MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: TURKS STRESS THE CAMP MUST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005720

SIPDIS

GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO PRM A/S DEWEY
DEPARTMENT FOR PRM, IO, EUR/SE, AND NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: TURKS STRESS THE CAMP MUST
CLOSE

REF: A. STATE 201785


B. ANKARA 509

C. BURGER-WYLLIE EMAILS 10/04/04 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Turkey remains ready to discuss a solution to
the Makhmour refugee camp issue, but any solution must
include the closure of the camp, MFA Deputy Under Secretary
for Multilateral Affairs Nabi Sensoy told the Ambassador Oct.

5. Sensoy was not explicit on whether Turkey will still
insist on an official U.S. guarantee to provide security
around the camp, but if that guarantee were to come instead
from the IIG we believe the Turks would demand robust
coalition liaison/support for the Iraqis. End summary.


2. (C) In the course of an Oct. 5 discussion on our approach
to the IIG and the GOT regarding next steps against the PKK
(reported septel),Ambassador raised the issue of the
Makhmour refugee camp with MFA Deputy Under Secretary for
Multilateral Affairs Nabi Sensoy. Ambassador reported that
PRM A/S Dewey was to meet with GOT, IIG, and UNHCR
representatives in Geneva on Oct. 7 with an eye to
re-energizing efforts to begin an orderly repatriation
process for the nearly 10,000 refugees there (per ref c).
Sensoy responded that the GOT would be represented at this
meeting by the Turkish Ambassador to their mission in Geneva.


3. (C) Sensoy recalled that he had participated along with
A/S Dewey in the negotiations last January to reach an
agreement on Makhmour, and expressed regret that the USG had
not met Turkey's request to provide a side letter from
Secretary Powell pledging our support for the implementation

SIPDIS
of the deal, especially in terms of the security required to
prevent PKK infiltration into the camp and intimidation of
the residents there (see ref b for text of the agreement).
Sensoy said he did not press for this letter over the course
of the spring as he believed we were waiting for the June
handover of sovereignty to the IIG to obviate the need for
the side letter. What, Sensoy asked, will be the position of
the U.S. in the Makhmour discussions now? What is the status
of the side letter? Sensoy confirmed that, with one or two
points of refinement, Turkey was ready to come to agreement
on the draft text of January.


4. (C) Sensoy emphasized that the GOT has one main goal in
this process: the camp must close. Should Turkey participate
in an agreement with the IIG and UNHCR, it would not want to
see a scenario at the end of the day where the camp would
still be open and subject to PKK infiltration. He said that
those people in the camp who wish to return to Turkey can
already do so at any time, but he allowed that the process
outlined in the draft agreement would assist in ascertaining
the free will of the residents. He added that it would be
the responsibility of the IIG to care for the people who
choose to remain in Iraq, but added again that this could not
be in the context of the camp remaining in place. Finally,
Sensoy wondered if time was now working against this effort,
as winter was approaching.


5. (S) Ambassador responded that the USG had not been sitting
on the side letter issue in order to wait for the handover,
but that regrettably the coalition had been compelled to deal
with the insurgency in other parts of the country and did not
have the resources to devote to providing security for
Makhmour. He emphasized our appreciation that the GOT would
work from January's draft agreement. On Turkey's desire that
the camp should close, Ambassador replied that refugee
camps--Makhmour included--should not be permanent, and that
all sides must work together to ensure an orderly
repatriation process. However, the camp's ultimate fate
rests in the hands of UNHCR. In this issue, the key is to
eliminate the fear factor. As part of our demarche to the
IIG on dealing with the PKK, we have requested that the
Iraqis patrol around Makhmour camp to deter the PKK from
intimidating the residents (ref a). Ambassador added that
perhaps the winter might actually help us; the harsh weather,
in combination with proposed IIG patrols, might serve to
deter the PKK. The recent strong performance of the Iraqi
security forces in Samarrah gives us some reason to be more
optimistic about the capability of the Iraqi security forces.


6. (S) Comment: Sensoy was not explicit on whether Turkey
will still insist on a U.S. guarantee, such as a side letter
from the Secretary, to seal the deal on Makhmour. We believe
the only way Turkey would agree to back down from its demand
for a U.S. guarantee is if the IIG not only agrees to monitor
Makhmour but the monitoring takes place with robust coalition
liaison/support. Absent these conditions, we will likely not
gain Turkish cooperation. End comment.


7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN