DASD BRZEZINSKI'S MEETING WITH TURKISH DEPUTY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005672

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/SE.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2029
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR OVIP PTER MOPS PARM TU
SUBJECT: DASD BRZEZINSKI'S MEETING WITH TURKISH DEPUTY
UNDER-SECRETARY ILKIN

REF: ANKARA 5266

Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: DASD Ian Brzezinski held a candid exchange
with Turkish MFA Deputy Under-Secretary Baki Ilkin during a
September 22 meeting to discuss ways to elevate the level of
our bilateral dialogue. Ilkin confirmed Turkey's interest in
developing the relationship and understood recent U.S.
requests for an expanded presence at Incirlik and weapons
deployment training were examples of the U.S. effort to
deepen bilateral ties. Ilkin underscored the MFA's intent to
respond to all requests and emphasized its role as a
facilitator. However, he warned that in the current
political climate anything requiring parliamentary blessing,
such as the permanent stationing and unrestricted use of
F-16s at Incirlik Air Base, was unlikely to receive
Government of Turkey (GoT) support. Ilkin thought the
proposed Cargo Hub at Incirlik could be considered within the
parameters of a Ministerial Decree, but would require an
annual renewal, which could prove difficult. Weapons
deployment training would not require parliamentary approval
but some elements of the proposed program were prohibited
under the Turkish constitution. Ilkin noted GoT approval of
the U.S. request to station F-16s at Incirlik between the
NATO AirMeet and Anatolian Eagle exercise and explained that
regional sensitivities drove the GoT disapproval of U-2
flight missions. On Iraq, Ilkin emphasized Turkish support
for the U.S. effort there but expressed dismay at the lack of
early U.S. dialogue with Turkey and urged greater
communication in advance of the planned January elections.
End Summary.


2. (U) Additional participants in the meeting included
Ambassador Eric Edelman, OSD Director for European Affairs
South Tony Aldwell, OSD Turkey Desk Officer Lisa Heald,
Embassy Ankara Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Maggie Nardi, Joint
Staff J-5 Turkey Desk Officer LTC Eric von Tersch, Turkish
Ambassador Ahmet Banguoglu, MFA Deputy Director General for
Middle East Affairs Sefak Gokturk, MFA Deputy Director for
the Americas Desk Meral Barlas and Pol-Mil Officer Lale
Agusman.

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STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
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3. (S) DASD Brzezinksi opened the meeting with a request to
move the bilateral dialogue beyond the daily issues that have
dominated our political-military relations over recent years
and to develop a more mature relationship based on a wider
view of the war on terrorism, defense transformation, broader
cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan and a strengthened
defense procurement strategy. U/S Ilkin stressed the GoT's
complete agreement. In response to Ilkin's request for
specifics on USG ideas to begin that process, DASD urged more
momentum in our space and missile defense (MD) cooperation,
including completion of MD site surveys; a GoT response to
the USG request for a military transport hub at Incirlik Air
Base; U.S. assistance to the Turkish-funded NATO Center of
Excellence for Defense Against Terrorism (CoE-DAT); and
renewed GoT engagement in the Defense Industrial Cooperation
(DIC) process, specifically, agreeing to a meeting in early
2005 to map out a new course of industrial cooperation after
a six year hiatus since the last meeting.

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USG REQUESTS
--------------


4. (S) Ilkin welcomed USG interest in a strategic dialogue
with Turkey, noting that the GoT had received five separate
requests for assistance in three months but that, in several
cases, very little detail had been provided. He specifically
noted the December 2003 visit of Under-Secretary Grossman and
PM Assistant-Secretary Bloomfield's June 2004 visit, during
which the question was raised whether Turkey would consider a
request to permanently station F-16s, if one were made.
Ilkin ticked off the status of recent USG requests as
follows: stationing of F-16s between the NATO AirMeet and
Anatolian Eagle exercise (approved); U-2 flights over Iran,
Iraq and Syria (disapproved); permanent stationing of 48
F-16s at Incirlik Air Base (pending); establishing a military
cargo hub at Incirlik (pending); and weapons deployment
training (pending).
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F-16s
--------------


5. (S) According to Ilkin, the MFA doesn't have the final say
on the F-16s, cargo hub or weapons deployment training but
was pushing for a political decision from the government and
the Prime Minister. In Ilkin's view, anything requiring
parliamentary blessing was a non-starter within the current
political climate, given the difficult situation in Iraq and
the internal political dynamics in Turkey, particularly since
the U.S. was asking for unrestricted flights, similar to
those allowed by Germany. Article 92 of the Turkish
constitution does not permit a foreign military to exercise
greater operational flexibility than that granted to Turkish
forces. He said he saw no way for the government to take the
F-16 basing request to Parliament for decision now. In his
estimation, Parliament's decision would be a repeat of the
March 1, 2003 decision against allowing U.S. troops to use
Turkey to open a northern front in Iraq.


6. (S) When asked by the Ambassador whether such a basing
request could be viewed within the parameters of the
strategic relationship both parties are striving for, Ilkin
responded that in theory it could, but the reality of the
current political situation proscribed action on the request
at this time. He added that Turkey had serious issues with
the current state of events in Iraq and that "nothing much
tangible" had been done to resolve them. Ilkin said he
wanted to get an answer for the U.S., adding that not
responding was the worst thing Turkey could do. He promised
to pursue the issue after the European Commission issued its
Oct. 6 progress report on Turkey. He emphasized that there
was a great deal to discuss regarding the overall development
of our relationship and urged discussion on the broader
strategic issues and other ways to enhance our position.

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CARGO HUB
--------------


7. (S) Ilkin confirmed that the government has not made a
final decision on the U.S. request for a military cargo hub
but indicated that such an arrangement may be workable
without parliamentary approval, depending on the USG
responses to three questions: 1) Duration of activities; 2)
Area of Operation (i.e. flight destinations); 3) Flight
permissions (i.e. blanket clearances). If the GoT approved
the request, the agreement would need to be written into the
Ministerial Decree governing the USG tanker re-fueling
operation at Incirlik. However, Ilkin continued that the
current Ministerial Decree clearly states that the USG can
only support efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem
lay with the USG request to supply the entire CENTCOM AoR.
Any destination other than Afghanistan or Iraq would likely
require parliamentary approval. While there was some
flexibility in the decree, according to Ilkin, it was not
endless. In addition, the GoT was not inclined to grant
blanket clearances for all U.S. flights. If it approved the
request, we would need to work through issues of the duration
of the request and the destination of the supply flights.
Again, he promised to pursue the issue after the European
Commission's Oct. 6 report.


8. (S) Ambassador noted that the current Ministerial Decree
operates on the basis of the UN resolution in Afghanistan and
the NATO resolution on Iraq. He asked if the absence of UN
resolutions on other countries was the basis for GoT
disapproval to fly elsewhere, and whether UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 might provide a possible rubric.
Ilkin simply reiterated that the limit would be Iraq and
Afghanistan. He noted the potential pitfalls of adding the
cargo hub into the Ministerial Decree, including the need to
wait until the current decree expires in June 2005 and the
need for annual renewal, which could be difficult.


9. (S) Ilkin underscored that taking the request to the
Turkish Parliament in order to expand the parameters of the
Ministerial Decree would "open Pandora's box." The situation
would become politicized and everything already agreed to
would be put back on the table. Ilkin expressed his
frustration at having heard twice that the Turkish General
Staff (TGS) had approved the cargo hub and the MFA was the
stumbling block. In his view the problem was that the
parameters of the request hadn't been finalized up front,
before the request was taken to the GoT, slowing the process.
Ilkin stated that he had wanted to give the U.S. a response
two months ago and was doing his best to get an answer from
the government.

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WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
--------------


10. (S) In Ilkin's perspective the weapons deployment
training request could be worked out. The MFA did not see a
requirement for parliamentary approval. However, some of the
dimensions of the request, such as night flying, didn't fit
within GoT parameters. The Turkish Air Force (TUAF) does not
undertake the type of night flying requested by the USAF
fighter aircraft. Since the constitution does not permit
foreign militaries to exercise greater freedom of operation
than that granted to Turkish forces, U.S. forces would need
to observe the rules followed by the TUAF.

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U-2 FLIGHTS
--------------


11. (S) In response to Ilkin's raising GoT disapproval of the
U.S. request for U-2 flights along Turkey's borders with
Syria and Iran, the Ambassador pointed out that this request
was a USG response to assist the GoT to fill a gap TGS had
identified in Turkey's surveillance coverage. Ilkin said
that GoT sensitivities about Turkey's need to maintain good
relations with its neighbors prohibited approval of this
request.

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IRAQ
--------------


12. (C) Turning to Iraq, MFA Deputy Director General for
Middle East Affairs Gokturk said Turkey's concerns with and
vision for Iraq mirrored that of the U.S. but developments on
the ground, particularly after the end of hostilities, were a
concern. In his view, the U.S. misconstrued Turkey as being
preoccupied with the Kurds in the north, but that was only
part of the picture. According to Gokturk, the GoT believed
the initial blueprint for Iraq was incorrect and that
realities on the ground were not adequately considered;
ethnic and religious lines were overemphasized. Now there
was a huge task to reconcile all ethnic and religious groups
toward a common agenda. Turkey saw Iraq as regionalizing
itself, and neighborhood involvement increasing. In
Gokturk's opinion, each successful insurgency action against
the U.S. military emboldened other groups. Gokturk stated
his belief that, working from a common understanding, we
could fix the problems in Iraq. The GoT wanted the elections
process to proceed as scheduled. Turkey had good relations
with almost every segment of Iraqi society. Working in
concert, drawing the Sunni Arabs into the process, the
international community could put things back on track.
Gokturk registered the GoT's concerns with the Iraqi
Governing Council, which Turkey had not viewed as a
decision-making body. These concerns had been partially
alleviated with the establishment of the Iraqi Interim
Government, which, he noted, had only eight members of
Turkmen origin. According to Gokturk, Turkey had pressed the
Turkmen and Arabs to integrate into the new structure in the
way they best saw fit. If all groups receive a sufficient
outlet to achieve their goals, he thought there would be
sufficient ethnic balance.


13. (C) Gokturk continued that, despite being the only U.S.
ally bordering Iraq, the GoT had felt in the past year as if
it was being treated like Syria or Iran. As an example,
Gokturk noted that during the development of UNSCR 1546, the
USG had approached, Syria, Egypt, and others, but not Turkey.
This isolation was magnified on the ground. While
expressing concern that Turkey had felt isolated, and
agreeing that we should have spent more time talking with
Turkey about Iraq early on, DASD emphasized that the U.S.
held Turkey in a very different category than Iran. He
agreed that the U.S. and Turkey shared the same vision for
Iraq but emphatically disagreed that the initial plan had
been wrong, saying such a view underestimates the progress
made, including the high level of interest among Iraqis in
creating a new Iraq and the large numbers of Iraqis risking
their lives to sign up for the Iraqi Security Service. This
incredible turnout had the terrorists worried.


14. (C) Ambassador Edelman noted U.S.-Turkish agreement on
the need for a politically unified Iraq, with territorial
integrity, whose citizens think of themselves first as
Iraqis. He reminded Gokturk of the USG effort to organize a
meeting in New York on the margins of UNGA between Deputy NSC
Advisor Blackwill, Turkish Senior Advisor on Iraq Koraturk,
and Turkish Director General for Middle East Affairs
Burcuoglu to discuss the way ahead.

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COMMENT
--------------

15. (S) Given Ilkin's emphasis on the difficulty of getting
GoT/parliamentary approval of the U.S. requests for F-16
basing in the current political climate, the Ambassador asked
whether removing the F-16 request from the table might
facilitate a positive GoT decision on the cargo hub and
weapons training. While Ilkin did not directly acknowledge
that the F-16 request was the crux of the problem, he gave
the impression that this might be the case. End Comment.


16. (U) This cable was approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Ian Brzezinski.

EDELMAN