangible
ways. Instead, the Turks feel they have almost nothing to
show for their forward-leaning position on the Annan Plan.
At the same time, the Turks feel we have failed to deliver on
a series of other issues related to Iraq, especially the PKK.
As a result, our credibility with the Turks is not high at
the moment.

What Would a Solution Look Like?
--------------


7. (C) The Turks are legalistic and would likely be unwilling
to agree to amend the December 2002 NAC decision which
requires both PfP membership and signing the NATO security
agreement for non-NATO EU countries who wish to engage in
NATO-EU strategic cooperation discussions. For the Turks,
this ensures they control the timing (blocking consensus
until Ankara is ready to move). For Cyprus and Malta, they
would have to apply for PfP. We note Embassy Nicosia's point
(ref b) that Cypriot PfP membership might not be desirable
given our efforts to eventually demilitarize the island, but
we also do not see another alternative acceptable to the
Turks. What we and the EU could do is to work on all three
to ensure the necessary steps are nearly simultaneous, but,
in our estimation, there is no point in trying with the Turks
until there is movement on EU measures to reward the TCs for
their April vote and/and Turkey has a date to begin EU
accession negotiations.
EDELMAN