Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA5550
2004-09-28 10:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NEW TLFC COMMANDER

Tags:  PREL MASS MARR MOPS PINR IZ CY AF TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005550 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2029
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR MOPS PINR IZ CY AF TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NEW TLFC COMMANDER

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005550

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2029
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR MOPS PINR IZ CY AF TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NEW TLFC COMMANDER

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador encouraged General Buyukanit
to discuss ways to improve our Army-to-Army relationship when
the latter sees USAREUR CG General Bell in October.
Buyukanit suggested that both sides made mistakes in the
attack helicopter tender and expected the next time the GOT
would utilize a "simpler model." For Turkey's assumption of
command of ISAF next year, TLFC is planning to send a large
corps headquarters and up to two reinforced battalions plus
perhaps a brigade headquarters. Buyukanit hinted that
canceling future years' Toros exercise on Cyprus might be
difficult, and suggested that support for a settlement may be
waning in northern Cyprus due to the international
community's disappointing response to the Turkish Cypriots
positive vote on the Annan Plan. The general thought Iran
was a "crazy country," and expressed concern over
developments in Kirkuk. Buyukanit appeared to be already
thinking about issues he will face if he assumes command of
TGS in 2006 as most observers expect. Engagement with him
will be important for the future of our security
relationship. End summary.

--------------
Improving Relations
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador congratulated General Mehmet Yasar
Buyukanit on assuming command of the Turkish Land Forces
Command (TLFC) when he called on the general September 24.
Army CSA GEN Schoomaker was looking to identify a time when
he might invite Buyukanit to visit the US, he added. The
Ambassador said he understood Buyukanit would be attending
the October 5-7 Conference of European Armies where he would
see USAREUR CG GEN Bell who would welcome thoughts on how to
improve our bilateral Army-to-Army relationship.

--------------
Transformation and Modernization
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador raised military transformation and
asked Buyukanit for his thoughts, particularly in light of

the cancellation of the tenders for attack helicopters and
other systems. Regarding the attack helicopter competition,
Buyukanit noted that he had worked on that project for five
of its six years during assignments in Ankara. In July,
2003, as he was leaving the Turkish General Staff (TGS),
there had been an agreement on a new model for the project
and he had hoped that Congressional notification would occur
in September. He suggested both sides had made errors that
derailed the project, although he complained of hearing that
with every proposal from Bell, the price went up. He and the
Ambassador agreed that the failure of that procurement effort
was a pity for both sides. Buyukanit said the new request
for proposals (RFP) would utilize a "simpler model." TLFC
had finished working on the RFP and had sent it to the
Turkish General Staff (TGS) for final review. In response to
a question, the Ambassador confirmed that the USMC's AH-1Z
program was still on track, despite rumors to the contrary.
ODC Chief Maj.Gen. Sutton urged that Turkey consider the pros
and cons of the Foreign Military Sale system and direct
commercial sale. In one recent case, a country discovered
FMS to be considerably cheaper than DCS.


4. (C) On TLFC's hope for a new main battle tank, Buyukanit
cited two reasons for this program's initial failure, price
and the co-development requirement which only the Ukraine was
prepared to meet. Now, Turkey plans on applying the
technology and know-how it is acquiring through its M-60
upgrade program with Israel to the development of a new tank.
A foreign partner would still be needed, he said, to provide
whatever portion of the tank that Turkey still was not able
to do itself.


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that American defense equipment
was the best in the world and his job included encouraging
Turkey to buy American products. Beyond the quality and
commercial considerations, however, was the strategic
interest of both countries in having their militaries
transform in ways that preserve interoperability. In an
earlier meeting with the Undersecretary of Defense
Industries, the Ambassador recalled making the point that
excessive source code demands threatened to exclude American
firms from competing. Buyukanit understood, noting that even
Israel had refused to release the technology for a few key
components of the M-60 fire control system. Buyukanit and
the Ambassador agreed on the need for transparency, goodwill
and open communication to resolve problems related to these
types of programs.

--------------
ISAF Command
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Turkey's
offer to lead ISAF again beginning in February 2005.
Buyukanit said that TLFC was planning on deploying a
reinforced headquarters element that is "much larger" than
the typical corps headquarters. While no decisions had yet
been made on what other forces Turkey would send, TLFC was
planning on either one or two reinforced battalions plus
"maybe" a brigade headquarters that could command the Turkish
battalion(s) plus other countries' forces. He worried that
NATO was not planning to hold a force generation conference
until November, which he thought would be late for forces to
arrive by February. On funding, Buyukanit said that the GOT
was working on what support might be received from NATO and
what would be covered by national contributions. Regardless,
"there will be no problem," he said.

--------------
Cyprus
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador said the USG was grateful that Turkey
and Greece had agreed to cancel their fall exercises on
Cyprus this year. Buyukanit responded that, "as a soldier,
exercises are necessary." Ankara recognized that now was a
sensitive time, but soldiers must exercise. Regarding
measures to reduce northern Cypriots' isolation, Buyukanit
thought the measures to date were disappointing and impacting
on Turkish Cypriot public opinion. The pro-solution camp was
losing support, he said, because they have received nothing
for the positive vote on the Annan Plan. The Ambassador
noted that the US was providing $30 million in aid directly
to northern Cyprus and taking other measures to ease the
north's isolation. He offered to provide a list of these
measures. Buyukanit lamented the continued lack of direct
flights. The Ambassador explained that there were many legal
issues involved in direct flights, including some with ICAO.
While direct flights to/from the United States would not be
commercially viable, some code sharing arrangements might be
possible.


8. (C) Buyukanit thought the UNSYG report on Cyprus was "not
perfect, but not too bad." The Ambassador noted that the
lack of Security Council action on the report would likely be
discussed by the Secretary and FonMin Gul in New York. On
that and the UNFICYP renewal, the Embassy would remain in
close contact with MFA, he told the general.

--------------
Iranian Nuclear Ambitions
--------------


9. (C) Turning to Iran, the Ambassador asked Buyukanit why a
country rich in oil and gas needed to develop nuclear power,
let alone the entire fuel cycle, and whether a nuclear-armed
Iran was a concern for Turkey. Buyukanit responded that
Iran's nuclear program was a concern for the entire region.
The Ambassador asked whether Iran was continuing to take
action against the PKK/Kongra Gel as it had on the eve of PM
Erdogan's recent visit to Tehran. Buyukanit said that when
it came to fighting the PKK/Kongra Gel, one must talk not
only of Iran but also Syria and Iraq. "Iran is a crazy
country. It poses a big threat for the region." Tehran has
supported the PKK/Kongra Gel for many years, he continued,
with terrorists staying in Iranian barracks near the Turkish
border. Many people say Turkey has an important geostrategic
position, he observed; "I hate it." It would be better if
Turkey were farther north, he mused, rather than surrounded
by the Caucasus, Iran, Syria and Iraq. The Ambassador noted
that the Iranian threat was not only from potential nuclear
weapons, but also from increasingly longer ranged missiles.
Buyukanit responded that the "ideological threat" was greater
than the proliferation threat. Al Qaida and others "are
mad," he said. "If they had WMD, they would use it." He
thought Iran would be a good place to "impose moderate Islam."

--------------
Iraq: PKK, LNOs and Kirkuk
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador informed Buyukanit of the recent
demarche by Embassy Baghdad to the IIG on taking action
against the PKK/Kongra Gel. In addition, the Embassy was
encouraging MFA to be more active in engaging the IIG. Our
Embassy in Baghdad was prepared to help. But getting
accurate information on developments in Iraq can be a
struggle. The recent operation in Talafar demonstrated the
value of getting real-time information to prevent problems.
In that case, reports from the TFO's liaison officer (LNO) to
the Turkish Special Forces, COL Rollinson, were invaluable.
He understood that the Turkish LNOs on the ground were a bit
frustrated at the time it took to get into Talafar to see the
situation for themselves. Having LNOs actively engaged
improves transparency and reduces misunderstandings.
Buyukanit agreed.


11. (C) Buyukanit asked about developments in Kirkuk. The
Ambassador stated that no forceful change in the ethnic
balance in the city should occur. There was a property
restitution process that, although slow in getting
established, should work transparently and on a sound legal
basis. The US understands Turkey's concerns about how
potentially dangerous the situation in Kirkuk could be for
Iraq's future, he added.

--------------
Comment: In Command and Preparing for Command
--------------


12. (C) Comment: Buyukanit was extremely pleasant and
engaging during this one-hour meeting, as he had been during
the Ambassador's call on him last May at First Army
headquarters in Istanbul. He has been commander of TLFC for
only four weeks but already appears in command of not only
the Land Forces but also Turkey's national security issues;
this is not surprising for a former Deputy Chief of TGS and
the heir apparent to succeed GEN Ozkok as TGS Chief in 2006.
His comments indicate he is already thinking ahead on the
issues he will face then:

--On Cyprus, suggesting future difficulty in canceling
exercises on the island as disillusionment with the
international response to the positive referendum vote grows.

--On Iraq, Kirkuk (the only Iraq issue he raised) is clearly
his barometer for Iraq's future.

--On Iran, a realistic view of the regime, its intentions and
the dangers it could pose with nuclear weapons, both
conventionally and unconventionally, unusual in Ankara.

High-level engagement with Buyukanit could permit us to help
him refine his thinking on these issues and others of
importance to us and shape how our relationship develops in
the future. End comment.
EDELMAN