DASD BRZEZINSKI DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005721

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2029
TAGS: MARR OVIP PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: DASD BRZEZINSKI DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY WITH
TURKISH DEPUTY U/S SENSOY

REF: ANKARA 5266

Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD)
Ian Brzezinski requested MFA Deputy Under-Secretary Sensoy's
assistance to elevate the level of U.S.-Turkey strategic
dialogue. He praised Turkey's agreement to command ISAF VII.
On Missile Defense, he emphasized the importance of our
bilateral cooperation, urged faster progress in working group
efforts and noted USG interest in conducting a site survey as
part of a sensor placement study in Turkey. D U/S Sensoy
emphasized that MD efforts should address all ranges of
missiles and focus on population center defense, and saw gaps
in MD coverage as its primary concern. Sensoy said the
Turkish Air Force (TUAF) was finalizing changes to the draft
space agreement. He noted Government of Turkey (GoT)
disappointment at not gaining Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) Core Group membership, highlighted penal
code changes to criminalize the import/export of restricted
dual-use items and expressed concern about Iran's nuclear
program. On ISAF VII, Sensoy said the GoT would like to see
an American in the Deputy Commander slot. End Summary.


2. (U) In the September 22 meeting at the MFA, DASD
Brzezinski and D U/S Sensoy were joined by Ambassador Eric
Edelman, OSD Director for European Affairs South Tony
Aldwell, OSD Turkey Desk Officer Lisa Heald, JCS J-5 LTC Eric
von Tersch, EUR/SE Deputy Director Doug Silliman and Embassy
Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Maggie Nardi, Turkish MFA Director
General for International Security Affairs Haluk Ilicak and
MFA NATO Department Chiefs Alper Coskun and Atilla Gunay.

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TURKISH STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
--------------


3. (S) DASD Brzezinski noted USG interest in raising the
Political-Military Working Group (PMWG) discussion to a more
strategic level, building on the strengths of our bilateral
relationship and shared goals in the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) and intensifying our Defense Industrial Cooperation
(DIC). This would mean deepening our dialogue on missile
defense (MD),space cooperation and regional security issues.
Sensoy welcomed this approach.

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MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


4. (S) D U/S Sensoy said that bilateral MD cooperation was
good. The July 8 Technical Experts Group meeting had been
fruitful. In his view, two issues should guide our
discussions - whether bilaterally or within NATO: 1)
Consideration of the full range of missiles; 2) Protection of
population centers. Sensoy stated his belief that Turkey
had succeeded in convincing Allies that there should be "no
gap in NATO's geography" when it came to missile defense.
All ranges of missiles were being discussed in NATO fora and
the coverage/defense issue had come up in NATO prior to the
U.S. intervention in Iraq. At that time, according to
Sensoy, the GoT questioned whether Turkish population centers
were adequately protected, and felt very vulnerable to what
it perceived as a real threat but was later proved untrue.


5. (S) DASD Brzezinski urged faster progress in the
U.S.-Turkey MD Technical Experts Group efforts. He noted USG
interest in doing a sensor placement study that included a
site survey in addition to modeling and simulation.
Brzezinski recognized the GoT threat concerns, which he had
heard first hand two years earlier when he led a USG
delegation to Turkey to discuss U.S. missile defense policy
and planning. Given the bilateral MD work Turkey and the
U.S. had done, Brzezinski looked forward to Turkey's
participation in the Missile Defense seminar the U.S. and
Romania were sponsoring at the 13-14 October NATO informal
ministerial in Bucharest. The seminar would examine two
scenarios involving long and short range threats against
Alliance forces as well as population centers. In response
to DASD's question on whether the GoT preferred the bilateral
or NATO MD approach, Sensoy said that the choice of forum was
unimportant; the GoT was open to any method of dealing with
Turkey's security concerns. DASD noted the USG preference
for a bilateral track, which was more efficient than the
slower Allied approach. He noted progress the U.S. had made
working bilaterally with Denmark and the UK.


6. (S) Deflecting discussion on sensor placement, Sensoy said
that talk about placing sensors was technical, and he
couldn't go into detail. He did say that, if this request
was made, the GoT would want to see how the sensor placement
would contribute to Turkey and to the alliance. This would
have to be explained to the public. In Sensoy's view,
sensors would be a possible target for Turkey's enemies and,
therefore, a danger. DASD pointed out that, while a sensor
could be a target, it also enhanced a country's ability to
see more. He questioned whether being less of a target but
being blind was really a better option.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


7. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's question about the
GoT's perception of the Iranian nuclear threat, Sensoy
acknowledged that Turkey is one of the most concerned about
Iran's nuclear progress and what it means for regional
stability. Sensoy said he thought the U.S. and Turkey saw
eye-to-eye on this threat and were cooperating effectively in
pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

--------------
CAUCASUS
--------------


8. (S) Sensoy noted GoT support for extending NATO's
Partnership for Peace (PfP) to the Caucasus, which he
considered a region of strategic importance for the USG and
NATO. He pledged Turkey's cooperation, suggesting the PfP
Training Center in Ankara as a forum to send this message to
Caucasus countries. According to Sensoy, Turkey was meeting
resistance in its efforts to help them to strengthen their
democracies and join the international community. In his
view, PfP policies and programs had to be tailored to each
country's individual situation, with the understanding that
it could take a generation to see democratic institutions and
protection of human rights take hold. A rushed approach
imposed from the outside could leave Russia to gain the upper
hand in "giving them what they need." DASD expressed USG
disappointment at the recent decision to cancel the
Azerbaijan-hosted PfP exercise, Cooperative Best Effort 2004,
and suggested that the presence of a NATO liaison officer
there might have changed the situation.


9. (S) Sensoy called the Caucasus the "soft belly" of Russia.
Putin had ended the disintegration of Russian territorial
integrity but the Chechen issue was emotional for Turks given
the large number of Chechens in Turkey. However, he
emphasized that the GoT still supported the preservation of
Russia's territorial integrity. DASD noted the potential for
problems to spread to other areas. Sensoy said that,
although Putin's iron-handed manner and centralized handling
of the Chechen issue was not good, sympathy for the Chechens
was waning after their recent actions (Note: Reference to the
August Beslan hostage crisis. End Note.). He added that
Putin was a strong leader, with 70 pct. popular support. His
heavy-handed actions were getting tougher and the
international community needed to send a unified message to
Putin that there were limits to what it would tolerate. In
the past, when Russia's help was needed elsewhere, such as
Kosovo, there was a reluctance to press this issue. Sensoy
said that Russia has been successful in making Chechnya a
terrorist issue and the international community had helped
create that image by being inconsistent in its message to
Moscow.
--------------
AFGHANISTAN
--------------


10. (S) DASD welcomed Turkey's willingness to take command of
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII
(February-August 2005). He noted the debate among Allies
over the pros and cons of unifying ISAF with Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). DASD Brzezinski emphasized the
importance of bringing the strengths of each mission to any
future merger of ISAF and OEF. For instance ISAF had allowed
Allies to manage domestic political constraints by defining
their contribution as participation in stability operations,
while OEF's strength was its operational flexibility to
conduct kinetic operations against al Qaida remnants and
their supporters. Sensoy opined that the two should
eventually overlap geographically. DASD pointed out that the
two did overlap, but Sensoy said further Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) expansion was needed. He added
that Turkey had offered to establish a PRT in the north where
the GoT thought it could be useful, but the offer was not
well-received. Sensoy said he couldn't envision a time frame
for unification of OEF and ISAF but did not see a rush to do
so, adding that a success story in Afghanistan would have
positive repercussions elsewhere. Sensoy said that Turkey
was now focused on ISAF VII but needed USG and Allied
assistance to enable use of NATO Common Funds. Sensoy also
mentioned that the GoT would like to see an American Major
General deploy with ISAF VII as its Deputy Commander.

--------------
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
--------------


11. (C) Sensoy underscored the GoT's disappointment in the
USG reaction to Turkey's request for PSI Core Group
membership. In his view, Turkey had tried its best to bring
a contribution to PSI and failed to understand why Singapore
and Norway, for example, had been invited into the Core Group
when Turkey was not. The government felt it never got a
straight answer on the rationale. That said, Turkey would
cooperate in PSI efforts. DASD explained that there were no
current plans to reconvene the Core Group, and underscored
that the action was with the Operational Experts Group. He
expressed his disappointment that Turkey had not been as
aggressive or eager as others and that its delegations to
operational experts meetings (with the exception of the
August meetings in Oslo and Copenhagen) had been less than
robust. The USG had expected more from Turkey, given its
abilities and experience.


12. (C) In response, Sensoy wondered why Turkey had not been
invited as one of the original eleven PSI members if its
contribution was valued. He said the GoT had had to overcome
legal restraints on its naval forces activities and to
determine the best way to contribute following its late
invitation. Having done that, Sensoy said Turkey
demonstrated significant interest only to receive a negative
response on the Core Group. Ambassador emphasized that the
Core Group was never intended to be an Executive Committee,
but rather a small steering group to articulate core
principles. Having done that it may cease to function. Some
Allies wanted to dissolve the group. The Ambassador
expressed his hope that Turkey could overcome its concern.
Given its extensive knowledge about illicit networks like AQ
Khan, Turkey had a valuable role to play.

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OTHER REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
--------------


13. (S) Sensoy ticked off the status of other security
issues. He said TUAF was making the final touches to its
revision of the revised Space MoU submitted by the USG this
summer. The MFA would need to review the document but Sensoy
didn't foresee any problems there. Referring to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting on Iran,
Sensoy said the GoT was very concerned about Iran's nuclear
program. Turkey wanted Iran to stop the program and
dismantle its weapons supply. Touching on Turkey's sale of
dual-use items to Libya, Sensoy said the GoT had been very
cooperative and forthcoming and noted the MFA had been
instructed to be as transparent as possible. He highlighted
the last minute addition to the penal code of language to
criminalize the import/export of restricted items.


14. (U) This cable was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Ian Brzezinski.


15. (U) Baghdad and Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN