Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA5734
2004-10-06 07:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY CANCELS EU/OIC FORUM OVER CYPRUS DISPUTE

Tags:  PREL TU CY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005734 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY CANCELS EU/OIC FORUM OVER CYPRUS DISPUTE


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005734

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY CANCELS EU/OIC FORUM OVER CYPRUS DISPUTE


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On September 30, in a dispute with the EU
over designation of the Turkish Cypriot observer delegation,
Turkey canceled the October 4-5 EU-OIC Joint Forum in
Istanbul. The Turkish MFA and the Dutch EU Presidency each
claim the other turned down reasonable compromises and
ignored the problem until it was too late. EU diplomats in
Ankara say the episode will not directly affect Turkey's
December bid for a date to begin accession negotiations but
has given ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics. It has also
strained relations between the Turks and the Dutch Embassy
here. In this incident, Ankara's frustration with the EU
trumped what should have been its better judgment. End
Summary.

Early Problems
--------------


2. (U) That Cyprus would be a problem for the Forum was
clear as early as August, when the Turkish MFA invited the
"TRNC Ambassador" to a briefing on Forum preparations. The
Dutch, as EU President, participated in the briefing but then
made a public statement that their participation did not
signify recognition of the "TRNC." When the Turks later sent
out invitations to the Forum, they did not send one to the
Republic of Cyprus; the Dutch stepped in and asked the Turks
to invite all EU member states via the Presidency.


3. (C) Although Turkey does not recognize the ROC, the Turks
accepted ROC participation in the Forum. They expected the
EU to adopt the same stance toward the "TRNC," which Turkey
invited under its OIC observer designation as the "Turkish
Cypriot State." The EU was willing to have TC observers, but
not designated as the "Turkish Cypriot State." Ironically,
according to Dutch DCM Bekkers, OIC contacts told the Dutch
the OIC was indifferent to the TCs' designation.

Each Blames the Other for Delay, Refusing Compromise
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The Turkish MFA and the Dutch Embassy both claim they
raised the issue with the other side during September,
including at the two FonMins' meeting on the margins of UNGA.
According to UK Political Chief Sharma, the UK also warned
the Turks early on that the designation was going to be a
problem. The Dutch and the Turks both claim they clearly

indicated they would not back off, but that the other side
said there would be no problem. Both sides accused the other
of refusing to deal with the issue until it was too late.


5. (C) The EU Presidency refused Turkey's offer that the TCs
would use their OIC designation and that EU members or FM Gul
would open the Forum with a statement that this did not imply
recognition. EU diplomats here tell us that other EU
members, including the French, backed that approach, but the
GCs shot it down. The Turks refused several EU Presidency
proposals for alternate designations of the TCs, or to
postpone the Forum until the sides could find a solution.


6. (C) The Turkish MFA blames the Greek Cypriots and the
Dutch Presidency for the incident. MFA Cyprus Department
Head Bilman called us in October 4 to express Turkish
displeasure and give us the MFA's version of events. On the
other side, Dutch DCM Bekkers attributed the incident to
Turkish misperception that the EU would back down. Bekkers
told us a majority of EU members objected to the "Turkish
Cypriot State" designation, not just the Greek Cypriots and
the Greeks. According to Bekkers, the Dutch told the Turks
this, but the Turks remain unconvinced. The truth may be
closer to the middle: according to UK Political Chief
Sharma, some countries went along with the Greek Cypriots not
on principle, but to preserve EU solidarity.

Strained Dutch/Turkish Relations in Ankara
--------------


7. (C) All EU diplomats we have talked to here doubt this
incident will directly affect Turkey's EU bid. However,
Dutch DCM Bekkers thinks that, like the controversy
surrounding PM Erdogan's gambit to criminalize adultery, this
gives ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics. "Things like this
cost Turkey one extra year in the accession process per
incident," he added. Bekkers and other EU diplomats we have
talked to here worry that the Turks still do not understand
the EU.


8. (C) Publicly, the MFA and the Dutch are trying to play
down the incident. The MFA has not expressed the bitterness
toward the Dutch in public that Cyprus Department Head Bilman
expressed to us privately. Bekkers says the Dutch want to
put the incident behind them and claims it has had no effect
on his Embassy's relations with the Turks. Sharma and Bilman
disagree, both saying the affair has strained the
Dutch/Turkish relationship in Ankara. Communication between
the two sides broke down; neither Bekkers nor Bilman
understands why the other side acted as it did. Bilman
worries about what the incident augurs for EU-related
matters. He asked rhetorically what is in store for the near
future if the Greek Cypriots managed to derail the Forum over
what he called a "non-issue."

Frustration Trumps Ankara's Better Judgment
--------------


9. (C) Comment: In this case, Ankara's frustration with the
EU, including EU failure to deliver on steps to end the TCs'
isolation, trumped what should have been its better judgment.
Bilman tried to justify Turkey's stance by saying that
Turkey could not give any more "concessions" in light of GC
intransigence on trade and aid for the TCs. In this regard,
PM Erdogan and FM Gul are under increasing fire from domestic
critics for allegedly selling out core Turkish interests.
Some EU embassies are concerned at what they see as too
hard-line a Dutch approach in this context.


10. (C) Comment (cont'd): However, the name plate was (as
Bilman himself noted) a "non-issue" that would have given the
TCs nothing. Moreover, the GOT's stance cuts against its
assertion that it is not seeking recognition for the "TRNC."
The echo of this incident will fade. However, the poor
communication between the GOT and Dutch Presidency (which
continues in Ankara through June 2005 due to lack of a
Luxembourg representation here) does not bode well for
avoidance of miscommunication or missteps in the months to
come. End Comment.
EDELMAN