SCENESETTER FOR DASD BRZEZINSKI'S SEPTEMBER 21

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 005266

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2029
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PARM PTER OVIP MOPS MASS CY IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DASD BRZEZINSKI'S SEPTEMBER 21
VISIT TO TURKEY

REF: A. A) ANKARA 5140

B. B) ANKARA 5115

C. C) ANKARA 5100

D. D) ANKARA 5118

E. E) ANKARA 4915

Classified By: Classified by: Acting DCM Jim Moore. Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).



1. (S) Summary: Your visit comes at a challenging time in our
bilateral relations. Our painstaking efforts to rebuild
relations over the last year, capped by a successful Istanbul
NATO Summit in June, have resulted in the restoration of
productive relations at the top military and civilian levels
and important Turkish contributions to the Global War on
Terrorism. Last year Turkey offered troops for Iraq and is
scheduled to take over ISAF beginning in February 2005. We
cooperated closely on Cyprus, and at Sea Island PM Erdogan
agreed to a role for Turkey in the Broader Middle East
Initiative. Turkey granted the use of Incirlik Air Base to
support refueling missions for OIF and OEF and as an OEF
transit hub. However, perceived lack of U.S. action to
terminate the PKK/Kongra-Gel presence in Iraq -- especially
in light of stepped-up PKK/Kongra-Gel attacks in southeastern
Turkey -- or to address a series of Turkish truck driver
kidnappings in Iraq has convinced many that the U.S. remains
indifferent to the needs of a loyal ally. Turkish public
opinion has soured significantly on the U.S., complicating
our efforts to expand relations with the civilian leadership
and to engage the Government of Turkey (GoT) on Global
Defense Posture planning and other efforts in the region.
Events in Iraq, such as the recent U.S. action against
insurgents in the predominantly Turkmen northern Iraqi city
of Talafar create tensions. U.S. military sales have
suffered with the cancellation of several tenders and
continued demands for terms exceeding the limits of U.S. law,
perhaps in part to send business to the EU in hopes of a
December vote in favor of beginning the EU harmonization
process toward membership. While the Turkish General Staff
(TGS) is interested in broadening the scope of our
political-military discussion, you should expect to be asked
about outstanding DECA issues, Turkey's inclusion in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Core Group and a U.S.
contribution to Turkey's Counter-Terrorism Center of
Excellence. End Summary.

--------------
SETTING
--------------


2. (SBU) Political: With a two-thirds majority in parliament,
control of a majority of municipalities, and no viable
political opposition, PM Erdogan and his AKP government
appear firmly in control. AKP's passage of major legal
reform packages and constitutional amendments appears to have
put Turkey more firmly on track to get an accession process
start date from the EU in December, although chronic problems
with implementation continue to plague the government. In
his meetings with foreign leaders, Erdogan projects
confidence, power, and a pragmatism that has seemed to belie
his Islamist firebrand past.


3. (C) Yet, while seemingly at the peak of their power,
Erdogan, his party, and his government face fundamental
political challenges. AKP has not consolidated itself as a
party and Erdogan increasingly struggles to impose discipline
and direction on the cabinet and parliamentary group.
Erdogan's frequent travel interferes with his control of
party policy-making and the Cabinet, and he stretches himself
thin trying also to oversee Istanbul (he retains an intense
interest in the management of the city he dominated as mayor
from 1994-98). AKP has not come to grips with the deeply
entrenched State bureaucracy or established a solid modus
vivendi with the judiciary, armed forces, and presidency.
Corruption in the cabinet and AKP's provincial organizations
has also become a serious problem. Elements within the
Turkish military and other elements of the "secular"
establishment continue to assert that AKP intends to
undermine Turkey's "secular" structure. These assertions are
harder for AKP to refute when various elements in the party
try to push neuralgic issues -- the latest being an abortive
attempt to re-criminalize adultery and fornication.


4. (U) Economy: The Turkish economy has recovered from the
financial and economic crisis of 2000-2001. However,
Turkey's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it
vulnerable to external shocks and necessitate continuation of
the IMF program and its accompanying fiscal restraint and
structural reform. Large IMF loans -- tied to implementation
of ambitious economic reforms -- have enabled Turkey to
stabilize interest rates and the currency and to meet its
debt obligations. In 2002-2003, the reforms began to show
results. With the exception of a period of market jitters in
the run-up to the Iraq war, inflation and interest rates have
fallen significantly, the currency has stabilized, and
confidence has begun to return. Nonetheless, the economy
still remains fragile, and continued implementation of
reforms is essential to sustain growth and stability.

--
EU
--


5. (S) The drive to get Turkey into the EU has widespread
support that cuts across political and religious lines, and
PM Erdogan remains focused on getting a date at the December
EU Summit to start accession negotiation talks. EU
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen toured the country
September 4-9 in advance of the European Commission's October
progress report and left positive about Turkey's prospects.
AKP's passage of major legal reform packages and
constitutional amendments have been well-received by the EU.
However, implementation is slow and uneven. In addition, the
government regularly gives the EU pause with initiatives such
as the recent attempt to re-criminalize adultery and
fornication and an earlier attempt to permit the wearing of
Islamic headscarves (turban) in public buildings. Whether PM
Erdogan is pandering to his conservative constituency,
competing with Foreign Minister Gul to demonstrate his
Islamist credentials, or showing the strength of his
religious convictions despite his best attempts to present a
democratic facade, is a matter of speculation. Turkey's
continued reluctance to cancel its annual fall military
exercises on northern Cyprus, as it did over the past several
years (and as the Greeks are prepared to do this year),
threatens to negate the goodwill engendered in the EU by
northern Cyprus's positive April vote on UN SYG Annan's plan
to unite the island. Still, most observers expect Turkey to
get a qualified "yes" from the EU in December.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


6. (C) Turkey recognizes that its national interest is best
served by the establishment of security and stability in Iraq
and has actively contributed to the country's reconstruction
efforts. The GoT offered to send troops to Iraq (an offer we
declined) and approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and trained Iraqi diplomats. It
authorized the transit of US troops out of Iraq, and
permitted the transit to Iraq of supplies for U.S. forces and
of humanitarian goods. Turkish companies have been awarded
contracts totaling USD 500 million and Turkish exports to
Iraq have grown to more than USD 1 billion in the first half
of 2004. At any one time 5-6,000 Turks are working in Iraq.


7. (S) Although our macro-interests in Iraq coincide, we
approach some issues and events from different vantages,
creating friction. Those currently impacting our dialogue on
Iraq are:

(C) Trucker Security: The recent spate of Turkish truck
driver abductions, and the subsequent murder of several
drivers, has become a grave concern for the government given
continued overwhelming disapproval by the Turkish population
of the U.S.-led effort in Iraq. The GoT recognizes its own
interest in remaining in Iraq, but faces a public relations
problem over mounting accusations that it is not doing enough
to protect its citizens there. While understanding that the
U.S. cannot escort every Turkish truck into/out of Iraq, per
Ref D, the GoT is asking for our help to establish other
security measures, such as the provision of regular
communication about the security situation, assistance to
establish secure trucker rest stops, and increased escorts
where possible.

(C) Talafar Operation: Recent Multi-National Force Iraq
(MNFI) action against insurgents in the largely Turkmen city
of Talafar in Northern Iraq have strained relations (Reftels
A,C). GoT concern about potential casualties among the large
Turkmen population in that city prompted a request to the
U.S. to use restraint in the operation, and a warning that
fallout from the operation could jeopardize Turkey's overall
cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq. The GoT also warned
against any change in ethnic balance of Talafar leadership
that would result in greater Kurdish authority. Turkish
press reports carrying exaggerated casualty figures and
conspiracy theories about U.S. plans to change the
demographics of the area created a highly charged media
environment. Perhaps suffering from the fatigue of an
extended overseas trip and the resulting information lag
about the actual situation on the ground, FM Gul made an
uncharacteristic breach of the moderate tone set by the GoT
on the issue with a threat to stop cooperation with the U.S.
in Iraq if situation continued. Following the Embassy's
immediate request for clarification, he walked back from this
statement, reiterating Turkey's continued commitment to
assist the people of Iraq. Post and Embassy Baghdad are
working with the GoT to facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian aid to the region.

(S) PKK/Kongra-Gel: The lack of visible U.S. action against
the PKK in northern Iraq remains a source of GoT frustration.
As the number of reported attacks by Iraq-based PKK
terrorists continues to mount, U.S. claims of non-military
action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel ring increasingly hollow.
Recent U.S. action against Iraqi insurgents in Talafar has
only underscored to the GoT and the Turkish man-on-the-street
(who relies on an irresponsible and sensationalist print
media as his primary news source) that the U.S. is willing
and able to use force against terrorists when it is in our
interest. Turkey maintains some 1,500 Special Forces
personnel in northern Iraq aimed at preventing the launching
of terrorist acts by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. In private they
have refrained from threatening specific action against the
PKK, but publicly PM Erdogan and FM Gul have promised that
Turkey will do what it needs to do to take care of its own
people. TGS officials have been unusually silent on the
issue, although TGS/J-3 Chief LTG Yalcin was pointed in his
initial meeting with our new ODC Chief, MG Sutton.

--------------
AFGHANISTAN
--------------


8. (C) Ankara is positively considering NATO's proposal that
the Turkey-led High Readiness Corps (HRC) in Istanbul take
over the command of ISAF for six months beginning in February

2005. Turkey previously led ISAF II from June 2002 to
February 2003. However, Turkey has two conditions to
accepting this mission - a firm commitment by another country
to take over six months later (based on the delay it
experienced in departing from ISAF II when it took several
months to find a successor),and NATO payment of HRC
transport to/from Afghanistan. We understand that the NATO
Budget Committee is positively considering the transport
request. Whether Turkey deploys only a headquarters staff or
a more robust force is still an open question, although
Turkey's (and NATO's) success may revolve around whether
security can be provided for the expected parliamentary
elections. Turkey also dispatched three medium-lift
helicopters to Afghanistan, bringing its total contribution
of personnel there to 220.

--------------
INCIRLIK AIR BASE OPERATIONS
--------------


9. (S/NF) Cargo Hub: Over the past year, the GoT has
permitted increased use of Incirlik Air Base to transit
forces and humanitarian goods and supplies for our forces in
Afghanistan and the operation of tanker aircraft to support
missions to/from both Iraq and Afghanistan and has authorized
the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq and the transit of
detainees to and from Guantanamo. We have also requested the
use of Incirlik as a logistics hub to transship cargo into
and out of Iraq and to temporarily base six C-17 aircraft and
130 support personnel, and asked for increased access to
nearby Konya Range for Fighter aircraft training, many of
which would stage out of Incirlik during their training
rotations. Despite repeated inquiries with the MFA, TGS and
the Prime Ministry, we have been unable to get a categorical
response to these requests. Each ministry has blamed GoT
silence on their counterparts. On September 10, MFA Deputy
Director General Suna Ilicak allowed that the decision was
being made at the interagency ministerial level. She
expressed the hope for a decision in advance of your visit.
There some speculation that the GoT may try to delay a
response until after the U.S. elections in November or the
December EU Summit.

--------------
ISSUES TO DISCUSS
--------------


10. (S/NF) F-16 Basing: Given the difficulty of eliciting a
response on the cargo hub request, we expect to encounter
significant obstacles with a request to permanently base 48
F-16s at Incirlik, an idea that we have floated only
informally in the context of the global defense posture
review. To our knowledge, the U.S. has never based aircraft
in Turkey on a permanent basis. To gain agreement would
likely require modification or renegotiation of the 1980
bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA),
which provides only for the rotational basing of aircraft
under a specific mandate. Renegotiation of the DECA would be
a difficult proposition given chronic Turkish complaints over
declining security assistance levels and differences over
DECA interpretation, particularly related to dependent hires
and off-base law enforcement and force protection activities
by U.S. forces. It would also provide the GoT an opportunity
to renegotiate DECA terms we consider favorable. Turkish
officials view all other Incirlik use requests as related to
the F-16 proposal, which has complicated consideration of
these requests and delayed GoT responses. We are still
awaiting an answer to PM A/S Bloomfield's question: Would
Turkey entertain a formal proposal if one were made? Our
interlocutors have said this is another question for
Ministers to decide, but it would still be useful for you to
remind your interlocutors that Washington is still waiting
for a reply.


11. (C) PSI: Turkey has made an important commitment to
non-proliferation with active participation in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It endorsed the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles, participated in the
Krakow PSI Anniversary Meeting in May as well as in the
August Operational Experts Meetings in Copenhagen and Oslo,
and offered to host the 2006 PSI Operational Experts Group
maritime interdiction exercise. However, continued GoT ire
at Turkey's exclusion from the PSI Core Group after Russia
was admitted last May is taking a toll. While initially
signaling its interest in participating in the October 1
Newport Gaming Exercise, the GoT is re-thinking its
representation and considering downgrading its overall level
of PSI participation. TGS is likely to reiterate its request
for Core Group membership to you. While acknowledging GoT
interest in this forum, you should emphasize the value of the
Experts Group and participation in exercises and offer full
USG support for GoT to host the 2006 maritime exercise.


12. (C) CT CoE: The GoT is prepared to begin classes at the
Center of Excellence for Counter Terrorism as soon as this
December and to begin full operation in June 2005. According
to TGS officials, the CoE is currently about 50 pct staffed.
Informally, TGS understands that the USG will offer one 0-6
Navy officer for the Deputy Commandant slot at the center
beginning FY 06, however officials are eagerly awaiting a
formal USG response to the letter of request for personnel
submitted by GEN Basbug to GEN Pace in August. Given the
late start date of the proposed Navy official, TGS has
inquired whether the USG can also provide an interim official
to begin work this winter. EUCOM and JCS J-5 are working on
an interim fill solution, which may be a recalled 0-6
reservist. Only after receiving the formal U.S. response
will TGS approach other countries for contributions. You
should welcome the establishment of this center, confirm the
proposed U.S. contribution. JCS J-5's RADM Loren was to give
the definitive answer on CoE staffing during an October
visit, but his trip has been postponed.

13. (C) Military Procurement: The May cancellation of three
major tenders for attack helicopters, unmanned aerial
vehicles and main battle tanks has capped a down year for
U.S. defense contractors. While IMF-mandated fiscal
restraint may be a factor, Turkey's drive to strengthen its
own defense industries and to increase business with
EU-origin companies are realities. A tender for the purchase
of up to 17 Seahawk Helicopters is pending. Boeing just
completed difficult negotiations over the design of its AEW&C
aircraft for Turkey. Some good news on the Foreign Military
Sales front is the Peace Onyx III F-16 CCIP Upgrade for the
Block 40s and 50s. The Letter of Request was submitted to
DSCA in June and our Letter of Response is expected by the
end of the calendar year. The Undersecretariat for Defense
Industry is in the process of trying to buy out Lockheed
Martin's shares in the aircraft assembly company, TAI. Post
understands that Turkey may issue a new tender for attack
helicopters as soon as this fall. However, if the tender
contains open source code requirements, U.S. firms will be
shut out of the competition. Your visit, as well as the
simultaneous DSCA-led Security Cooperation Working Group
meeting, will provide an opportunity to gauge the Turkish
military's long-range procurement plans.


14. (C) Iraq: We need to encourage the Turks to deal more
with the IIG and not to turn to us every time they have an
issue in Iraq. You should remind your interlocutors that the
IIG is sovereign. We can be helpful in persuading the IIG to
take constructive positions, but we can best do so only after
Ankara has raised an issue with Baghdad. By increasing its
bilateral dialogue with the IIG, Turkey would be helping the
new government get used to governing and strengthen the
foundation for future, positive Turkey-Iraq relations.


15. (C) Cyprus: Turkey currently has the moral high ground on
the Cyprus issue, but growing frustration at the continued
isolation of Turkish Cypriots, despite their positive vote
for a settlement, could lead the Turks to do something
unhelpful. You should encourage TGS and MFA to cancel this
fall's Toros exercise on the island.
EDELMAN