Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA5952
2004-10-20 09:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

MASOUD BARZANI IN ANKARA: NOT IN A MOOD TO

Tags:  PREL PTER PINR TU IZ 
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200922Z Oct 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005952 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR TU IZ
SUBJECT: MASOUD BARZANI IN ANKARA: NOT IN A MOOD TO
COMPROMISE ON KIRKUK


Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005952

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR TU IZ
SUBJECT: MASOUD BARZANI IN ANKARA: NOT IN A MOOD TO
COMPROMISE ON KIRKUK


Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: KDP leader Masoud Barzani paid his first
visit to Ankara in two years Oct. 11-12, during which he met
with PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul. According to the Turkish
MFA, Barzani was unexpectedly assertive, especially on
Kirkuk, which he stated was a Kurdish city, period. Barzani
characterized the PKK as the KDP's enemy, and told the Turks
that the second border gate issue was for the Turks and the
IIG to determine. End summary.


2. (C) MFA Director General for the Middle East Tahsin
Burcuoglu told the DCM Oct. 13 that the Turks were surprised
at KDP leader Masoud Barzani's "assertiveness" during his
Oct. 11-12 visit to Ankara, his first in two years. Barzani
met PM Erdogan, FonMin Gul, and had a working lunch with
senior MFA, military, and intelligence officials. He recited
generally familiar themes on other key issues, namely the PKK
and the second border crossing. Barzani told the Turks that
the PKK is the KDP's enemy as well, not just the Turks'. He
added that the issue of where to place the second border
crossing was one for the IIG and the GOT to solve.


3. (C) MFA, the local KDP rep, and the Turkish press all
agreed that Kirkuk was the main bone of contention during
Barzani's visit. The tone for had been thus set in late
September, when the Turkish press quoted Barzani as saying
that the Kurds are ready to fight for Kirkuk if the city is
not included in Kurdistan. In Turkey, Burcuoglu told the
DCM, Barzani stated firmly that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city and
that he will not accept any abrogation of the Kurds' right of
return. Barzani told the Turks that the Arabs in Kirkuk will
be resettled elsewhere, and then there would be a referendum
where Kirkuk's residents could (read: will) decide that
Kirkuk will be a "part of Kurdistan." The KDP's local
representative, Omar Merani, told PolMilOff that Barzani was
so annoyed at the working lunch by persistent Turkish
questioning on Kirkuk that he refused to discuss the subject
further in that venue (though he did discuss the issue
extensively in his bilats). Burcuoglu noted that Barzani was
noticeably less confrontational in his meeting with PM
Erdogan; Burcuoglu said with a laugh that Erdogan's
aggressive body language influenced Barzani's deportment.


4. (C) Barzani told the Turks that he did not seek ethnic
conflict, and that his harsh words were not directed at
Turkey but at elements in Iraq who would resist the idea of a
Kurdish Kirkuk. If the new central government in Baghdad is
like Saddam, Barzani asserted, the Kurds will fight. The
local PUK representative, Bahros Galali, told us that we
should read Barzani's public remarks through the prism of
Kurdish politics: The PUK, he claimed, is stronger in Kirkuk
than the KDP, so Barzani was making a play for Kurdish
nationalist votes by claiming Kirkuk for the Kurds.


5. (C) Comment: While the Turks claim to be concerned about
the Turkmen minority there, their real concern, we believe,
is that Kurdish nationalists will seek to use control of
Kirkuk and its natural resources as a basis for a viable
Kurdish state. Although we argue with the Turks that we and
the IIG are working for an orderly process of returns to
Kirkuk as laid out in the TAL, the ardent stand Barzani
asserts undermines our arguments as well as Turkish/KDP
relations. His visit did nothing to improve the situation.


6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN